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Abstract 
I 
Abstract 
The rise of seller’s obligation to tender subject matters conforming to the contract 
indicates a fundamental shift in sales law, away from the classical notions of defects in things 
and warranty liability for defects. “Nonconformity with the contract” is a promising concept as 
it allows a “single-track” remedy system for breach of contract, rather than distinguishing 
special remedies for defects and general remedies for breach of contract. The fact that the 
special remedy regime has had difficulties in meeting the requirements of modern society has 
been a major factor in its decline, besides the confusing legal structure of the expression 
“warranty liability” it relied on.  
In Chinese legislations and judicial practices, the reasonable exercise of the buyer’s 
remedy rights in case of nonconformity and the reasonable time limitation on these buyer’s 
remedies are two problems that need further clarification and examination. These two 
“reasonableness” issues are the focus of this study.  
Regarding the reasonable exercise of remedy rights, I argue that the seller should be 
granted a right to cure the nonconformity in the subject matter he delivered, notably because of 
the need to maintain the inner coherency of the remedy system and to strike a balance of 
interests between the contracting parties. The right to cure should be constructed as a right to 
suspend any inconsistent or abusive remedy claims by the buyer, giving the seller a “last 
chance” to save the contract. Further, I suggest that the buyer’s right to refuse nonconforming 
goods in Chinese law should not be interpreted as a right to reject nonconforming goods as in 
Anglo-American law, because China already has a functional equivalent to this right to reject, 
namely the right to require supplementary performance. Rather, what should be perfected is the 
buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery, and the conditions for exercising this right should be 
basically the same regardless of whether the nonconformity is in quality or quantity. Finally, I 
argue that the buyers’ right to price reduction in case of nonconformity should be interpreted as 
a right to require contract modification and that the buyer should not reduce the price 
unilaterally, because in Chinese positive law the conditions for exercising this right are not as 
strict as the conditions of contract termination. The introduction of a German-style price 
reduction into Chinese law might cause disorder within the remedy system as well as an 
Abstract 
II 
imbalance of the parties’ interests, as it would give excessive protection to the buyer. 
Regarding the determination of a reasonable period for the buyer to give notice of 
nonconformity, I first clarify the relationship among inspection period, notification period, and 
guarantee period for quality. The Chinese Contract Law (CCL) has merged the inspection 
period with the notification one, making the time for the buyer’s notification overly short. I 
therefore recommend differentiating, by teleological reduction, the “inspection period” 
provided in CCL Article 158(1) from the one provided in CCL Article 157. On the other hand, 
as the agreed inspection period has functioned as the longest time limit for notification, it often 
conflicts with the guarantee period for quality, which can also affect the length of the longest 
time limit, causing confusing applications in judicial practice. I then propose various methods 
for interpreting the contract in order to address potential conflicts resulting from the problem of 
“double interference” with the time limit. As to determine a reasonable period for notification 
of nonconformity, I firstly introduce the experiences in German-speaking countries, which 
have been using a so-called “noble month” as a rough average period, and in U.S. law, which 
has been following certain policy rationales in determination. Finally, I propose that the 
policies aiming to protect the seller from being prejudiced by the buyer’s failure to notify the 
nonconformity should be fundamental guidance, whereas a relatively “rigid” starting scope 
could be a secondary reference, taking into account both the predictability and the flexibility in 
the application of law. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Research topic and background 
In Chinese contract law, there are two key questions related to “reasonableness” that need 
further research. One concerns the reasonable exercise of the buyer’s remedy rights in case of 
quality or quantity problems in subject matter for sales; the other concerns the reasonable time 
limitation on these buyer’s remedies. Regarding the first one, there are disagreements on 
whether the seller can basically remove the nonconformity or deliver a fresh conforming tender 
before the buyer terminates the contract, requires price reduction, or claims damages, and on 
how the buyer can exercise the rights of refusing to take delivery and requiring price reduction. 
Regarding the second one, there are disagreements on whether the periods for inspection and 
for notification ought to be distinguished and on how to determine a reasonable length for the 
notification period. These questions ought to be considered from the perspectives of the 
balance of interests between the contracting parties and the inner coherency and consistency of 
the system. 
When we approach this topic, it is crucial to keep in mind that contract law, especially the 
law of sales contracts, has experienced a process of extraordinary globalization in the past few 
decades. One important symbol of this process is the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
①
 in 80 countries and 
counting, including all important economic actors except the U.K..
②
 This convention and a 
few other successful model rules, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles) and the Principles of European Contract Law 
(the PECL), have greatly stimulated the unification of cross-national laws (e.g., Z. Q. Chen, 
2010a; Z. Q. Chen, 2010b; M. E, Xiang, 2010), and the revision and modernization of 
domestic contract laws, including the EU’s Directive of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (hereafter EU Consumer Directive of 1999), 
                                                             
① As to official text, see official website of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf. 
② See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/zh/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. 
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Germany’s modernization of its obligation law (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts) 
in 2002 (Haas et al., 2002, pp. 2-4),
 the United States’ amendment on the Article of Sales in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in 2003, Japan’s Proposal for Principles of Reforming 
Obligation Law (hereafter pPROL) drafted by the Japanese Civil Code (Law of Obligations) 
Reform Commission since 2009
①
 and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law (pCESL) in 2011.
②
 Another 
important legislative development is the unified Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1999 (hereafter CCL). 
It has to be admitted that the rapid development of cross-national transactions has had a 
very internationalizing influence on the law of sales contract. Many national legal systems have 
generally come to share similar fundamental analysis instruments,
③ 
remedy systems
④
 and time 
limitations on the buyer’s remedies.⑤ Accordingly, they have also come to share the same 
problems and uncertainties, notably regarding the reasonableness of the buyer’s exercise of 
remedy rights, and of the time limitations within which the buyer should give notice of 
nonconformity. 
Against this background, this dissertation will, by comparing the above-mentioned 
legislations, proposals and interpretations, try to identify possible solutions for both issues 
above and make some suggestions for the improvement of related Chinese rules. Throughout 
the analysis, this author will emphasize the importance of striking a balance of interests 
between the contract parties and maintaining coherency within the remedy system. Although 
the main purpose of this dissertation is to draw a roadmap to solve these “reasonableness” 
issues within Chinese law, the research may also be helpful for the modernization of Japanese 
obligation law, which is confronted to similar problems internationally.  
I am confronted with a theoretic obstacle in Chinese contract law right from the start of 
                                                             
① The Japan’s Reform Commission emphasizes that these draft proposals are not draft provisions to be promulgated as they 
are. A lot of polishing is expected before the proposals can become legal provisions. What the Reform Commission intended 
was to submit a set of policy proposals for drafting new provisions of the Law of Obligations. However, these proposals were 
drafted by a number of senior scholars specialized in civil law. The proposals can therefore more or less reflect the prevailing 
standpoint of major civil law scholars. See Japanese Civil Code (Law of Obligations) Reform Commission (2009a, p. i). 
② As to full text, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF. This proposal 
indicates that we may be expecting a Uniform European Sales Law, as an optional instrument for the EU’s member states 
(Macqueen et al., 2012, pp. 65-70). 
③ For example, the concept of nonconformity with the contract discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
④ For example, the U.K. has introduced remedies of requiring repair and replacement for consumers, according to Sale and 
Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations in 2002 (Basedow, 2005, p. 487). 
⑤ For example, the notice rule applying on nonconforming goods in U.S. law was inspired from the German Commercial Code 
about a century ago, and has further influenced the drafting of CISG Article 39. See Section 7.3 of this dissertation. 
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the analysis, namely the instability of fundamental analysis instruments. Important divergences 
between “unitary theory” and “relative independence theory” have significantly impacted the 
identity of fundamental legal instruments, such as liability for breach of contract, and the 
properness of certain legal concepts, such as warranty liability and defects. Therefore, the first 
part of this dissertation will review fundamental theories on this topic in China, aiming to 
supplement and perfect the unitary theory, and then clarify fundamental analysis instruments 
for further analysis. 
1.2 Previous research in China 
1.2.1 Previous research on fundamental analysis instruments 
Academic research on “warranty liability for defects” began with the introduction of 
foreign theories (Liang, 1991), and has, for now, concentrated on whether warranty liability for 
defects had been merged into “liability for breach of contract”. It seems that more and more 
researchers have been considering that warranty liability for defects cannot be independent 
from liability for breach (L. M. Wang, 2001; Han, 2007; X. J. Chen, 2003, pp. 276-277; Xie, 
2011). After the enforcement of the CCL, Professor L. M. Wang (2001) argues that “there is no 
such system of warranty liability for defects that can be separated from inappropriate 
performance” (p. 25), Professor S. Y. Han (2007) also concludes that warranty liability for 
defects has been merged into liability for breach of contract, and therefore, the “double-track” 
remedy system has been replaced by a “single-track” remedy system (p. 170). This theory is 
usually been named “unitary theory” (Cui, 2006).  
On the other hand, some other authors advocate the so-called “relative independence 
theory”, according to which the independent warranty liability for defects still exists 
independently, but is merely merged into liability for breach of contract in name (e.g., Cui, 
2006). These scholars argue that there are still substantial differences between warranty 
liability for defects and liability for breach of contract, in respect of both idea and function (e.g., 
Cui, 2006). Sometimes this theory is also called “distinction theory” (Y. J. Li, 2008, p. 333).  
Generally speaking, the enforcement of and the case law related to the unified Chinese 
Contract law has convinced more and more scholars of the unitary theory, making it gradually 
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become the prevailing theory (Xie, 2011, p. 80), while leaving the relative independence theory 
as its major critique. Under these circumstances, this author considers it necessary to work for 
further consensus, in order to promote the identity and stability of fundamental analysis 
instruments. Thus, I will try to perfect the unitary theory by reviewing what the relative 
independence theory could contribute to. 
1.2.2 Previous research on the reasonable exercise of remedies for nonconformity 
First, there are only a few studies on the seller’s right to cure nonconformity, which is an 
important device for striking a balance of interests between the contracting parties and 
promoting the reasonable exercise of remedies. Professor D. M. Shen published a thesis in 
1995 on the right to cure in U.S. law, in which he introduced the content of and official 
comments on UCC §2-508. He pointed out that “there is no definition provided in the code [on 
the right to cure]. According to academic research, the cure refers to repairing, adjusting and 
replacing nonconforming goods, as well (in some cases) as paying a monetary allowance.” 
(Shen, 1995, p. 19-21) He also argues that “strictly speaking, it [i.e., the right to cure] is not a 
right but a power” (Shen, 1995, p.19). This is one of the most insightful researches on the right 
to cure among Chinese scholars. After that, Professor S. Y. Han, who later becomes a famous 
proponent of the unitary theory, has introduced the system of cure into a draft proposal for the 
Chinese Civil Code. Professor Han drafted one provision on “breaching party’s cure”, based on 
the advanced experiences of international model rules (Liang, 2011, p.183). Since that, only a 
few scholars have concentrated on the seller’s right to cure. Among them, the research of F. M. 
Jiao and Y. Lu (2009) deserves mentioning: they examined the right of the obligor to cure in 
the PICC and the PECL, and argue that the common idea behind the right to cure is basically 
coordination. They also raised the issue of the Chinese translation of the concept and argue that 
the term “zhiyu” is preferable to that of “bujiu” (pp. 66-68). To sum up, as to the research on 
the seller’s right to cure, there has been some inspiring work; however, there is still a lack of 
consensus on the expression of this concept, not to mention the essential nature, constituent 
elements and legal effects of it. Moreover, no concern has been given to the inner coherency of 
the remedy system, especially considering that the CCL has introduced a right for the 
aggrieved party to require supplementary performance (a concept inspired by continental legal 
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systems). Proper suggestions cannot be made without considering the coherency between the 
buyer’s right to require supplementary performance and the seller’s right to cure. 
Second, the realization of some of the buyer’s remedy rights needs to be reviewed from 
the perspectives of the balance of the parties’ interests and the inner coherency of the system. 
For example, there has been great dispute on the refusal to take delivery, the refusal to accept, 
and the returning of goods. H. Y. Xia and J. Fu (2008) argue that provisions on advance 
performance (CCL Art. 71), partial performance (CCL Art. 72), performance with exceeding 
quantity (CCL Art. 162) and performance with nonconformity in quality (CCL Art. 148) have 
all confirmed the buyer’s right to refuse to accept nonconforming subject matters, whereas Han 
(2011b) argues that those four articles all relate to the buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery 
(pp. 317-319). H. Wang (2009), however, considers that the rights in Articles 71 and 72 of the 
CCL are rights to suspend, of a different nature than the right that can lead to termination of 
contract in Article 148, and she advocates perfecting the system of the right to refuse goods by 
borrowing the experiences in Anglo-American law. Yet L. H. Chen and C. B. Liu (2004) make 
distinctions among the refusal to take delivery provided in Article 162, the refusal to accept 
provided in Article 148, and the returning of goods provided in Article 111 and, consider the 
refusal to accept as a termination of the contract in its nature. It can be observed that the nature 
of buyer’s rights provided in Articles 71, 72, 148 and 162 and their relationship to each other 
are complicated and draw little consensus among scholars. It is urgent to analyze these 
problems from the perspective of the inner coherency of remedy system. 
The buyer’s right to price reduction is also among the most disputed issues. Regarding the 
structure of price reduction and its perfection, Professors Han (2008) and J. L. Du (2008) have 
separately made relatively thorough analyses, and both advocate the German-style price 
reduction, which basically allow the aggrieved party to unilaterally declare price reduction.
①
 
Professor J. Y. Cui (2012), on the other hand, emphasizes the importance for analysis with 
reference to the coherency of the remedy system, and argues that the status of price reduction 
should be considered regarding “whether or not it is a special way of compensating for losses” 
(p. 98). Actually, there is a need for a greater inner coherency in the system. Although 
                                                             
① For further discussion based on these opinions, see Z. L. Yang (2010). 
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according to the prevailing theory, price reduction can be exercised by unilateral declaration,
①
 
the essential justification of this structure has been largely neglected. The key device of 
German-style price reduction is to base the conditions to exercise the right of price reduction 
on the one to exercise the right of termination (except regarding minor defects). Without this 
key device, the introduction of German-style price reduction into Chinese contract law will 
probably cause disorder within the remedy system as well as an imbalance of the parties’ 
interests, in the sense that it overprotects the aggrieved party. This author will examine 
different ways to realize price reduction and recommend reconsidering the prevailing theory. 
1.2.3 Previous research on the time limitation on remedies for nonconformity 
As to time limitation on the buyer’s remedies, most scholars in China have concentrated 
their research on the legal nature of inspection period or notification period. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, Professor Liang (1991), based on observations of continental law countries’ 
experiences, recommended that the nature of notification period should be considered as an 
extinction period (p. 29). Yet, judges of the Supreme Court have tended to interpret and enforce 
CCL Article 158 as a kind of special rule of prescription. They have stated that, “since special 
rules have priority over general rules, Article 158 of the CCL should have priority over Article 
136 of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL).” (G. G. Li, 1999, p. 734) According to this 
standpoint, given that GPCL Article 136 is a general rule for prescription, CCL Article 158 is 
unquestionably a specific rule for such prescription. Some scholars have been known to 
basically agree (e.g., Y. Wang, 2001, pp. 109-117).  
The consensus achieved is after the lapse of a certain period, the buyer’s claim for remedies 
for nonconformity in quality or quantity should basically not be admitted by legal authorities. 
However, as to the relationship among inspection period, notification period, and guarantee 
period for quality and factors or standard for determining a reasonable period for giving notice, 
which judges are eager to address, only a few law practitioners have devoted themselves to do 
research,
②
 and few analysis on policies served by the notice rule have been conducted.
③
 
Therefore, it is necessary, for proper application of Chinese law, to review the structure of the 
                                                             
① As to the prevailing theory, see Han (2008); Du (2008); Ma & Yu (2007, p. 690); Su (2011, p. 275). 
② As to the exploration made by law practitioners, see Mao and Cai (2004), and Y. Q. Sun (2011). 
③ Even the literature introducing expereices in foreign legal systems is rare. As to related studies, see L. H. Chen and Q. Li 
(2011), and J. G. Wang (2011). 
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notice rule in the CCL and to establish adequate instructions for determining a reasonable 
period for notification. 
1.3 Research methods  
1.3.1 Comparative legal analysis  
Comparative legal analysis, in the most general sense, is comparing the spirit and 
approaches of various legal cultures, and revealing the characteristics of different legal systems, 
as well as their similarities; specifically, comparative legal study compares different methods 
for solving a given legal problem, to help understand and improve the domestic legal system 
(Ooki, 2006, p. 66). The analysis of comparative law employed in this dissertation focuses on 
functional comparison, rather than literal comparison of statutory provisions. I believe, 
moreover, that functional comparison of the legal concepts in different legal systems is the only 
way to reduce misunderstanding arising from literal translation. As mentioned above, the CISG 
has significantly influenced the drafting of the unified Chinese Contract law of 1999 as well as 
the modernization of the German obligation law of 2002, and is impacting, directly or 
indirectly, the reform of Japanese obligation law in recent years. Studies of nonconformity of 
the subject matter in contract law cannot be limited to the domestic area; comparative law 
study is necessary and irreplaceable. 
The first civil code in China entered into force in 1929, and was abolished in most areas 
of China, except Taiwan, in 1949. Moreover, the direct study of traditional civil law theories 
had been interrupted for about thirty years, and had not revived until the 1980s. It is widely 
accepted that the General Principles of Civil Law of China (GPCL) in 1986 has followed the 
models of traditional civil codes, including the civil codes of European continental countries’ 
and Japanese Civil Code. However, since the 1980s, Chinese contract law has been more and 
more heavily influenced by international uniform private laws (Liang, 1996, p. 13). It is 
generally recognized that a large amount of rules, especially rules related to sales contract in 
the CCL of 1999 was borrowed from the CISG and has close relationship with common law 
systems (e.g., Liang, 1996, pp. 13-15); as exemplified by the notice rule. In this account, it is 
plausible to say that the research of Chinese contract law cannot be competently made without 
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comparative study of both civil law and common law approaches. The previous research on 
time limitation was, however, essentially dominated by not only special legal expressions from 
traditional civil law, but also by the interpretational approaches from continental jurisprudence. 
However, it has been largely overlooked that requirement for notification in a reasonable 
period is much closer to rules in the CISG and the UCC. Therefore, it is necessary to 
emphasize the desirability of thorough comparative law study of different legal systems for the 
improvement of related rules in China.  
1.3.2 Empirical analysis  
Empirical analysis of law has been particularly highlighted during the past decade. J. J. 
Bai, for example, has proposed that empirical analysis should be applied more frequently in the 
study of law, as he expressed by advocating “a little less I believe that, a little more I found 
that” (Bai, 2008, p. 25). Recently, many Chinese scholars have discussed the application of 
empirical analysis in civil law research; and case study has been particularly emphasized (e.g., 
Han, 2012, p. 46). The subject of empirical study, however, ought to be the objective elements 
of judicial decisions, such as the types of nonconformities or the different understandings of a 
special legal concept in a series of given cases. By collecting, classifying and analyzing legal 
decisions available in the database of Beida Fabao, certain problems or phenomena in legal 
practice can be well demonstrated.  
In the first chapter, this author employs this empirical method to analyze the usages of 
warranty liability for defects, aiming to explore the different understandings and applications 
in decisions using this legal concept. The result shows that, more than a half of the samples 
have considered warranty liability as a certain obligation of the seller to warrant the subject 
matter to satisfy some requirements on quality or quantity. This means that the understanding 
and application of warranty liability in legal practice deviates significantly from the prevailing 
definition in academic research, according to which warranty liability is some kind of remedies. 
In this chapter I will examine the cause of this phenomenon and discuss the definition of this 
legal concept. 
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1.3.3 “Norm-logical” analysis 
One of the most important and oldest legal study methods is the so-called “norm-logical” 
analysis, which is actually a logico-semantic analysis of positive law (MacCormick & 
Weinberger, 1986, p. 45). “Norm-logical” analysis aims at clarifying the logic and literal 
content of positive norms. It is the most important method to construct interpretative theory. 
When applying this analysis, various interpretative methods would be employed, including 
semantic interpretation, historical interpretation and teleological interpretation. “Norm-logical” 
analysis will be employed in all chapters, not only on positive statutes, but also on judicial 
decisions. When applying this method, the following instructions ought to be mentioned. 
First, contemporary logical-semantic analysis should not be dismissed as a game of 
concepts, which is unable to reflect the changes of morality and to meet the aims of society. 
Contemporary logical-semantic analysis ought to be connected with value judgment and 
evaluation of interests.
①
 In other words, the “norm-logical” analysis should not be independent 
from social aims and basic values in human society. On the contrary, it ought to be, more or 
less, interpreted or implemented in consideration of these social aims and policies 
(Bodenheimer, 1967, p. 97).  
Secondly, it is important for the interpreter who follows the traditional methods of legal 
interpretation to keep one basic standpoint, but not, for example, swing from an extremely 
subjective one to an excessively objective one when exploring legislative purposes. Failing to 
keep one basic standpoint could be fatal for the inner coherency of the remedy system. 
1.4 The structure of this dissertation 
1.4.1 Clarification of fundamental analysis instruments (Chapters 2 and 3) 
The first part of this dissertation, consisting of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, primarily aims to 
deal with the dispute of fundamental theories and dispel the confusion relating to fundamental 
instruments. As mentioned above, the main theoretical obstacle for dealing with those two 
                                                             
① The approach of incorporating value judgement and evaluation of interests into legal interpretations has formed, in Germany, 
the so-called Jurisprudence of Value Judgments (Wertungsjurisprudenz), which was advocated in particular by Karl Larenz, 
whose methodology of legal science is influential in China (Larenz, 1991, pp. 119-125). Jurisprudence of Value Judgments is 
considered as the dominant jurisprudence in today’s Germany (Grisé, Gelter, & Whitman, 2012, p. 113). 
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“reasonableness” issues is the instability of fundamental analysis instruments. Because of the 
opposition between the unitary theory and the relative independence theory, the fundamental 
concepts, that is to say liability for breach of contract and warranty liability for defects, lack 
stability and identity. It is necessary, at first, to review fundamental theories on this topic and 
clarify fundamental analysis instruments.  
In Chapter 2, I try to demonstrate the problems existing in legal practice through an 
empirical analysis of judicial decisions. It turns out that the results of judicial decisions using 
warranty liability as some kind of obligation are much more than expected. It is clear that there 
is great divergence related to the usage of warranty liability. From the perspective of semantic 
interpretation and based on the historical development of related rules, it seems that the 
concept of warranty liability itself has a confusing structure. After reviewing the fall of special 
remedies for breach of warranty, I show, not only that the old special remedies that cannot 
adapt to the modern economy ought to be abandoned, but also that the expression of warranty 
liability itself is too ambiguous for proper application. I conclude in this chapter that the 
“liability for breach of contract” has indeed and generally a broad meaning in Chinese law and 
that this kind of “broad meaning” in legislation can hardly be “corrected” by interpretation. 
Although the unitary theory admittedly suffers from shortcomings, the relative independence 
theory would face even more problems and must therefore be abandoned. 
In Chapter 3, I reconstruct fundamental instruments for analysis. The unitary theory, in the 
past, has merely concentrated on the analysis of remedies, while this dissertation will mainly 
focus on the issues of contractual obligations. Most scholars still tend to preserve the legal 
concept of defects as a key instrument for analyzing legal consequences for breach of contract, 
to refer to obligations of warranty against defects (e.g., L. M. Wang, 2003, p. 398; Cui, 2010, p. 
386; Han, 2010, p. 389; Ma & Yu, 2007, p. 642), while I would like to argue that the concept of 
nonconformity is less ambiguous and better recognized worldwide, and that it could therefore 
be a promising replacement to defects. Furthermore, obligation of warranty against defects is 
not a satisfactory concept insofar as the special meaning of warranty cannot be well defined. In 
this chapter I will argue that the concept of the seller’s obligation to tender conforming subject 
matters would be a preferable instrument for analysis. Based on this opinion, I attempt to 
redefine the concept of warranty liability for defects that remains in the Supreme People’s 
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Court’s Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract (hereafter JILSC) in 2012. 
1.4.2 Reform of rules on exercising remedies for nonconformity (Chapters 4 and 5) 
1.4.2.1 Construction of the seller’s right to cure 
Chapter 4 deals with the introduction and clarification of the seller’s right to cure. The 
remedy system for breach of contract in China does not prioritize the seller’s supplementary 
performance. In other words, the buyer may choose any remedy he considers to be reasonable, 
whether supplementary performance, damages, or price reduction in case of nonconformity; 
there is no order of priority among them. However, a problem arises from this kind of design: 
once the breach occurs, is the buyer able to choose any remedy he considers as reasonable, 
disregarding the seller’s requirement of cure or supplementary performance in good faith? The 
reason I address this question is the obvious imbalance of interests between the buyer and 
seller in the CCL. It should be noted that in both German law and U.S. law, the answers to the 
question above are negative, while in Chinese law the seller seems to be completely at the 
mercy of the buyer in case of breach of contract.  
German law gives priority to supplementary performance, and the buyer must generally 
fix an additional period for that performance before pursuing other remedies. U.S. law, on the 
other hand, gives the seller a so-called “right to cure”; even if the buyer rejected the goods or 
justifiably revoked the acceptance, he must still accept the seller’s effective cure and thereby 
prevent cancellation of the contract (though note that any cure must be made with timely notice 
and at the seller’s expense). In Japan, the pPROL has not only adopted the obligee’s right to 
require supplementary performance (追完請求権) (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 198), but also 
introduced the obligor’s right to cure (追完権) (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 209); both of them 
generally require the buyer to wait a reasonable time for potential supplementary performance 
or cure. In contrast, in Chinese law, there is neither a duty for the buyer to fix an additional 
period for supplementary performance nor one to accept a reasonable cure. The CCL only 
stipulates that supplementary performance is one of the possible remedies available to the 
buyer.
①
 This makes it possible for the buyer to act opportunistically, for instance, by refusing 
                                                             
① This is somewhat different from the dominant views in Germany, which consider supplementary performance as a 
transformation of the initial performance (der modifizierte vertragliche Erfüllungspruch) (Heyers & Heuser, 2010, p. 3057). 
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the seller’s bid to cure in order to keep his own performance, and the seller could do nothing 
but accuse the buyer of failing to mitigate his own loss (CCL Art. 119). Clearly this system 
may cause unfairness and imbalance of interests between the contracting parties. 
Besides, without the introduction of devices like the seller’s right to cure, there may be 
theoretical inconsistencies between the lax freedom of the buyer to choose remedies and the 
strict conditions for him to terminate the contract under the CCL. According to CCL Article 94, 
the buyer who received nonconforming subject matters may not terminate the contract unless 
the breach frustrated the purpose of contract. This strict standard reflects that the legislative 
purpose is generally encouraging the parties to save or maintain a contract. Such a purpose 
would be frustrated if there were no effective restriction on the buyer to choose remedies.  
Therefore, I try to argue in Chapter 4 that the seller’s the right to cure is not only 
important for the balance of interests between the contracting parties, but also beneficial for the 
coherency as to provisions of termination of contract and of notification of nonconformity. The 
nature, constituent elements and legal effects of this right will also be clarified here. 
1.4.2.2 Reconstruction of the buyer’s right to refusal to take delivery and to price reduction  
Chapter 5 deals with the structure of several of the buyer’s remedy rights. I try here to 
reconstruct these rights from the perspectives of the inner coherency of remedy system and the 
balance of interests between the contracting parties, addressing refusal to take delivery and 
price reduction respectively in the first and second section of this chapter.  
In the first section of Chapter 5, I will firstly address whether the buyer’s right to reject 
should be established, on a par with the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance. 
By comparing the right of rejection in Anglo-American law and the right to require 
supplementary performance in German law, I will argue that the systemic functions of these 
two rights are equivalent. Accordingly, if, in a legal system, the right to require supplementary 
performance has been established as one of the main remedies for the buyer in case of 
nonconformity, and the right to terminate the contract has been recognized as the basic system 
for ending the contractual relationship, it would be neither necessary nor suitable to introduce 
the system of rejection, otherwise the overlap of systemic functions or legal effects would be 
inevitable, and confusions in practice might accordingly arise.  
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Based on these analyses, I will then reconstruct the interpretative theory for CCL Article 
148. Next, I suggest that what ought to be carefully construed is the buyer’s right of refusal to 
take delivery, and the determination of the conditions for this right deserves particular attention. 
Finally, I propose to establish a uniform condition for refusal to take delivery, whether the 
nonconformity is based on quality or quantity. 
In the second section of Chapter 5, I address the exercise of price reduction. The basic 
problem under the CCL lies in knowing whether the buyer is entitled to reduce the price by 
himself or must require the seller to reduce the price. In this section, I firstly examine different 
ways to exercise price reduction in different legal systems. In German law, the right of price 
reduction allows the buyer to reduce the price by a declaration of his own, rather than having to 
require the seller to reduce it for him (BGB Art. 441). By contrast, in Anglo-American law, the 
price generally cannot be reduced by the buyer himself. Under the UCC, the buyer can only 
deduct the damages by notifying the seller of his intention according to UCC §2-717, but this 
cannot be confused with unilateral price reduction; Likewise, according to the special rules 
supplemented for consumer buyers in 2002 to the U.K.’s Sale of Goods Act (SGA) of 1979, the 
buyer is not allowed to reduce the price of the goods by himself, and must require the seller to 
reduce the purchase price for him. (SGA 1979 §48A) 
I then explore the special characteristics of price reduction in German law. Firstly, though 
its function is to strike a balance between the contracting parties by reducing the purchase price 
to a level in accordance with the actual value of the delivered object, it is different from 
damage compensation in the sense that it is a remedy that is not based on fault. Secondly, its 
logic of unilateral price reduction is grounded on that of a partial termination of the contract, in 
the sense that the buyer may keep the nonconforming subject matter but free himself from one 
part of payment. Thirdly, the conditions for its exercise are based on the ones of termination 
(insignificant defects excepted) (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, pp. 58-59).  
Next, I argue that unilateral price reduction can only be justified insofar as its logical 
foundation is partial termination and the conditions for its exercise are almost the same as those 
of termination. Both of these justifications can be found in German law, but do not exist in the 
CCL as well as the pPROL of Japan.
①
 In this part, I further argue that if the buyer can reduce 
                                                             
① As to this proposal, it is argued that using “partial termination” to explain price reduction is no more than a metaphor, and is 
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the price unilaterally, without conditions similar to those of contract termination, the inner 
coherency of the remedy system as well as the balance of interests between the contracting 
parties would both be undermined.
①
 Finally, I suggest that it is preferable to establish the right 
of price reduction as a right to require contract modification. This kind of approach may 
change the function of price reduction; however, it will still remain an effective method for 
contract liquidation. 
1.4.3 Reform of rules on time limitation (Chapters 6 and 7) 
In many countries there are strict time limitations on remedies of the buyer in case of 
nonconformity. In U.S. law, for example, according to UCC §2-607(3) (before the amendment 
of 2003), “if a tender has been accepted, the buyer must within a reasonable time after he 
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from 
any remedy.” This notice rule has very strict effects, for the buyer can no longer invoke the 
breach as a defense to refuse the payment as soon as he fails to give timely proper notice. Such 
kind of strict rule has been introduced into the CISG, and then was borrowed by Japan’s 
pPROL. However, this kind of strict notice rule has been seriously criticized recently. It is said 
to be too harsh, because it can make the buyer lose all his remedies even though the seller was 
in fact in breach of contract (Reitz, 1988, p. 534). This is why an amendment to UCC §607(3) 
was proposed in 2003, stating that “the failure to give timely notice bars the buyer from a 
remedy only to the extent that the seller is prejudiced by the failure.”  
The CCL has also borrowed rules from the CISG, establishing a strict duty of notification 
for the buyer. CCL Article 158(1)-(2) states:  
“When an inspection period was prescribed, the buyer shall notify the seller of any 
nonconformity within such inspection period, otherwise the subject matter is presumed to 
be conforming to the contract. 
When there was no inspection period prescribed, the buyer shall notify the seller 
within a reasonable period, since he discovered or should have discovered the 
nonconformity, otherwise the subject matter is presumed to be conforming to the contract. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
likely to cause worthless confusion to the application of fundamental nonperformance, which is a constituent element of 
termination (JCCRC, 2010, p. 60). 
① As to opinions in favor of unilateral declaration, see, e.g., Han (2008, p. 15). 
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However, if the buyer fails to notify within 2 years since he received the delivery, the 
subject matter is presumed to be conforming to the contract. If there is a guarantee period 
for quality, the 2-year period will not apply.”  
Accordingly, there are two major problems concerning time limitation on buyer’s 
remedies in case of nonconformity in Chinese law, the first one is that the period for inspection 
has merged with the period for notification, and creates an unfairly short limitation on the 
buyer. The second one is that there are no proper instructions for determining what a 
“reasonable period” for notification is, leading to great divergence in Chinese judical practice. 
In Chapter 6 I deal with the first problem. Under German law, U.S. law and the CISG, the 
periods for inspecting the subject matter and for notifying the nonconformity are clearly 
distinguished; the requirement for inspection is promptness or with a reasonable opportunity, 
while the one for notification is promptness or within a reasonable time. Under the CCL, 
however, the inspection period merges with the notification period, and the agreed inspection 
period, as a combined period for both inspection and notification, has been given the effect of 
the longest time limit for giving notice. Therefore, the rules on inspection period in the CCL 
may have very harsh consequences. We should apply the so-called “teleological reduction” to 
CCL Article 157, so that the inspection period provided in this article can be distinguished 
from the one provided in CCL Article 158(1). 
In China, guarantee periods for quality have different types and usually can only influence, 
but not equal the longest time limit for giving notice. Given the agreed inspection period (that 
merges with the notification period) and the guarantee period for quality both can determine or 
influence the longest time limit for giving notice, there exists a “double-interference with the 
time limit” problem. In order to avoid a conflicting application of the law, we should try to 
exclude one or the other interference by the application of various interpretive methods. The 
JILSC has entitled Chinese courts to intervene in the agreement on inspection period, but still 
has some disadvantages in this area. 
Chapter 7 addresses the issue of determining a reasonable period for giving notice of 
nonconformity. Surrounding this issue, German-speaking countries have been using a so-called 
“noble month” as a rough average period when applying the notice rule under the CISG in the 
past few years, while the U.S. courts has been pursuing the guidance of policy rationales to 
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protect the seller from being prejudiced by the failure to notify the breach. The former has an 
advantage in the uniformity and predictability in the application of law, but it has been 
criticized for being too “rigid”; the latter may be more appropriate to fit the requirements of 
individual cases, but it does not contribute much to the uniformity of the application of law. 
When establishing instructions for determining a reasonable period in Chinese law, it is 
necessary to take into account both the predictability and the flexibility of its legal application. 
I argue that policy rationales regarding the seller’s prejudice are suitable as fundamental 
guidance, while a relatively “fixed” scope could be a secondary reference. As to the content of 
policy rationales, there should be more than one policy rationale to support the notice rule. 
These policies include preserving opportunities for the seller to cure the breach, to collect 
useful evidence and to mitigate loss caused by the breach, as well as generally enhancing the 
effectiveness of commercial transactions. Most of them aim at protecting the seller from being 
substantially prejudiced by the buyer’s failure to notification. The JILSC has listed many 
factors for the courts to refer to when determining a reasonable period for notification; however, 
the contents of them need to be clarified. 
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Chapter 2  The Decline of Warranty Liability for Defects 
The decline of warranty liability is one of the past several decades’ most important 
developments in international sales law. The traditional function of warranty liability in civil 
law systems, to establish special remedies for latent defects, has fallen. In modern sales law the 
seller’s warranty liability can be merged into the seller’s obligation to tender conforming 
subject matters, the breach of which may give rise to various remedies for nonconformity. In 
this chapter, I firstly demonstrate the double usage of the expression “warranty liability for 
defects” (WLD) in Chinese judicial practice, a problem that has been largely overlooked in 
academic research, then review the decline of the special remedies established by warranty 
liability in major civil law systems. Finally, I will comment on the present dispute between the 
unitary and the relative independence theories in China. In doing so, I will notably argue that 
the relative independence theory is not preferable, not only because the special remedies 
established by warranty liability for defects cannot meet the requirement of transactions in 
modern society, but can also be attributed to the ambiguity of the joint concept “warranty 
liability”. 
2.1 Ambiguity of the legal concept of “warranty liability for defects” 
The expression that Chinese judges and scholars have been using for the concept of 
“warranty liability for defects” (WLD) (in Chinese, xiaci danbao zeren) has been transplanted 
from its equivalent in Japanese law (kashi tanpo sekinin). However, the characters used in 
Japanese for this expression lead to a rather ambiguous meaning in Chinese. And indeed, it 
appears that over the course of the past decade, the term of WLD has been interpreted in two 
different ways in China: firstly as a contractual obligation on warranty against defects (in the 
sense of an a priori obligation of warranty against defects), and secondly as the legal 
consequences for the breach of that warranty (in the sense of an a posteriori liability for 
breach). The joining of concepts of “warranty” and “liability” in the WLD term has been 
sowing confusion in the application of Chinese contract law. If this situation continues to be 
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ignored, there might be ambiguities in legal findings that could jeopardize the authority of 
judicial decisions.  
In this section I will first demonstrate, through the empirical analysis of judicial decisions 
made after the Chinese Contract Law (CCL) came into force, how WLD has been ambiguously 
applied. I will then re-examine the historical development of legal rules on warranty in 
traditional civil codes and see why the WLD expression was originally and properly used in the 
sense of an a priori obligation of warranty rather than a posteriori liability for breach of that 
warranty, and why WLD as a joint concept of “warranty” and “liability” is an unsatisfactory 
expression to refer to legal remedies.  
2.1.1 Empirical analysis on the application of warranty liability for defects 
2.1.1.1 Subjects and methods of empirical analysis 
In China, academic research on the concept of “warranty liability for defects” (WLD) has 
focused on whether it had been merged into the one of “liability for breach of contract” (LBC) 
under the CCL (L. M. Wang, 2001; Han, 2007). In other words, is the special remedies regime 
for latent defects, which originated in Roman law and then spread to later civil law systems,
①
 
still relatively independent from the general remedies regime for breach of contract in the CCL? 
Currently, more and more scholars conclude that WLD is not independent from LBC (L. M. 
Wang, 2001; Han, 2007; X. J. Chen, 2003, pp. 276-277; Xie, 2011). Professor L. M. Wang 
(2001), for example, states that “there is no such system of warranty liability for defects which 
can be separated from inappropriate performance” (p. 25). Professor S. Y. Han (2007) also 
concludes that WLD has been merged into LBC and that, therefore, a “double-track” remedy 
system had been replaced by “single-track” one (p. 170). This kind of view is sometimes called 
“unitary theory” (Cui, 2006).  
On the other hand, some other authors advocate the so-called “relative independence 
theory”, according to which the independent WLD still exists independently, but is merely 
merged into LBC in name (e.g., Cui, 2006). These scholars argue that there are still substantial 
differences between WLD and LBC, in respect of both idea and function (e.g., Cui, 2006). 
                                                             
① As to the historical development of warranty liability since the Roman law, see Zimmermann (2005, pp. 82-89). 
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Sometimes this theory is also called “distinction theory” (Y. J. Li, 2008, p. 333).  
Generally speaking, the enforcement of and case law related to the unified Chinese 
Contract law has convinced more and more scholars of the unitary theory, making it gradually 
become the prevailing theory (Xie, 2011, p. 80), while leaving the relative independence theory 
as its major critique. 
The analysis of the application of WLD in as many judicial decisions as possible since the 
CCL came into force in 1999 is an irreplaceable step in the evaluation of different theories. 
Therefore, I will examine each case identified by the “xiaci danbao zeren” (warranty liability 
for defects) keyword in the Beida Fabao database,
①
 one of the leading Chinese legal 
databases.  
 According to the debate between the preceding interpretative theories, it can be 
presumed that the divergence in legal practice should be at the level of contents and conditions 
of different remedies for defects. However, the results of the empirical analysis do not really 
verify that presumption. In practice, the WLD expression was rarely understood as an a 
posteriori liability for breach of warranty. On the contrary, it was often employed in the sense 
of an a priori obligation of warranty. For example, in the MinSan ZhongZi No. 217 decision 
(2010) of the Intermediate People’s Court of Changde city, Hunan Province, the court found 
that the hiree “is obligated to make and fix the black marble washing platen in compliance with 
the requirement of college X and within the agreed time, he (the hiree) also bears a contractual 
obligation of ‘warranty liability for defects’ in the platen; college X bears the contractual 
obligation to take delivery and inspect the work, as well as pay the charge.” In this finding, the 
court was clearly attempting to clarify the specific obligations of contracting parties in a 
contract for work. Whether from a semantic or systematic perspective, we cannot interpret the 
usage of the expression WLD here in the sense of an a posteriori liability for breach of 
warranty, for no defects had been confirmed by the court yet. On the contrary, it is much more 
plausible to interpret it as an a priori obligation of warranty on the quality of the hiree’s work. 
Therefore, the court seemed to apply the term in the sense of an a priori obligation to bear 
warranty against defects in subject matters.  
In a further example, the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming city, Yunnan province, 
                                                             
① See http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp. 
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stated in the Kun MinWu ZhongZi No.1 decision (2008): “the contract of a sale of raw 
materials is enforceable. X, the seller, not only has obligations to tender the subject matter in 
compliance with the contractual requirement on time and quantity, but also is bound to a 
warranty liability for defects in the quality of the subject matter tendered.” The court then 
moved on to analyze whether the quality requirement ought to be determined according to the 
corporation’s standard or to the national standard. In this case, the WLD expression cannot be 
understood in the sense of an a posteriori liability for breach, because when it occurred, it had 
not yet been decided whether the seller failed to satisfy the requirement of quality; on the other 
hand, that WLD was associated with contractual requirements on time and quantity. Therefore 
it is reasonable to interpret it as an a priori obligation of warranty on the quality of the subject 
matter.  
Because the modern Chinese legal system has been only recently set up, emotions of 
distrust towards courts still pervade Chinese society. Thus, some scholars may tend to consider 
that any usage of WLD in the sense of an a priori obligation of warranty is merely a “mistake” 
made by an unprofessional judge. This view, however, is prejudiced. By thorough investigation, 
it can be discovered that there are too many cases in which WLD has been treated by the courts 
as an a priori obligation of warranty for it to be dismissed as an occasional “mistake”.  
Over the past decade, Professor J. J. Bai (2000) has proposed that empirical analysis 
should be emphasized in the study of law, and advocated “a little less I believe that, a little 
more I found that” (Bai, 2008). Recently, many private law scholars have discussed the method 
of empirical analysis in the study of civil law (e.g., Han, 2012). Given the ambiguity of the 
transplanted legal concept and possible prejudices against the professionalism of the Chinese 
judicial establishment, it is necessary to launch an empirical analysis to determine to what 
extent unprofessional “mistakes” really exist, and then decide whether the transplanted term in 
Chinese law should be reconsidered. 
Therefore, I collected all cases with the “xiaci danbao zeren” (warranty liability for defects) 
as the keyword in the Beida Fabao database, and classified the usages of this legal term in 
those decisions. I will first introduce the specific methods adopted in the following analysis, as 
they are essential for the credibility of this study.  
(1) Analysis of the logical relationship between defects and WLD 
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WLD can be understood as an a posteriori liability for breach of warranty only if the 
court has first confirmed unsatisfactory quality or quantity conditions in the subject matter; if 
this term is used before such problems were confirmed, and it is determined merely according 
to the nature of the contract or of legal rules. In that case, it would be reasonable to consider 
that the WLD term has been used in the sense of an a priori obligation of warranty rather than 
an a posteriori liability for breach of that warranty. 
(2) Replacement of the WLD expression with either concept 
Firstly, I will try to replace in each case the WLD expression with “a posteriori liability for 
breach of warranty”, then determine whether the logic of the court’s opinion can be maintained 
or not. If it can, then I will retain the a posteriori sense; if it can’t, or the logic even becomes 
self-contradictory, then I will repeat the analysis by replacing the original term with a priori 
obligation of warranty. If this second replacement makes sense, then I will categorize the 
court’s use of the WLD expression as that of an a priori obligation. If neither replacement 
makes, I will sort the case in a “not clear” category. 
2.1.1.2 Process and results of empirical analysis 
(1) Collection and selection of samples 
From August 1 to 8, 2012, I searched for judicial decisions which used the WLD 
expression. The Beida Fabao database contained 241 judicial decisions with such a keyword. 
Given the rapid development of internet technology and the date at which the Chinese Contract 
Law came into force (October 1, 1999), I excluded seven samples made before 1999. The 
samples were therefore limited to cases between 2000 and 2012 (the cases in 2012 only include 
those made in the early part of this year).  
Next, some other samples had to be excluded or treated specially: Firstly, nine cases were 
complete duplicates, and another seven lacked basic information and were therefore unusable. 
These 16 cases had to be excluded. Secondly, in 21 samples, the WLD expression was used in 
the comments or interpretations made by scholars following the decisions, but not in the 
decisions themselves; in 47 further samples this term was merely used by the plaintiff or the 
defendant, but not in the finding of the judicial decision. These cases could not reflect the 
usage of legal term in judicial decisions, and were therefore not suitable for our purposes. 
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Thirdly, there were some results possibly related to class actions. The contents of the decisions 
were almost the same, and the case numbers were also continuous. For the sake of 
representativeness, I have treated each such case series as a single result. I have also treated as 
a single result cases series which involved different instances with the higher ones merely 
quoted each other the lower ones on warranty liability. 36 of these case series results hence had 
to be excluded. Finally, there were 114 results left, 30 of which involved “defects in title”, 
while 82 were related to “defects in quality or quantity”; however, two cases among theses 114 
samples were difficult to fit in either of the two categories: One was a “shareholder’s warranty 
liability for defects in capital contribution”, the other was an “original obligor’s warranty 
liability for defects in assumed obligation”.① Usage in those two samples were rare and unclear; 
therefore, I decided to exclude these two cases and analyze instead the remaining 112 results. 
Table 2.1  
Distribution of Samples According to the Date of Judicial Decisions 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sum 
Defects 
in 
Thing 
0 1 2 3 3 8 6 6 8 21 9 12 3 82 
Defects 
in 
Title 
0 2 2 1 2 2 5 5 3 2 1 5 0 30 
Sum 0 3 4 4 5 10 11 11 11 23 10 17 3 112 
Table 2.1 shows that the amount of samples increased significantly since the year of 2005. 
Perhaps this is due to the gradual development of internet technology and therefore, should not 
necessarily be held to mean that the cases using “warranty liability for defects” have increased 
significantly since 2005; on the other hand, it may mean that the results of the empirical study 
particularly reflect the situation after the year of 2005. 
Differing from the results in Table 2.1, the year in which a given case was held has almost 
no impact on the meaning of the legal concept used by the court. It is safe to assume that Table 
2.2 and Table 2.3 below reflect the general distribution of usages of WLD in Chinese judicial 
                                                             
① As to the difficulty in distinguishing between defects in thing and defects in title, see Han (2011a). 
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practice.  
There were too many sorts of defects and quality problems to categorize them properly. In 
the category of defects in thing, many involved defects in machinery, chemical or electronic 
products, and the like (amount to 45.7% in all 82 samples). A few samples involved seepage of 
water, cracks or hollowing in the wall or floor (amount to 21% in 82 samples). There are only 
three samples which involved disease or disability of livestock. It is interesting to point out that 
41.7% of the samples related to leasing contract were about lease items which could not satisfy 
environmental standards, fire prevention standards, or business requirements. 
As to the samples of defects in title, 56.7% involved disputes on ownership or secured 
rights; and about 20% (six samples) concerned failure of registration due to breach of 
mandatory rules or seal up of property. 
(2) Data of empirical analysis 
Sometimes the term of WLD was not used once in each sample. If the court used the term 
in one sample in one way, I just recorded one usage; but if it used it twice or even more times 
in one sample and each of those usages were different, I recorded each of them. For example, 
one court stated that:  
“under this contract, the seller bears warranty liability for defect, which means he is 
responsible for warranting there is neither defect in title, nor unsatisfactory physical 
conditions in the subject matter tendered. In this case, the subject matter of contract is a 
milk cow. However, the cow actually tendered by the seller has no uterus and cannot 
lactate, and therefore cannot satisfy the purpose of contract; the value of the cow is 
reduced as a result. The seller shall bear the warranty liability for defects”.  
It can be observed that here the usage of WLD refers not only to the seller’s a priori 
obligation to warrant the good’s quality in the light of the contractual purpose, but also to the a 
posteriori legal consequences he has to face for breaching that obligation. Therefore, in this 
case two different usages have to be distinguished and counted in. 
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Table 2.2 
Usage of “Warranty Liability for Defects” in Samples of Defects in Thing 
 Remedies Obligations Not clear Sum of 
usages 
Sum of 
samples 
Sales contract   22 29 5 56 51 
Auction contract   2 4 0 6 6 
Leasing contract  3 9 1 13 12 
Work contract 4 6 2 12 11 
Travel contract 0 1 0 1 1 
Goods in tort case 0 0 1 1 1 
Sum 31 49 9 89 82 
Table 2.3  
Usage of “Warranty Liability for Defects” in Samples of Defects in Title 
 Remedies Obligations Not clear Sum of 
usages 
Sum of 
samples 
Sales contract 2 5 0 7 7 
Contracts for assignment 
of obligee’s right, 
transferring of equity, 
or using right on 
State-owned land 
2 4 2 8 8 
Auction contract 0 4 0 4 4 
Leasing contract 3 2 0 5 5 
Contract for financial 
leasing 
0 1 0 1 1 
Contract for transferring 
business 
1 0 0 1 1 
Contract for transferring 
technology 
0 0 1 1 1 
Others
①
 1 2 0 3 3 
Sum 9 19 4 32 30 
 
                                                             
① Including contract for operating rural lands, contract for dissolution of partnership, and contract for a license of the 
copyright. 
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Given the limitations of the database
①
 and the author’s subjective factors in the process of 
analysis, the results cannot be fully accurate. However, by employing the methods mentioned 
in 2.1.1.1 on different dates, the error or deviation has been controlled as much as possible. The 
obtained results demonstrate that the WLD expression evidently has two usages in Chinese 
legal practice. In samples of defects in thing, 35.3% of the term’s usages were in the ‘a 
posteriori liability’ sense, while 54.5% of usages were in the ‘a priori obligation’ sense. The 
samples of defects in title are more or less the same: 28.1% of usages were in the ‘a posteriori 
liability’ sense, while 59.4% were in the ‘a priori obligation’ sense. It can be concluded that 
these findings significantly contradict the general understanding in academic research on this 
subject, and that it is not just a few decisions that have “mistakenly” used WLD in the ‘a priori 
obligation’ sense. Rather, the term just tends to be interpreted in such a way. Therefore, it is 
necessary to explore the cause of the confusing application of this legal term. 
2.1.2 The cause of double usage  
Generally speaking, the usage of a legal concept is primarily influenced by relevant 
statutory provisions. However, there is no article laying down the WLD concept in the CCL. 
Other statutes do not mention it either, except Article 61 of Chinese Auction Law, which 
provides a WLD rule for auction contracts.  
In addition, we must also consider instruction books and legal textbooks. As to the former, 
the most influential one among various instruction books published since the enforcement of 
the CCL is the Interpretation and Application of Chinese Contract Law written by judges of the 
economic tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court in 1999. In this book, CCL Articles 153 and 
155 have been described as provisions regarding the “seller’s warranty liability for defects in 
quality” and the “legal consequences for breach of warranty liability for defects in quality” (G. 
G. Li, 1999, p. 707, 716). CCL Article 153 provides that “[t]he seller shall deliver the subject 
matter in conformity with the prescribed quality requirements. Where the seller has provided 
quality specifications for the subject matter, the subject matter delivered shall conform to the 
quality requirements set forth therein.” CCL Article 155 provides that “[i]f the subject matter 
delivered by the seller fails to conform to the quality requirements, the buyer may hold the 
                                                             
① The decisions of around 3,000 courts in China were not all required to be disclosed on the Internet until November 27, 2013. 
See http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/sytp/201311/t20131127_189869.htm. 
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seller liable for breach of contract in accordance with Article 111 hereof.” It is very clear that 
CCL Article 153 concerns the obligation of the seller to tender conforming subject matters, and 
we can see here that the Interpretation and Application of Chinese Contract Law paraphrased it 
as “seller’s warranty liability for defects in quality”; CCL Article 155 concerns the liability for 
breach of contract, and has been paraphrased as “legal consequences for breach of warranty 
liability for defects in quality”. The summary of these articles’ contents indicates that judges of 
the Supreme People’s Court considered the term WLD to stand for some kind of contractual 
obligation of warranty, but not as legal consequences for breach of that warranty.  
In 2012, the second civil trial tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court, whose predecessor 
was the economic tribunal, published an instruction book entitled Interpretation and 
Application of Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract (JILSC). Article 33 of the 
JILSC states that “the preparation group of the JILSC believes that the seller’s warranty 
liability for defects in quality is one of the primary obligations of the seller in the contractual 
relationship; therefore, it cannot be easily excluded by agreement of parties, statement of the 
seller, nor acknowledgement of the buyer.” (Xi, 2012, p. 495) This interpretation clearly shows 
that even judges from the Supreme People’s Court use the WLD term in the a priori obligation 
sense, which would explain why the majority of courts have followed this approach.  
Moreover, although many textbooks use the term obligation of warranty against defects 
(xiaci danbao yiwu) to refer to one of the primary obligations of the seller in a sales contract 
(e.g., X. J. Chen, 2003, pp. 276-277; M. R. Guo, 2005, pp. 260-266), some textbooks 
confusingly use the term xiaci danbao zeren. For example, one textbook stated that “warranty 
liability for defects is the obligation of the seller to warrant the adequate quality of his subject 
matter, as well as the right on it,” while at the same time it pointed out that WLD has been 
treated as LBC in China (W. G. Wang, 2012, p. 435). Thus, the double usage emerges. It can be 
presumed that the ambiguous treatment in certain textbooks may have exacerbated the 
confusing application of WLD in legal practice.  
How could so many judges, including those of the Supreme People’s Court, “mistakenly” 
use WLD in the sense of an a priori obligation? Are there any further reasons supporting this 
viewpoint? Broadening our horizon, we find that those “misunderstandings” do not spring from 
a careless confusion of concepts, but can be, more or less, explained by the special semantic 
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structure of the term. Chinese Guarantee Law has a similar fundamental notion called 
guarantee liability (baozheng zeren). Most scholars believe that “guarantee liability” does not 
stand for a liability for breach of obligation, but the obligation itself, and the term of “guarantee 
liability” is just a name established by usage (e.g., Cui, 2010, p. 184). In other words, the 
concept of “liability” and that of “guarantee” form a joint concept that is not to be understood 
as an a posteriori liability for breach but as an a priori obligation of guarantee. Similarly, the 
expression of WLD also represents a joint concept consisting of warranty and liability. The 
meaning of liability has adhered to and been absorbed by the meaning of warranty; hence, it 
becomes difficult to interpret liability separately. Therefore, a priori obligation of warranty is 
not only a possible meaning of the WLD expression, but also the semantically most plausible 
one. 
In fact, some scholars have noticed the properness of using WLD to stand for an a 
posteriori liability for breach (e.g., as one special kind of LBC). L. X. He (2002) suggested the 
expression liability for breach of contract for defects in quality to replace warranty liability for 
defects, and D. F. Xu (2004) has also argued that “liability for defects” is more proper, because 
WLD is a confusing term, in consideration of the special meaning of “warranty” (p. 194). 
These reasonable opinions certainly deserve attention. 
Given the element of “warranty”, we may presume that many courts might have paid 
more attention on the special meaning of “warranty” and tend to refuse to interpret this term as 
“legal consequences for breach of warranty”. The question we will turn to now is whether it is 
necessary to reconsider this usage in academic research. In the next part I will explore the 
historical development of warranty rules in civil laws and argue that the double usage problem 
comes from an improper translation in the process of legal transplantation.  
2.1.3 The development of warranty rules and the creation of “warranty liability”  
Chinese civil laws and legal theories have been heavily influenced by German civil law 
and Japanese civil law. And rules on warranty liability are particularly rooted in the tradition of 
continental law systems. To shed light on the double usage of WLD, we ought to examine the 
old German obligation law and Japanese law. 
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2.1.3.1 Haftung and Gewährleistung in the old BGB 
In the old German obligation law, frequently used terms were “Haftung für Sachmängel” 
(Larenz, 1977, §41; Westermann, 1995, §459) and “Sachmängelhaftung” (Medicus, 1997, §74), 
and both of them can be translated to be “liability for defects in thing” or “liability for material 
defects”. Professor R. Zimmermann (2005) has used the expression “liability for latent defects” 
to refer to special liability for defects in the old German law, and he considers it to be based on 
“statutory warranty” (pp. 82-88). According to this standpoint, it seems that “Haftung für 
Sachmängel” should be a posteriori liability for defects in thing. 
However, if we examine the letter of the old BGB carefully, the conclusion is not that 
straightforward. Articles 433-458 of the old BGB laid down rules on the primary obligations of 
the seller and the buyer, including warranty against defects in title, but did not include warranty 
against defects in thing (Westermann, 1995, §433, §434). Warranty against defects in thing 
(Gewährleistung wegen Mängel der Sache) and related rules are stipulated in Articles 459-493 
of the old BGB, side by side with the primary obligations of the seller (Westermann, 1995, p. 
192). In Article 459, the term haften is used as following:  
“Der Verkäufer einer Sache haftet dem Käufer dafür, daβ sie zu der Zeit, zu welcher die 
Gefahr auf den Käufer übergeht, nicht mit Fehlern behaftet ist, die den Wert oder die 
Tauglichkeit zu dem gewöhnlichen oder dem nach dem Vertrage vorausgesetzten Gebrauch 
aufheben oder mindern. Eine unerhebliche Minderung des Wertes oder der Tauglichkeit 
kommt nicht in Betracht. 
Der Verkäufer haftet auch dafür, daβ die Sache zur Zeit des Überganges der Gefahr 
die zugesicherten Eigenschaften hat.” (Westermann, 1995, §459) 
C. H. Wang (1907), who reportedly wrote one of the earliest and high quality English 
translations of the old BGB, has translated Article 459 as such:  
“The seller of a thing warrants the purchaser that, at the time when the risk passes to the 
purchaser, it is free from defects which diminish or destroy its value or fitness for its 
ordinary use or the use presupposed in the contract. An insignificant diminution in value or 
fitness is not taken into consideration. 
The seller also warrants that, at the time the risk passes, the thing has the promised 
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qualities.” (p. 100)  
According to this translation, haftet means nothing else but warrants, and this provision 
can by no means refer to a posteriori liability for breach, but ought to be considered as an a 
priori obligation of warranty.  
It makes more sense for the haften in Article 459 to be understood in an a priori 
obligation rather than a posteriori liability sense, because the legal consequences for breach of 
warranty provided in the old BGB are termination of contract and price reduction, neither of 
which ought to be considered as forms of a posteriori liability. Instead, these consequences 
should be conceptualized as rights of the buyer (Rechte des Käufers), as Karl Larenz (1977) did 
in his Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts (p. 45). On the other hand, Haftung für Sachmägel or 
Sachmängelhaftung should, in the spirit of Article 459, be understood as the a priori warranty 
against defects in thing,
①
 as none of the a posteriori legal consequences for the breach of that 
warranty has been provided in this article.  
Now I turn to examine related rules in another civil law system - Japanese civil law, which 
has more directly influenced Chinese civil law and its legal concepts. 
2.1.3.2 Warranty liability in Japanese law 
Regarding latent defects, Article 570 of the Japanese Civil Code (JCC) provides that: “If 
there is any latent defect in the subject matter of a sale, the provisions of Article 566 shall 
apply mutatis mutandis; provided, however, that this shall not apply in cases of compulsory 
auction.” JCC Article 566 provides remedies for sales involving superficies or other rights. The 
content of Article 566(1) is:  
“In cases where the subject matter of a sale is encumbered with for the purpose of a 
superficies, an emphyteusis, an easement, a right of retention, or a pledge, if the buyer did 
not know the same and the purpose of the contract will frustrate on account thereof, the 
buyer may terminate the contract. If the contract cannot be terminated, the buyer may 
demand compensation for damages.”②  
                                                             
① When translating the treatise of Medicus’s obligation law into Chinese, Professors Du and Lu have used the term “liability 
for defects” (Medicus, 2007, p. 35). 
② For all Japanese articles referred to in this dissertation, see Kamata et al. (2012). 
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Dr. Ume (1984) used the French expression garantie des vices cachés (warranty on 
hidden or latent defects) to describe kashi tanpo (warranty against defects) in Japanese law (p. 
525). The texts of warranty liability rules in the Japanese Civil Code are considered to have 
been primarily influenced by the French Civil Code (FCC) (Shiomi, 2010, pp. 13-16). However, 
the relevant provision in the French Civil Code has significant differences. For example, 
Article 1641 of the FCC, the provision laying down the French warranty on latent defects, 
states that:  
“Le vendeur est tenu de la garantie à raison des défauts cachés de la chose vendue qui la 
rendent impropre à l’usage auquel on la destine, ou qui diminuent tellement cet usage que 
l’acheteur ne l’aurait pas acquise, ou n’en aurait donné qu’un moindre prix, s’il les avait 
connus.” ①  
Professor Georges Rouhette, who has been considered to have set the relationship between 
French and English law on the plane of ideas (Kasirer, 1999), aided by his assistant, has 
translated it as such:  
“A seller is bound to a warranty on account of the latent defects of the thing sold which 
render it unfit for the use for which it was intended, or which so impair that use that the 
buyer would not have acquired it, or would only have given a lesser price for it, had he 
known of them.”②  
The Japanese translation of this article, as provided by Japan’s Ministry of Justice, is as 
follows:  
“売主は、売却された目的物が予定した用途に適さないような、又は買主がそれを
知っていた場合には取得しなかったか、より低い価格しか与えなかったであろうほ
どにその用途を減ずるような隠れた欠陥を理由として、担保責任を負う。” (Nozawa, 
2009b, p. 87)  
On the one hand, this Japanese translation with official background uses the expression 
                                                             
① For all French text of French Civil Code referred to in this dissertation, see 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=71D56C8770A3482B47B6A5634B58BD45.tpdjo03v_1?cidTexte=LE
GITEXT000006070721. 
② See http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_22.pdf. 2013-3-7. All English 
translations of French Civil Code have come from this translated version by Professor Rouhette. 
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“担保責任を負う” (bear the warranty liability) to translate the expression “être tenu de la 
garantie” (be bound to a warranty) from the French code. It employs the joint concept of 
“tanpo sekinin” (warranty liability), the meaning of which is close to a posteriori liability for 
breach of warranty. On the other hand, it can be observed, from the comparison between FCC 
Article 1641 and JCC Articles 570 and 566, that that French article does not stipulate any 
remedies for breach, but merely classifies the cause and content of warranty, while the 
Japanese articles basically provide the remedies for latent defects; the sense of the seller’s 
warranty against defects needs to be deducted from the text of JCC Articles 570 and 566. This 
means the codes have different legislative logics. The Japanese articles, unlike the French one, 
describe a liability in the sense of an a posteriori liability. 
It ought to be noted that in Japanese Civil Code the term warranty liability (tanpo no 
sekinin) is only explicitly stipulated in Article 572. This article provides that:  
“Even if there is special agreement aiming at excluding warranty liability in Article 560 
and the preceding articles, insofar as there are certain facts that the seller knew and did not 
disclose, or certain rights set for himself or a third party, exclusion of such warranty 
liability shall not be effective.”  
The joint concept of “warranty liability” has been created and put in use by this article in 
JCC. This rule is different from those of either French law or German law. Article 1627 of the 
FCC, as the comparable provision related to special agreement on limitation and exclusion of 
warranty of the seller, states that: “Les parties peuvent, par des conventions particulières, 
ajouter à cette obligation de droit ou en diminuer l’effet; elles peuvent même convenir que le 
vendeur ne sera soumis à aucune garantie.” Professor Rouhette and his assistant have translated 
it as: “The parties may, by particular agreements, add to this obligation of right or diminish its 
effect; they may even agree that the seller may not be subject to any warranty.” Clearly, in 
French law, what may be limited or excluded is the “warranty” as an “a priori obligation”, 
while the a posteriori legal consequences for breach have not been mentioned (although it is 
obvious that once the warranty has been disclaimed, all remedies would be affected). As to the 
old BGB, it states in Article 476 on this subject that “Eine Vereinbarung, durch welche die 
Verpflichtung des Verkäufers zur Gewährleistung wegen Mängel der Sache erlassen oder 
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beschränkt wird, ist nichtig, wenn der Verkäufer den Mangel arglistig verschweigt.” 
(Westermann, 1995, §476) . This means that an agreement that limits or excludes the seller’s 
“warranty obligations against defects in thing” (Verpflichtung zur Gewährleistung wegen 
Mängel der Sache) is void if the seller concealed the defects in bad faith. Obviously, this article 
does not mention a posteriori liability for breach, either. Thus, it can be concluded that the joint 
concept of “warranty liability” in JCC Article 472 does not come directly from either the FCC 
or the old BGB.  
Since the term warranty liability, as a joint concept, has been firstly used in the JCC, it is 
necessary to ask how Japanese jurists have interpreted it. A literature review reveals that for 
many Japanese scholars, JCC Articles 560 to 571 should all be understood, in light of Article 
572, as rules on “warranty liability” (e.g., Uchida, 2011, p. 123). Indeed, JCC Articles 561, 563 
and 565-569 are normally discussed as rules on “warranty liability” (Kamata, 2012). For 
example, JCC Article 561 is paraphrased as the seller’s warranty liability in case of transferring 
rights to others, JCC Article 563 as the seller’s warranty liability where rights partially 
belonged to others, and JCC Article 565 as the seller’s warranty liability in cases of shortage in 
quantity or partial loss of the subject (Kamata, 2012, p. 383). Since the contents of these rules 
are mainly related to remedies, the warranty liability might not be understood in the sense of an 
“a priori obligation of warranty”, but is probably to be interpreted as an “a posteriori 
consequence for breach”. And this is exactly what many Japanese literatures have shown.  
According to an influential academic commentary on Japanese Civil Code, the “contents 
of warranty liability” include termination, price reduction, and damage compensation (Yunoki 
& Takagi, 1993, pp. 139-161). Debate over warranty liability for defects is precisely debate on 
the nature and application of legal remedies; “warranty liability” has been widely accepted to 
be a concept mainly referring to a posteriori consequences for breach (Yunoki & Takagi, 1993, 
pp. 139-161). Professor Oomura (2005) concludes that the contemporary debate is focusing on 
whether to include the “warranty liability” into the wider concept of contractual liability 
(keiyaku sekinin) for breach (p. 48).  
After all, we can conclude that a joint concept of “warranty liability” has been firstly used 
in JCC Article 572 and is considered to be also related to the preceding articles. Given that the 
logic of the Japanese Civil Code is to directly provide remedies for defects, the sense of the 
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seller’s warranty against defects has to be deducted from those remedies. Contrarily to German 
and French law, the Japanese warranty liability is basically only to be understood in the sense 
of a posteriori consequences for breach, including termination, price reduction, and damage 
compensation. However, termination and price reduction should be considered as remedies; 
calling them warranty liability is hardly suitable. 
In the next subsection, I will examine that in early Chinese civil law, which has borrowed 
the joint concept “warranty liability” from Japan, in which sense such legal term has been 
interpreted. 
2.1.3.3 Warranty liability for defects in Taiwan, China 
The Civil Code of Taiwan, China (hereafter CCT) has in general been heavily influenced 
by both German and Japanese law. In Article 354 of the CCT, it states that: 
“The seller of a thing warrants that the thing sold is, at the time when the risk passes to the 
buyer according to the provisions of Article 373, free from any defect in quality which 
may impair or destroy its value, or its fitness for ordinary purposes, or its fitness for the 
purposes of the contract of sale. However, if the extent of the impairment is of no 
importance, such impairment cannot be deemed to be a defect. 
The seller also warrants that, at the time the risk passes, the thing has the promised 
qualities.”  
Then Article 355 of the CCT states that: 
“A seller is not responsible for such defect of quality in the thing sold as specified in the 
first paragraph of the preceding article, if the buyer knew of the defect at the time when the 
contract was made. If a defect of the kind specified in the first paragraph of the preceding 
article has remained unknown to the buyer in consequence of gross negligence, the seller is 
not responsible if he has not guaranteed that the thing is free from the defect, except in the 
case that he has intentionally concealed it.” 
Accordingly, CCT Article 359 provides that: 
“When there is a defect in the thing sold for which, according to the provisions of the five 
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preceding articles, the seller is responsible for a warranty, the buyer has the option to 
rescind the contract or to require a reduction of the price, but when it appears from the 
circumstances of the case, that a rescission of the contract would constitute an obvious 
unfairness of the transaction, the buyer is only entitled to a reduction of the price.”  
As we can see, remedies, including rescinding contract and price reduction, are provided 
for the buyer under two prerequisites. One is that a defect exists in the thing sold; the other is 
that, according to the provisions of Articles 354-358 of the CCT, the seller is responsible for a 
warranty. It is proper to interpret “being responsible for a warranty” as “being bound to a 
warranty”. 
If “being responsible for a warranty” had been interpreted as bearing the legal 
consequences for defects, the meaning of “warranty” would have been overlooked and the 
logic might be questionable; since this term would mean nothing but declaring the arising of 
legal consequences, it cannot function as one condition for the buyer to pursue termination or 
price reduction, and therefore the function of it, as one of the two prerequisites, would have 
failed. In fact, “being responsible for a warranty” should be interpreted as “warrant” only. The 
first condition -the existence of a defect- is not sufficient; there ought to be other elements, 
such as that the defect should exist no later than the time of transfer of risk from the seller to 
the buyer, and that the defect should not be negligible. These elements constitute the second 
condition, i.e., “being responsible for a warranty”, which means the seller should warrant that 
no defects, other than those of no importance, existed at the time when the risk passed to the 
buyer.  
Chinese civil law scholars from Taiwan have always used the joint concept warranty 
liability borrowed from Japan. Professor S. K. Shi (2000b, p. 22) has used the German 
expression of Sachmängelhaftung or Gewährleistung wegen Sachmängel, the French 
expression of garantie contre les vices de la chose, and the English expression of warranty 
against defects of quality to refer to xiaci danbao zeren. It is clear that, according to German, 
French, and English expressions, “warranty liability” means “warranty against defects”. 
However, the double usage clearly exists in the treatise of Y. B. Zheng, another famous 
scholar in China. He borrowed the prevailing theory in Japan at that time, which called for 
securing transaction orders based on contract with consideration, and maintaining the special 
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characteristic of those bilateral contracts (Zheng, 1986, pp. 29-31). In his Special Obligation 
Law, Zheng (1986) has mentioned that “the contents of warranty liability for defects in things” 
are, on the one hand, warranty against defects in value and, on the other hand, warranty against 
defects in utility (p. 41). This standpoint was different from opinions of the majority of 
Japanese scholars, who consider “the contents of warranty liability for defects” to be remedial 
rights of the buyer. However, Zheng (1986) also pointed out that the elements of “warranty 
liability for defects in things” include: (a) defects that existed at the time when the risk passed 
to the buyer, (b) the buyer was in good faith and had no gross negligence, and (c) the buyer had 
timely examined the subject matter. If these are elements that constitute “warranty liability for 
defects in things”, then this “warranty liability” should be understood as legal remedies (pp. 
41-56). This standpoint is advocated by many other Chinese scholars, like C. Z. Qiu (2006, p. 
74), C. E. Lin (2007, p. 87), and becomes the prevailing theory in Taiwan, China; accordingly, 
the double usage of the “warranty liability” expression have also been inherited in China 
without thorough reconsideration (Qiu, 2006, pp. 70-74, 90-95; Lin, 2007, pp. 84-85, 93). 
2.1.4 Conclusion of this section 
“Warranty liability”, as a joint legal concept, did not exist in the old BGB; its concepts of 
“Haftung” and “Gewährleistung” share the same meaning. The term of “warranty liability” has 
been firstly used in JCC Article 572 and is considered to be related to the preceding articles 
(JCC Arts. 560-571). Given that the legislative structure of Japanese Civil Code is directly 
providing remedies for defects and the rules laying down remedies are treated as rules on 
warranty liability, this term (warranty liability for defects) has been used in the sense of a 
posteriori liability for breach of warranty. After Chinese jurists borrowed this term from 
Japanese law, a confusing double usage of the term has spread in Chinese law and legal 
practice: warranty liability is interpreted on the one hand as a contractual obligation of 
warranty, and on the other hand as the legal consequence for the breach of this obligation. In 
fact, termination and price reduction are not suitable to be called liability. “Warranty liability” 
is more properly understood as certain obligation of “warranty”. The legal consequences of 
breach of such obligation should be referred to as remedies for breach of warranty. 
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2.2 The decline of special remedies for latent defects  
Contrarily to that of the double usage of warranty liability, the debate over whether special 
remedies for latent defects can be unified into general remedies for breach of contract has 
always been a hot topic. In Germany, Japan, as well as mainland China, the prevailing views 
are that, basically, special remedies for latent defects ought not to be independent, but can be 
unified into general remedies for breach of contract. In this section I will explore the reason of 
the decline of such special remedies, and describe the legislative movement in Germany, as 
well as in Japan. Finally, I will comment the dispute between the unitary theory and relative 
independence theory in China. 
2.2.1 Special remedies established by warranty   
2.2.1.1 Aedilitian remedies in Roman law 
Roman law is the ultimate common legal tradition for many European legal systems 
(Zimmermann, 2001, pp. 1-2), and has therefore also provided the basis of many continental 
sales laws on the conformity of things for quite a long time (Zamir, 1991). The most famous 
legal device in this area is called “aedilitian remedies”. Already in Roman law, the seller had to 
bear liability for fraud or breach of express warranty: the former included “non-disclosure of 
known defects in the object”; the latter arose “[not only from] an actual promise, but also from 
any representation or even description of the object, provided they were not mere puff” (Zamir, 
1991, p. 6). Zamir (1991) pointed out that “even a tacit representation could give rise to such 
liability” (p. 6). 
Besides those foundations for liability, the Roman Aediles developed special remedies 
that applied to every severe defect “that precluded the possibility of using the property for its 
ordinary purpose, or which significantly impaired its usefulness (‘redhibitory’ defects)”, and 
the seller’s liability for such defects “was not conditioned upon his knowledge of the defect” 
(Zamir, 1991, p. 6). The aedilitian remedies in Roman law were considered as a “fair and 
balanced solution”, which aimed at dealing with problems concerning “certain individualized 
commodities which are (i) regularly sold on open markets, (ii) notoriously prone to suffer from 
defects which even vigilant purchasers were unable to discover on sight, and (iii) offered for 
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sale by persons who had a questionable reputation.” (Zimmermann, 2005, p. 82) This kind of 
special liability did not allow the buyer to claim damages; on the other hand, it was based on 
neither the principle of fault nor the seller’s assertions.  
The aedilitian remedies made good sense for transactions of slaves or cattle on the open 
market, because latent quality defects in sales were often impossible for either party to 
“discover on the spot.” (Reimann, 2009, p. 901) When such a defect later appeared, it was not 
easy to decide who was at fault, but interests between the seller and the buyer had to be 
balanced: since claims for a “nondefective substitute” or for repair were usually meaningless, 
the appropriate way was to permit the buyer to cancel the sale or to reduce the price (Reimann, 
2009). At the same time, short limitation periods were considered to be necessary because 
usually it became quickly impossible to verify “whether the slave or cow had already been sick 
when delivered.” (Reimann, 2009, p. 901) 
2.2.1.2. Special remedies in the old German law 
The Roman special remedies influenced the old BGB’s approach of remedies for defects 
in thing. Firstly, as the aedilitian remedies covered only substantive defects (i.e., of quality) but 
not legal problems with the object sold (i.e, on its title), the old BGB also treated them totally 
differently (Reimann, 2009, p. 899). Articles 433-434 of the old BGB expressly stated that 
seller was obligated to transfer title and to deliver the object “free from rights” of third parties, 
otherwise there would be a “legal defect” (Rechtsmangel) governed by the general rules on 
breach of main obligations (Grundpflichten) (Westermann, 1995, §433, §434). On the other 
hand, the old BGB Articles 459-480 addressed defects in thing (Sachmangel) under a specific 
set of rules, namely, Gewährleistung wegen Mängel der Sache, but had no explicit provision 
on the “obligation of” the seller to transfer the object free from quality defects. Thus, the 
existence of such a quality defect could hardly be treated as a type of nonperformance under 
the old BGB rules.  
Secondly, the old BGB’s approach to defects in thing focused, like Roman law, on the 
sale of specified objects rather than unspecified ones. The remedies thus focused on 
“nonreplaceable” objects (Reimann, 2009).  
Thirdly, these special remedies differed significantly from the general ones for 
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nonperformance. In case of a defect in thing, the buyer had only two options: return the object 
and recover his payment (Wandelung), or keep the object and reduce the price (Minderung) 
(Reimann, 2009). While the buyer had these rights regardless of the seller’s fault, he had to 
exercise them within a relatively short period of time (six months to one year) (Westermann, 
1995, §477). Damages were available only if the sold object missed a promised quality 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaft), or if the seller had fraudulently concealed a defect (Arglist) 
(Zimmerman, 2004). The old BGB Article 480 “went beyond Roman law, however, in that it 
did consider the sale of unspecified goods.” (Reimann, 2009, p. 900) If such goods were 
defective, the buyer could also demand delivery of a nondefective replacement (Reimann, 2009, 
p. 900).
 
 
To sum up, according to the old BGB Article 462, the contractual obligations that arose 
from a sale of a thing were limited to (a) delivering the subject matter to the buyer, (b) 
transferring the ownership to the buyer, and (c) warranting the sold object free from rights of 
third parties against the buyer. It was not the seller’s contractual obligation to deliver the 
subject matter free from defects in quality. However, it would be unfair for the buyer to bear 
the whole risk of accepting an object with defects that he could hardly discover or foresee at 
the time he engaged himself by the contract. Thus, a separate concept was created in the old 
BGB, i.e., warranty against defect in things, and special remedies and strict time limitations 
followed. In short, the function of such warranty was to establish strict liability (Haftung ohne 
Verschulden) and limited remedies - termination and price reduction.  
2.2.1.3 Special remedies in Japanese law  
Besides the old BGB, the special remedies approach has also been adopted in Japan 
through the concept of kashi tanpo sekinin, which translates as “warranty liability for defects” 
(WLD). However, the Japanese WLD rules are not transplanted from the old German law, but 
from French law, as we saw above. The concept of “kashi” merely refers to “latent defect”, and 
the term kashi tanpo sekinin hence only covers those latent defects. Therefore, both of them are 
narrower than their counterparts in German law (Morita, 2002, pp. 198-199; Nozawa, 2009a, p. 
19). Moreover, the special “warranty liability for defects” in Japan allow damage compensation 
in case the contract cannot be terminated (JCC Arts. 570 and 566). 
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As to the nature of the concept of “warranty liability for defects” (WLD), the prevailing 
theory in early Japanese law research is that it is a “statutory liability” (Nozawa, 2009a, p. 21). 
This theory was advocated by Kaoru Yunoki, Hiroshi Suekawa, and Sakae Wagatsuma (Yunoki 
& Takagi, 1993, p. 197). According to this theory, the Japanese WLD is based on the idea of 
equity, rather than contractual obligations; its aim is to strike a balance between the interests of 
the buyer and the seller in case there were latent defects which were not discovered by the 
buyer at delivery.  
As I mentioned above, WLD may be not a rigorous term. It is generally understood as 
“being liable for breaching the warranty against defects” in academic research. While actually, 
it should be read as “being liable for the warranty against defects”, which is equivalent to 
“warranty against defects” itself.  
2.2.2 Reforms of rules on warranty against defects in Germany and Japan 
2.2.2.1 Modernization of German obligation law and its historical background 
During the development of Roman law, the additional remedies for latent defects had 
already been considered to be “redundant” (Zimmermann, 2005, p. 83). However, the old BGB 
continued to adopt this device. Some scholars argue that, despite their lack of consistency, the 
old aedilitian remedies survived in the 19
th
 century codification of private law “thanks to a 
strange coalition: while the historic school in German legal scholarship followed Roman law as 
a model for the codification of private law, trade and industry supported short prescription 
periods which tend to shift the economic consequences of defects onto consumers for obvious 
economic reasons.” (Basedow, 2005, p. 491)  
Levin Goldschmidt (1829-1897), also known as the founding father of modern German 
scholarship in commercial law, was one of the most prominent German jurists who insisted on 
maintaining the aedilitian remedies, even regarding the sale of unascertained objects. He had 
once served as a judge in the Commercial Supreme Court (Zimmermann, 2005, p. 89). 
Goldschmidt argued that “the act of delivery restricts the seller’s obligation to the particular 
object chosen by him; what has originally been the sale of unascertained goods is then turned 
into the sale of specific goods,” justifying the application of the aedilitian remedies 
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(Zimmermann, 2005, p. 88). The legislators of the old BGB adopted this reasoning, and so both 
specific and unascertained objects fell into the scope of the application of warranty liability. 
The buyer’s remedies were limited to termination and price reduction, except in case of fraud 
or special promises by the seller. It has to be noted that the seller was not generally granted a 
second chance to make a conforming tender. As Professor Zimmermann (2005) observed, 
“[t]he traditional thinking patterns largely prevailed” in the old German law, and “the sale of 
unascertained goods was still regarded as a deviation from norm that could be dealt with by 
way of special provisions modifying the general law”, which was designed mainly for specific 
goods (pp. 88-89). 
Why did the earlier German jurists decided to maintain Roman law by keeping those 
special remedies in the BGB of 1900? The answer can be inferred from the beliefs of them. For 
example, Judge Goldschmidt “considered merchants as potential or actual representatives of 
the Volk and viewed mercantile law as the ultimate product of an organic and historical 
development, relatively immune from alien contaminations.”(Robilant, 2006, p. 526) This kind 
of idea was typical of the famous German Historical School. The Historical School was the 
dominant school toward the end of the 19
th
 century (Pound, 1937, p. 564); it really began in the 
fore part of the nineteenth century under the influence of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the most 
prominent jurist in the area of modern German private law. The historical jurists believed that 
“law is found, not made,” and that “a principle of human action or of social action is found by 
human experience and is gradually developed into and expressed in a rule.” (Pound, 1911, p. 
599) Therefore, the Historical School denied that law was “a product of conscious or 
determinate human will”, and “doubt[ed] the efficacy of legislation” (Pound, 1911, p. 599). 
The German historical jurists “sought the nature of right and of law in historical deduction 
from the Roman sources, from Germanic legal institutions, and from the juristic development 
based thereon.” (Pound, 1911, p. 600) The historical school held onto “the doctrine of 
legislative futility” and denied any real function to legislator. As Professor Pound (1912, p. 494) 
deplored, “[t]hey have helped to clear away, but they have built nothing”, because the 
“declaration of the dominant social organism by which a legal standard is created or imposed” 
may not establish itself in the legal system. In his eyes, “the historical school went too far in 
the opposite direction and attempted to exclude development and improvement of the law from 
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the field of conscious human effort.” (Pound, 1911, p. 149) 
In can be found that the historical school might have a beneficial influence in limiting 
institutional waste, but made little contributions in transforming the old Roman law into an 
efficient, modern system (Pound, 2004, p. 85). Therefore, it would not be surprising that, 
during the drafting of the old BGB, the so-called “redundant” aedilitian remedies could still be 
kept. 
We must keep the background and reason of the survival of aedilitian remedies in mind 
when we encounter a defense of these remedies in the contemporary academic discourse. 
It has been generally recognized that Germany has abandoned the aedilitian remedies 
during the 2002 reform of its obligation law (Haas et al., 2002, pp. 13-15). Article 433 of the 
new BGB lays down the basic contractual obligations in sales contracts: The seller of a thing is 
obliged to deliver the thing to the buyer and to transfer ownership of the thing to the buyer; the 
seller must procure the thing for the buyer free from defects in thing and defects in title. On the 
other hand, the buyer is obliged to pay the seller the agreed purchase price and to take delivery 
of the thing purchased. Regardless of whether the good at the time of dealing is ascertained or 
not, the seller is always bound to transfer a good free from defects in thing.  
Under the new German obligation law, defects in thing have been defined with rather 
subjective criteria (Hente, 2005). BGB Article 434(1) provides that the object is free from 
defects in thing if, upon the passing of the risk, the object has the agreed quality; to the extent 
that the quality has not been agreed, the object is free of defects in thing if (a) it is suitable for 
the use intended under the contract, and (b) it is suitable for the customary use and its quality is 
usual in things of the same kind and the buyer may expect this quality in view of the type of 
the thing. Moreover, supply by the seller of a different thing or of a lesser amount of the thing 
is equivalent to a defect in thing. 
Accordingly, defects in thing are considered as a breach of obligation in the new BGB, 
which may give rise to various remedies, including damage compensation. Article 437 
specifically provides those remedies, presenting as rights of the buyer. According to this article, 
if the subject matter has defects, the buyer may, provided the requirements of the following 
provisions are met and unless otherwise specified, (a) demand supplementary performance 
under Article 439, (b) terminate the contract under Articles 440, 323 and 326(5), or reduce the 
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purchase price under Article 441, or (c) demand damages under Articles 440, 280, 281, 283 and 
311a, or demand reimbursement of futile expenditure under Article 284. 
Accompanying these reforms, the special prescription for defects in the old German sales 
law has also been changed. Although it is still not the same as the general prescription, the 
prescription period, which was considered to be harsh and unfair for the buyer, has been 
significantly extended under Article 437 of the new BGB. 
2.2.2.2 Reform of Japanese obligation law 
According to the so-called “contractual liability theory” that arose in the 1960s in Japan, 
the delivery of conforming subject matters is part of the consensus of intentions between 
contracting parties, and can therefore be interpreted as a contractual obligation of the seller 
(Shiomi, 2009, p. 85). Adherents of this theory include Hujio Oho, Zentarou Kitagawa, Kiyoshi 
Igarashi, Eiichi Hoshino, Sueto Yamashita, and Hisashi Tanikawa (Yunoki & Takagi, 1993, p. 
268). Professor Shiomi (2010, pp. 2-3) argues that the research level that the contractual 
liability theory has achieved is the binding effect of contract, which relates to the well-known 
principle “promise ought to be kept” (pacta sunt servanda), and the determination of the 
contractual content. This theory is considered as relatively convincing to broad range of 
scholars (Uchida, 2011, p. 131), and has significantly influenced the draft of the pPROL 
(JCCRC, 2009b, p. 248). 
It has to be noted that it is not just the term “kashi tanpo sekinin” (warranty liability for 
defects) that can be misleading, but also that of “keiyaku sekinin,” which seems to refer 
basically to “liability for nonperformance of contract”. However, it is not desirable to define all 
remedy measures from the perspective of liability. Some legal consequences, such as 
termination of contract, should not be considered as liability for nonperformance. 
Influenced by the CISG and international model rules, the pPROL has proposed two 
approaches for reforming the core concept here. One is to follow the new German obligation 
law by redefining the concept of “defect” with subjective meaning; the other is to follow the 
CISG and some other international model rules by introducing a new concept of 
“nonconformity” (JCCRC, 2009b, pp. 17-18). It seems that the former has earned more support, 
as “nonconformity” and “conformity” have been considered to be difficult for Japanese 
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lawyers to understand. However, there is no substantial difference between these two 
approaches. According to pPROL §3.2.1.16, once a defect occurs, the aggrieved party is 
entitled to pursue various remedies that are provided by the pPROL for nonperformance of 
contract (JCCRC, 2010, pp. 71-72). 
The foremost remedy for nonconformity clarified by the pPROL is the obligee’s right to 
require supplementary performance (追完请求权) (pPROL, §3.1.1.57) (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 
198). In the part of proposed sales law, pPROL §3.2.1.16, based on Article 570 of the JCC, 
provides in the first paragraph that, in case there are defects in the subject matter tendered to 
the buyer, the following remedies are admitted: (a) requiring the removal of defects (by, e.g., 
replacement or repair), (b) requiring price reduction, (c) terminating the contract, and (d) 
demanding damage compensation. The second paragraph states that the “existence of defects 
shall be determined at the time when the risk passes in accordance with §3.2.1.27.” (JCCRC, 
2010, pp. 71-72) Hence, the pPROL has generally recognized the buyer’s right to require the 
tendering of subject matters that are free from defects. According to the interpretation of the 
pPROL, both termination of contract and damage compensation are subject to the general 
principles applicable to nonperformance of contract (JCCRC, 2010, p. 72).  
Moreover, according to pPROL §3.2.1.D and §3.2.1.E, the original rules on one-year 
special period in JCC Articles 564 and 566(3) should be eliminated, applying the general  
prescription instead (JCCRC, 2010, pp. 64, 69). On the other hand, pPROL §3.2.1.18 
establishes a duty to notify defects, based on a modification of JCC Articles 566(3) and 570. 
According to pPROL §3.2.1.18(1), the buyer shall notify the seller of the existence of defect 
within a reasonable time since he has been aware of defects when or after taking delivery of 
subject matter, however, in the case that the seller had bad faiths on the defects, the duty to 
notify shall not apply. According to pPROL §3.2.1.18(2), the buyer cannot pursue remedies on 
the grounds that there are defects if he did not notify the seller in compliance with the 
requirement provided in the preceding paragraph; however, if the failure of notification is 
beyond the control of the buyer, the duty to notify shall not apply (JCCRC, 2010, p. 86). The 
notice rule in the pPROL is similar to the one in the CISG, and even to the one in the UCC. In 
the third part of this dissertation I will deal with problems concerning notice rules, which have 
caused tremendous amount of debate in many legal systems. 
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The interpretation made by drafters of the pPROL states that “elements of each remedy 
ought to be in compliance with the general principle of liability for nonperformance, however, 
the elements cannot be inferred from the general principle exclusively, and therefore, specific 
stipulation is important” (JCCRC, 2010, p. 77). According to the specific provisions, the right 
to require supplementary performance, the right to require price reduction, the right of 
termination, and the right to demand damages have different elements and application scopes. 
For example, price reduction has no relationship with “legal excuse” and plays a special role 
for balance of interests. As to the Japanese law, it can be concluded that, on the one hand, the 
reforming of its obligation law is moving towards a uniform system of remedies for 
nonperformance, while on the other hand, the elements for each remedy will still differ from 
one to another. 
2.2.3 Comment on the dispute between Chinese interpretative theories 
2.2.3.1 The prevalence of the unitary theory 
Debate over warranty liability for defects in thing arose as early as the drafting of the 
unified Chinese Contract Law (Liang, 1996, p. 13). Professors Wang and Yao (1995) argued 
that there were imperfections in the old German obligation law and that it was preferable to 
“abandon the concept of warranty liability for defects, and use that of liability for breach of 
contract as a replacement” (pp. 6-8). Following the enforcement trends of the CCL, more and 
more scholars have considered that there is no independent WLD concept coexisting with that 
of liability for breach of contract (e.g., L. M. Wang, 2001; Han, 2001). 
Professor Han dedicates himself to the unitary theory.
 
He argues that WLD has been 
merged into liability for breach of contract, and that the “single-track” remedy system has 
replaced the former “double-track” one (Han, 2007, p. 170). His argument is mainly based on 
his observation on international trends in the development of sales law and the historical 
development of Chinese contract law. As to the interpretation of the CCL, it is plausible to say 
the WLD has never been independent from liability for breach of contract. After all, the unitary 
theory has been advocated by more and more scholars, and is considered as “the prevailing 
theory” (Xie, 2011, p. 80). 
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2.2.3.2 Response to the relative independence theory 
Professor Cui (2006) insists on the so-called “relative independence theory”, according to 
which the WLD may have been merged into liability for breach of contract in name, but 
actually still survives independently. He argues that there are still substantial differences 
between WLD and liability for breach of contract, in respect of both idea and function. 
(1) Symptom discovered by relatively independent theory: ambiguity of “liability” 
The logic of the relatively independent theory is that “the snake can’t swallow an 
elephant”: liability for breach of contract is not broad enough to cover all contents of WLD. 
Professor Cui (2006) argues that liability for breach of contract should contain, and only 
contain, what can be qualified as liability, excluding remedies that cannot be considered as 
such. Therefore, price reduction and return of goods, the key remedies for defects, cannot be 
contained by the concept of liability for breach of contract; on the contrary, they can only be 
contained by the concept of WLD, the nature of which is remedy rather than liability. In other 
words, in his view, WLD is an “elephant”, and liability for breach of contract is a “snake”; the 
latter cannot swallow the former.   
Liability for breach of contract is indeed not the most suitable concept to refer to all 
remedies for breach of contract; for instance, it is not proper to describe the remedy of 
termination as a liability. However, I do not believe the relative independence theory can 
resolve these problems it has raised. In fact, scholars who advocated the relative independence 
theory do not seem to have ever discussed the historical development of the ambiguous usage 
of the concept of “liability for breach of contract”. 
Because of the Chinese civil war in the 1940s and the following international political 
situation, reconstruction of PRC’s civil law and its theory in the 1980s was heavily influence 
by Soviet law. In the obligation law of the Soviet Union, there was a special category which 
could not be found in either German law or French law, called “liability provided by the Soviet 
Union’s civil law”. This category had been mentioned in many textbooks of the Soviet Union 
that served as reference to early Chinese researchers in the 1980s, and thereby influenced early 
Chinese legislation.  
Legal liability has a narrow meaning in the civil law theory of the Soviet Union. It has 
been defined as the most serious sanction imposed by the state on those who broke the law. 
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None of the following elements should lack when defining something as liability in the Soviet 
sense: (a) it qualifies as “one of the forcible forms imposed on individuals to compel them to 
obey the law”; (b) it “applies only to those who broke the law”; (c) it “ought to be applied by 
state organ or social organ with legal authority and within the scope it has been authorized”; 
and (d) it goes “against the interests of the law breaker,” making it an actual sanction 
(Gribanov & Korneev, 1984, p. 488). The most significant characteristic of civil law liability is 
its “property feature”. Gribanov and Korneev (1984) believed that “to force the obligor to pay a 
debt, or to force the goods to be tendered” was not a form of liability in the Soviet sense but a 
“special form that forces the obligor to perform their obligation” (pp. 489-491). Smirnov et al. 
(1987) have further argued that “removing the defects detected after the work was completed” 
was not a form of liability in the Soviet sense, either (p. 395). In contrast, “compensation for 
the damages, including liquidated damages,” as well as loss of deposit, are considered forms of 
civil law liabilities (Smirnov et al., 1987, p. 397). We can conclude that the Soviet civil law 
was characterized by (a) the construction of a system of legal liability in obligation law and (b) 
a restriction of the contents of this legal liability. Under this kind of system, it is clear that not 
all remedies can be covered by the concept of liability. 
In China, Chapter 4 of the Economic Contract Law of 1981 had laid down provisions on 
the liability for breach of an economic contract, and so did the Law of Economic Contract 
involving Foreign Interest of 1985 and the Technology Contract Law of 1987. These laws were 
made obsolete when the CCL came into force in 1999. However, the General Principle of Civil 
Law of 1986 (GPCL) is still in force. The GPCL covers civil liability in its Chapter 6, with 
Article 106 as the general provision on this topic. GPCL Article 106(1) states that “citizens and 
legal persons who breach a contract or fail to perform other obligations shall bear civil 
liability.” GPCL Article 111 further provides that “[i]f one party fails to perform its contractual 
obligations or its performance fails to satisfy the terms of the contract, the other party is 
entitled to demand performance or remedial measures, as well as claim compensation for its 
losses.” We can hence observe that the rules of the GPCL involving breach of contract have the 
two following characteristics. First, the rules for breach have been designed and laid down as 
liabilities rather than remedies, which is similar to the Soviet approach. Second, demanding 
damage compensation, specific performance, or other remedial measures is conceptualized as 
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the aggrieved party’s right, rather than the liability in the Soviet sense.  
This kind of legal design has been changed in the CCL of 1999. CCL Article 107 states 
that “If one party fails to perform its obligations under a contract, or its performance fails to 
satisfy the terms of the contract, it shall bear the liabilities for breach of contract, such as to 
continue to perform its obligations, to take remedial measures, or to compensate for losses.” In 
this chapter, there are also liquidated damages and deposit. We can infer from the system and 
the letter of provisions, that the CCL designed the rules on breach with “liability” rather than 
“remedy”. Accordingly, a problem arises. On one hand, the concept of liability itself often 
suggests that the behavior leading to the breach is a misconduct that must be sanctioned by the 
state.
①
 Therefore, the scope of liability cannot be broad. On the other hand, the CCL has 
abandoned the general fault-based principle of the Economic Contract Law of 1981, and 
introduced so-called strict liability in the area of obligation of result
②
, not to mention including 
various remedies in the concept of “liability for breach of contract”. Thus, great tension arises 
between the concept of liability as a State sanction for some sort of misconduct, and the 
structure of “liability”, which is not necessarily based on fault and includes various remedies. 
As a result, we are confronted to a dilemma in defining “liability for breach of contract”. 
(2) Relative independence theory: a suitable prescription？ 
Relative independence theory has recognized the incoherency in the system of “liability 
for breach of contract” and has given a prescription for this symptom. There is indeed a 
problem of ambiguity with the concept of “liability for breach of contract”. Future codification 
of Chinese private laws might benefit by replacing the “liability design” of breach rules with a 
“remedy design.” For now, though, we have to make an appropriate choice between the unitary 
and relative independence theories.  
We probably cannot avoid broadening the content of liability for breach of contract when 
constructing an interpretative theory for the CCL.
③
 The term “liability” has been widely used 
                                                             
① Chinese Economic Contract Law provided liability for breach of contract in Article 29(1). Following that, it provided 
administrative liability and criminal liability, also in Article 29(1). This reflects the idea to treat liability for breach of contract 
as the same level of the both of these other liabilities. 
② The theory distinguishing between “obligations of means” (obligation de moyens) and “obligations of result” (obligation de 
résultat) originated in French law (Morita, 2002, pp. 11-16). It can be generally agreed to sort sales of goods into the category 
of obligations of result. This kind of distinction of obligations has been noticed and introduced by Chinese scholars as well 
(Yin, 1995, pp. 303-307; G. X. Zhu, 2012, pp. 546-549). 
③ No matter the liability for breach of contract in Chinese Contract Law, or the liability for tort in Chinese Tort Law, the scope 
of liability has drifted quite far away from the one in traditional continental law. It is unclear whether in the future a uniform 
concept of liability for nonperformance of obligations can be established or not. 
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in many different contexts: in the broad sense it is used in the concepts of “guarantee liability” 
and “warranty liability”, and also in that of “liability for breach of contract”. As a matter of fact, 
liability is commonly understood as some burden borne by people with moral or legal duties. 
Under the CCL, specific performance and other remedy measures have been merged into the 
concept of liability for breach of contract. This kind of “broad sense” at the level of legislation 
can hardly be “corrected” at the level of interpretation. In fact, a flexible interpretation of the 
concept of “liability for breach of contract” should not be problematic, because it will not push 
the judge to punish the breaching party more seriously. Therefore, it should be tolerable to 
interpret “liability for breach of contract” from a functional perspective.  
As G. X. Zhu argues, the provisions of Chapter 7 of the CCL represent the functional 
equivalents to “remedies for breach”; “liability for breach of contract” actually means that 
when one party fails to perform its obligation or its performance fails to satisfy the standard of 
agreement, “the aggrieved party is entitled to require specific performance, taking remedial 
measures, damage compensation, or liquidated damages.”(G. X. Zhu, 2008, p. 396) This 
functional interpretation method could avoid many of the problems of the relative 
independence theory.  
First, the relative independence theory also faces its own “ambiguity” problems. It is 
based on the “nonperformance theory”, which considers WLD as special legal consequence for 
breach of contractual obligation, but not a special statute liability. But if the relative 
independence theory argues that the concept of “liability” stands for a kind of obligation that 
cannot include all types of remedies, how could it avoid the ambiguity that springs from the 
shared usage of the term “liability” in the two concepts of WLD (warranty liability for defects) 
and LBC (liability for breach of contract)? Its criticism of the ambiguity of the legal notion of 
“liability” makes it unavoidably fall into self-contradiction.  
Second, WLD is itself ambiguous as a joint concept. As analyzed above, the juxtaposition 
of “liability” with “warranty” easily gives rise to confusion. The joint concept was understood 
in many judicial decisions as an a priori obligation of warranty rather than an a posteriori 
liability for breach of that warranty. The relative independence theory can hardly overcome 
this ambiguity. 
Third, the relative independence theory jeopardizes the unity of the remedy system for 
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nonperformance or breach of contract. It does so by insisting that LBC and WLD are governed 
by two different ideas. This interpretation actually relies on the “statutory liability theory”, 
which harms the unity of the CCL remedy system by attempting to revive Roman law’s special 
remedies for latent defects (i.e. by attempting to revive a double-track remedy system). 
In conclusion, the unitary theory may not be perfect, but remains preferable as a general 
interpretative theory. The relative independence theory has certainly pointed out some 
important problems, but fails to give a satisfying solution. Not only does it fail to solve the 
original problem, but it creates new ones in attempting to do so. 
2.3 Conclusion of this chapter 
Research on Chinese sales law in the past was dominated by a debate on comparative law, 
rarely supported by a thorough empirical analysis on the actual application of the CCL. This 
neglect of empirical data is a weak point of studies. It is a pity, because proper empirical 
analysis is a powerful tool for revealing problems in the application of legal rules, for example, 
the ambiguity of a legal concept like WLD. 
In the first section of this chapter, I collected 112 decisions as samples to conduct such an 
empirical analysis on the practical application of the WLD concept in Chinese law. I 
discovered that there were much more decisions than expected that used WLD in the sense of 
an a priori obligation of warranty rather than an a posteriori liability for breach of that 
obligation. It appeared clearly from this analysis that some positions advocated in the 
theoretical dispute on WLD seemed far removed from the realities of its application. Next, I 
explored the cause of significant divergence in understanding of WLD. The direct reason 
appeared to be that many senior judges and scholars defined WLD as an a priori obligation of 
warranty. If we dig deeper, it can be found that these divergences are due to the confusing 
structure of the WLD concept: joining “warranty” and “liability” in the concept leads it to be 
interpreted as an a priori obligation of warranty on the one side and an a posteriori liability for 
breach of that obligation on the other. Then, I examined the historical development of WLD 
and found out that the joint concept has been firstly used in Japanese civil code. Given that the 
legislative logic of the Japanese Civil Code is to provide remedies for defects directly rather 
than to stipulate warranty against defects before providing remedies, the sense of the seller’s 
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warranty against defects has to be deducted from those rules on remedies, and WLD in 
Japanese law can easily be interpreted as forms of legal remedies, rather than as the a priori 
obligation of warranty itself. This approach exacerbates the confusion on the concept of WLD. 
The concept of WLD declined not only of its confusing structure, but also, more 
essentially, because the limited remedies established by it cannot satisfactorily remedy 
nonconforming unascertained subject matters in modern society. In the second section of this 
chapter I reviewed the modernization process of German obligation law and explained the 
academic proposals for the reform of Japanese obligation law. As to the former, I pointed out 
that the essential reason for which the special remedy established by warranty liability could 
survive in the old German law was the dominance of Historical School in Germany. The 
disadvantage of this School was that it lacked motivation to reform the old legal rules which 
might out of date. Nevertheless, after a hundred years, the German obligation law finally 
moved towards a unified remedy system for nonperformance of contractual obligation. As to 
the reform of Japanese obligation law, it turns out most Japanese scholars favor interpreting 
warranty liability as a contractual liability, while those drafting the pPROL have clearly called 
for a unified remedy system for all sorts of breach in their proposals, including defects in thing. 
As to Chinese civil law, Chinese scholars have come to the consensus that there is no 
independent concept of WLD in the CCL. At the end of this chapter I argued that LBC has 
indeed been used in a broad sense in the CCL and that this legislative design cannot be 
“corrected” by any sort of scholarly interpretation. The relative independence theory cannot 
solve this problem, and will instead create other problems in its attempt to do so. In short, the 
interpretation of the unitary theory may not be perfect, but is preferable to the relative 
independence one for interpreting the positive rules under the CCL. 
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Chapter 3  The Rise of Seller’s Obligation to Tender Conforming 
Subject Matters 
In Chapter 2, I have demonstrated the divergence in the understanding and application of 
warranty liability for defects, recalled the historical development of warranty rules since 
Roman law and described the decline of warranty liability for defects in many civil law 
systems. In China, warranty liability for defects should be abandoned to be fundamental 
analysis instrument, not only because it cannot meet the requirement of modern economics, but 
also because of its confusion borne from joining the two concepts of “warranty” and “liability”. 
In this chapter, I would like to introduce new instruments for analyzing situations where 
inadequate subject matters are sold, and attempt to construct an interpretative theory on the 
basis of those instruments. 
The new analysis instruments are “conformity of the subject matter” and “nonconformity 
of the subject matter”, which have become wide recognized in international conventions and 
model rules concerning sales contract. In this dissertation they will be used in the sense of 
conformity “with the contract”, rather than with regulations, and only in the sense of 
nonconformity in the thing (i.e. material inadequacy), rather than in the title. Nonconformity of 
the subject matter in thing has no substantial difference with the notion of “SachMangel” in 
the new German law, but should not be confused with the notion of “defects in thing” in 
Japanese civil code or the one in the civil code of Taiwan, China. The introduction of 
nonconformity of the subject matter as a basic analyzing instrument in contract law is based on 
the following considerations. Firstly, this concept may avoid the confusion arising from the 
different definitions of the notion of “defects” in different civil law systems. Secondly, 
nonconformity of goods has already become a basic concept in the CISG and some influential 
model rules concerning contract for cross-national sales. Thirdly, and most importantly, the 
influence of these model rules actually led the drafters of the Chinese Contract Law (CCL) to 
design its provisions following the notion of “nonconformity of the subject matter”. As a result, 
this concept has already seeped into a number of important provisions of the Chinese Contract 
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Law of 1999, while the more general and less precise notion of “defects” is only used in some 
less weighty provisions connected with pre-contract duties. For these reasons, it should be 
beneficial to interpret the CCL in the light of the notion of nonconformity of the subject matter. 
In the following sections, I would like to first examine the development of conformity of 
the subject matter in international contract law and discuss its potential as an analyzing 
instrument for interpreting the CCL, then use it to construct the system of obligation to tender 
conforming subject matters in the CCL, and redefine rules on warranty liability for defects in 
the Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract issued by the Supreme People’s Court 
in 2012 (JILSC). 
3.1 The rise and development of “conformity with the contract” 
3.1.1 Worldwide concepts: nonconformity and conformity with the contract 
To avoid different understandings of what defects in goods could constitute breach of 
contract, the CISG has created a uniform concept of “lack of conformity” with the contract, 
which includes not only differences in quality, but also differences in quantity and defects in 
packing (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 411). During the past several decades, more and 
more countries have introduced this concept: some of them, like China, directly adopted the 
new concept in its uniform contract law; some others, like Germany, used it to redefine its 
traditional concept when reforming its obligation law. Regarding the reform of Japanese 
obligation law, the prevailing view reflected in the pPROL is to redefine the traditional concept 
kashi (defects) in the Japanese civil code (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 17), while certain other scholars 
suggest using keiyaku hutekigou (nonconformity) to replace kashi (JCCRC, 2009b, pp. 17-18). 
3.1.1.1 Lack of conformity in the CISG 
Different legal systems have been using various legal concepts to settle problems of quality 
in the sale of goods. For example, U.S. law has been using concepts like “express warranty” 
(UCC §2-313), “warranty of merchantability” (UCC §2-314) and “warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose” (UCC §2-315); French law differentiates “latent defects” (vices cachés) 
and “apparent defects” (vices apparents) (Honnold, 1999, pp. 252-253). The diversity of those 
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different concepts has been a complicating factor for international trade disputes. It is those 
divergences that stimulated the development of a uniform law for international sales. In 1964 a 
diplomatic conference of 28 States was held at the Hague and two conventions were agreed 
upon: the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the 
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF), both of which went into 
force in 1972 (Honnold, 1999, pp. 5-6). Based on those two conventions, the CISG was 
approved in 1980 and finally came into force in 1988 (Kröll, Mistelis, & Viscasillas, 2011, pp. 
4-5). It is this convention that introduced the notion of “nonconformity”. The drafters of the 
CISG compared different concepts in many Western countries when dealing with the problems 
of quality in the sale of goods, and distilled a uniform concept from it: “lack of conformity”. 
This concept differs from most domestic laws so that it does not burden itself with elusive 
distinctions, such as the Swiss legal distinction between the ordinary characteristics of goods 
(Sacheigenschaft) and a specific warranty that particular characteristics exist (Zusicherung), or 
the distinction between completely different goods (aliud) and merely non-conforming goods 
(peius), or again the distinction between latent defects (vices cachés) and apparent defects 
(vices apparents) (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 411-412). The drafters believed that 
“such differences in interpretation will hinder unification of the law”, because “there is a risk 
that each court will interpret [CISG] Article 35 in accordance with its own domestic legal 
classification.” (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 412) The consequent creation of the 
concept of “nonconformity” is considered to be an “excellent illustration of the work of 
simplification” strived for by the CISG (Pham & Wautelet, 2001, p. 333). 
Nonconformity in Article 35 of the CISG differs from its predecessor in Article 33 of the 
ULIS. Firstly, nonconformity does not affect the fulfillment of obligation of delivery, thus the 
buyer can only appeal to the general remedies for nonperformance of contract provided in 
Article 45, but not to remedies for late delivery. Secondly, nonconformity also includes 
immaterial discrepancies. Thirdly, nonconformity includes problems in quality, quantity, and 
packing, as well as situations with completely different goods (aliud) (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 411; Kröll, Mistelis, & Viscasillas, 2011, pp. 491-498). It should be noted 
that some French and Italian scholars have been worried about the loss of the special remedies 
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for aliud (i.e. equivalent to the remedies for a non-delivery).
①
 
The CISG’s concept of nonconformity differs from the Mangel of the old German Civil 
Code in the following respects. First, contrarily to the objective standard of Mangel, the 
nonconformity standard is constructed from a subjective perspective, the term itself shows 
close relationship with the requirement of the agreement, with objective standards only used as 
secondary factors. Second, this concept covers nonconformity not only in quality, but also in 
quantity and in packing (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 411). Last but not least, 
nonconformity leads to general remedies for nonperformance of contract, while Mangel was 
linked to a special remedy regime in the old German Civil Code. 
3.1.1.2 Conforming goods in U.S. law 
The U.S.’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) had developed a concept of contractual 
nonconformity before its internationalization by the CISG. UCC §2-106 provides a definition 
of conformity: “Goods or Conduct including any part of performance are conforming or 
conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract”. 
The 2003 official comment on UCC §2-508 compares cure within the agreed time for 
performance and the one after the expiration of agreed time for performance. It states that the 
conforming goods should be conforming to the contracted-for quality, quantity, assortment, and 
other similar obligations under the contract. But the seller’s tender of conforming goods 
required to effect a cure may not conform to the contracted time for performance (ALI & 
NCCUSL, 2010, 134-135). This means the merely delay of performance without 
nonconformity in quality, quantity, and other similar conditions, can only be treated as 
“nonconforming conduct”, but not “nonconforming goods”. Nonconforming goods merely 
refer to lack of conformity in quality, quantity, and other similar natures of goods. For now, 
nonconformity has been an important and wide accepted term in American legal textbooks (e.g., 
Ayres & Klass, 2012, pp. 936-937). 
3.1.1.3 Conformity of goods in European law 
European private law has been on a path of progressive unification. Since the l980s, and 
                                                             
① As to the French opinion, see Pham (2001, p. 308). As to views of Italian observers, see Ferreri (2005, pp. 232-233). 
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particularly in the 1990s, large quantities of EU directives have played important roles in the 
unification of European private law, especially in the area of contract law (Müller-Graff, 2011, 
pp. 153-155). In 1999, the European Union promulgated a Directive on the Sale of Consumers 
Goods and Associated Guarantees (1999/44/EC), also known as the “Consumer Sales 
Directive”. This directive borrowed some uniform legal concepts and rules from the CISG 
(Bonell, 2008, pp. 6-8), making “conformity with the contract” one of the directive’s 
fundamental notions.
①
 Article 2-1 of the Consumer Sales Directive states that: “The seller 
must deliver goods to the consumer which are in conformity with the contract of sale”. Because 
Article 11-1 requires EU Member States to transpose the directive by means of laws, 
regulations, or administrative provisions which should come into force no later than January 1, 
2002,
②
 many European countries have as result launched a project to supplement or modernize 
their contract law. Germany took the opportunity to carry out the so-called “big solution” (die 
groβe Lösung), i.e. the reform of its whole obligation law. On January 1, 2002, the Act 
concerning the Modernization of Obligation Law (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts) 
came into force, introducing a new German Civil Code (BGB) (Haas et al., 2002, pp. 2-4). 
Article 433 of the new BGB, which is said to be modeled after the CISG, requires the seller to 
deliver goods free from defects (Beckmann, 2008, p. 2). It seems that the concept of freedom 
from defects (Mängelfreiheit) has almost the same meaning as conformity of the goods. 
Moreover, German scholars believe that CISG Article 35, the core concept of which is 
“conformity of the goods”, has inspired the liability for defects in thing (Sachmängelhaftung) 
to be based on general liabilities for breach of contract (Honsell, 2010, p. 385 ). 
Although with some delay, the U.K. and France respectively transposed the rules of 
directive into the UK’s Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations in 2002③ and the 
French Consumer Code (Code de la Consommation) in 2005.
④
 It appears that following the 
impetus of the EU Consumer Sales Directive of 1999, the uniform concept of “conformity” and 
the rules for defining it have been in some measure accepted by the major European countries. 
But although this directive partly harmonized laws on consumer sales, barriers to the “free 
movement of goods” inside the Europe Union still survived in other sale areas. This is why 
                                                             
① See Directive on the Sale of Consumers Goods and Associated Guarantees 1999/44/EC 25.5.1999, OJ L 171/14. 
② See Directive on the Sale of Consumers Goods and Associated Guarantees 1999/44/EC 25.5.1999, OJ L 171/14. 
③ See 2002/3045.s.52(1)of the SoGA. 
④ There are also two amendments in French Civil Code (Miller, L., 2007, p. 397). 
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recently there has been a movement towards a more general unification of sales law. In October, 
2011, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union published a “Proposal 
for a Common European Sales Law” (pCESL), the scope of whose application would cover all 
business-to consumer transactions and contracts between traders where at least one of the 
parties is a micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises (SME), drawing upon Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361 of the 6
th
 May of 2003.
①
 This proposal continues to use 
“conformity” as its cornerstone. The title of Chapter 10 of the pCESL is “the seller’s 
obligations”, and its Article 91 states the following main obligations of the seller:  
“The seller of goods or the supplier of digital content (in this part referred to as ‘the seller’) 
must: (a) deliver the goods or supply the digital content; (b) transfer the ownership of the 
goods, including the tangible medium on which the digital content is supplied; (c) ensure 
that the goods or the digital content are in conformity with the contract; (d) ensure that the 
buyer has the right to use the digital content in accordance with the contract; and (e) 
deliver such documents representing or relating to the goods or documents relating to the 
digital content as may be required by the contract.”②  
It is clear from point (c) that the delivery of goods and digital content conform to the 
stipulations of the contract is one of the seller’s primary duties. It can be imagined that the 
European sales law might be further harmonized in the direction that the pCESL has pointed to, 
and the notion of conformity is likely to be further accepted in many European countries. 
3.1.2 Adoption of conformity of the subject matter under the CCL  
In the preceding subsection I have shown that the conformity concept has been embraced 
in a number of countries. There are clues that the drafters of the CCL have also fallen under its 
charm. In fact, the influence is so evident that this concept could even be wielded as a useful 
analyzing instrument in the interpretation of the CCL, especially when comparing it 
internationally with other sales laws. 
Firstly, it appears that many provisions in the CCL (1999) have been inspired by the CISG 
and the UCC. For instance, according to the Paraphrase on the Contract law of the People’s 
                                                             
① There are debates over the scope of its application (Ortiz & Viscasillas, 2012, pp. 241-258). 
② COM (2011) 635 final. 
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Republic of China (PRC), edited by the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), Article 153 of the CCL has been 
inspired from Article 35 of the CISG and Section 2-313 of the UCC (Hu, 2009, pp. 233-234). 
This Commission is a work department which was responsible for drafting the initial 
provisions of the CCL, therefore this comment may indeed reflect the actual drafting progress 
of CCL Article 153. 
Secondly, the words employed in the text of provisions on requirement of quality of 
subject matters are quite close to CISG Article 35. Conformity can be translated as “shihe” or 
“fuhe” in Chinese, while nonconformity essentially corresponds to the “bufu” expression in 
CCL Articles 153-158; as a matter of fact, the “bufu” expression has been used by certain 
Chinese scholars to refer to the nonconformity in the CISG (W. Li, 2009, pp. 160-162).  
Thirdly, the standards for determining whether a subject matter is adequate or not in the 
CCL are almost the same as the ones in the CISG. Both require the subject matter (a) to be in 
conformity with the agreement and specific instructions of the seller, (b) to meet their ordinary 
purpose or to be expected as the same kind of subject matter, in the absence of explicit 
agreement; (c) to be identical with the sample provided by the seller; and (d) to be contained or 
packed in a way that is sufficient to protect the subject matter, in the absence of explicit 
agreement (Mo, 1999, pp. 235-236). Some U.S. scholars who compared the CISG, the CCL and 
the UCC agree that conformity is an appropriate instrument for comparing the three regimes; It 
has been suggested that rules on the quality of goods under the CCL and under the CISG 
essentially share the same idea and expressions, although there are slight differences between 
the two regarding: (a) the unclear relationship among CCL Articles 153, 154, and 61, 62, and 
(b) the special treatment on latent defects in sample provided in CCL Article 169 (Giuliano, 
2006, pp. 340-341; Mo, 1999, pp. 236-237). 
3.1.3 Reconsideration of the notion of defects under Chinese law 
3.1.3.1 Different meanings of defects in academic research 
Many Chinese civil law scholars prefer to use “defects” rather than “nonconformity” in 
their studies in spite that the latter concept is used much more frequently in both the CCL and 
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the legal practice (e.g., L. M. Wang, 2003, p. 398; Cui, 2010, p. 386; Han, 2010, p. 389; Ma & 
Yu, 2007, p. 642). D. F. Xu (2006) stated that: “If the defects have been disclosed, the mere 
lack of a certain function in the product will not constitute defects; but if a functional defects 
has not been disclosed, it will definitely give rise to liability for defects”, and that the common 
basis for liability for defects and liability for culpa in contrahendo could be reflected in “the 
relationship between defects and disclosure” (pp. 88-89). It is clear that, in the preceding 
literature, defects that should be disclosed in the process of contract conclusion and the one that 
leads to liability for defects must be differentiated at the level of both meaning and function, 
otherwise the logic is confusing: defects that has not been disclosed will not constitute defects. 
H. L. Wang (2005) argues that the concept of nonconformity in quality specified in CCL 
Article 111 could be considered as one of defects in quality, and “the concept of defects may 
also provide basis for the pre-contractual obligations and the collateral obligations” (pp. 72-73). 
Obviously, defects here do not only refer to the nonconformity in quality in CCL Article 111, 
but also play an important role for clarifying the pre-contract obligations and the collateral 
obligations. Therefore, defects have different meanings and functions in academic research and 
cannot be merely sorted into the instruments for analyzing breach of contract or the ones for 
determining the pre-contract obligations. 
The different functions carried by defects have shown that it is a more general concept, 
which is often connected with an objective standard. If we go back to the initial meaning of 
defects in the traditional civil law systems, we can observe that most legislators initially 
employed objective rather than subjective standards to define the notion of “defects”. A case in 
point is the old German obligation law.  
The old BGB Article 459 firstly required the seller to warrant the buyer that at the time 
when the risk passed to the buyer, “it is free from defects which diminish or destroy its value or 
fitness for its ordinary use or the use presupposed in the contract. An insignificant diminution 
in value or fitness is not taken into consideration” (C. H. Wang, 1907, p. 100), then in the same 
provision it required the seller to warrant that, “at the time the risk passes, the thing has the 
promised qualities.” (C. H. Wang, 1907, p. 100) The notion of “defects” was only defined in 
light of the “ordinary use or the use presupposed in the contract”, but not primarily according 
to “the promise”. Therefore, defects and breach of promise may be interpreted as different 
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systems, and the former should only be determined from the objective perspective. 
Accompanying the rise of the performance theory (Erfüllungstheorie), the subjective 
standard for determining defects has been more emphasized (Westermann, 1995, p.199). When 
modernizing the old German obligation law, the new wine was put into the old bottle: as 
Medicus and Lorenz (2010b, §77 Rn. 77, 81, 85) point out, “Mangel” has been redefined with 
subjective meanings in the first rank (subjektive Fehlerbegriff). The new BGB Article 434 
requires the thing sold free from defects as to quality when the risk passed, and the foremost 
standard to determine whether the thing is free from defects is “the agreed quality”. In the 
absence of such agreement, the thing being free from defects as to quality can be determined in 
light of the following standards: (a) the use specified in the contract, and otherwise (b) the 
normal use and “its quality and condition is such as is usual in things of the same kind and can 
be expected by the buyer by virtue of its nature” (Tamm, 2006, pp. 52-53). It is obvious that 
the subjective meaning of defects has been given priority over the objective meaning and the 
new German law is moving towards the approach of the CISG and EU Consumer Sales 
Directive of 1999. 
The academic researches that consider nonconformity of the subject matter provided in 
CCL Article 111 and Article 155 as defects, may be inspired from the approach of the 
redefinition of Mangel in the new German law. However, the reform of German obligation law 
reflects that the old German law at first did not define defects with the subject meaning in the 
first rank; on the contrary, the objective meaning had been put in the first rank since this 
concept was established. It is understandable that the German legislators preferred to redefine a 
traditional concept rather than to replace it with a new one from international conventions; on 
the other hand, it is not necessary for Chinese scholars to follow the German approach to 
interpret nonconformity as defects, unless the Chinese contract law is facing the same problem 
as the German law did. If we examine the provisions of the CCL carefully, it can be found that 
the law of sales contract was more influenced by the CISG, while the laws of contract for gift 
and contract for storage have borrowed some rules from traditional civil codes. As a result, on 
one hand, nonconformity has become the stone concept in the law of sales contract (CCL Arts. 
153-155) and contract for work (CCL Art. 262), on the other hand, there are still rules with the 
concept “defects” in the law of contract for gift (CCL Art. 191), contract for storage (CCL Art. 
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370), and contract for trading-trust (CCL Art. 417).  
Given the considerable weight of contract for sales, for works, and for lease, it is fair to 
say, the CCL has, from the beginning, basically refused to adopt the traditional notion of 
defects, but established similar notion and related rules with the CISG. The following questions 
should be: in what way the Chinese legislators have actually employed defects in the preceding 
four provisions? Are they actually the same as nonconformity? 
3.1.3.2 Defects in Chinese positive law 
In this subsection, each of these provisions that have employed the concept defects will be 
examined. The first provision that mentions “defects” relates to latent defects in sample for 
sales. CCL Article 169 provides in this respect that: “In a sale by sample, if the buyer was not 
aware of a latent defect in the sample, the subject matter delivered by the seller shall 
nevertheless comply with the normal quality standard for a like item, even though the subject 
matter delivered complies with the sample.” No comparable provisions can be found in U.S. 
law, German law, the CISG,
①
 or Japanese civil law. Latent defects in CCL Article 169 cannot 
be understood from the perspective of nonconformity with the agreement because these defects 
only concern samples in the pre-contractual negotiation phase. The subject matter tendered 
afterwards with the same kind of defects as the sample will be viewed as nonconforming only 
if the defects make them fail to meet the normal requirement for subject matter in the same 
kind, but they would not be considered as nonconforming merely because of the failure of 
being fit for a particular purpose of the buyer. In short, the latent defects in sample cannot be 
defined as nonconformity with the contract.  
The second provision that mentions defects relates to gift contracts. According to the first 
sentence of CCL Article 191(1), the donor is not liable for any defects in the gift property if he 
did not contract for an obligation to the donee; CCL Article 191(2) then provides: “Where the 
donor intentionally omitted to inform the donee of the defects or warranted the absence of any 
defects, thereby causing loss to the donee, he shall be liable for damages.” Yet CCL Article 191 
would not make sense if “defect” was defined in a solely subjective sense of nonconformity to 
the contract, because no donor can be excused under CCL Article 191(2) if the defects refer to 
                                                             
① See A. M. Giuliano (2006); see also J. S. Mo (1999). 
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quality conditions that do not comply with the requirement agreed in the contract. On the 
contrary, it seems reasonable to define defects with an objective standard here. Firstly, most 
contracts for gift with no obligation on the donee would not specify the quality condition of the 
gift property and, the special requirement of the donee rarely occurs even if it is normal to find 
some unsatisfactory conditions in the gift property, comparing with the new item of the same 
kind. Secondly, since the donee gets a benefit from the contract without consideration, it is not 
unreasonable to consider that he should bear the burden of possible defects. Therefore, it is 
unnecessary to hold the donor to a general obligation to warrant the gift to meet normal quality 
standards for a like item, except if the parties expressly agree so. It is more reasonable to hold 
him instead of an obligation to inform the donee of any defects, as provided in Article 191(2). 
And this obligation to inform only makes sense in case defects are defined by an objective 
standard rather than a subjective one, because the contract will only rarely set a quality 
standard.  
Another two provisions contained defects are Article 370 and Article 417. CCL Article 
370 provides that if the deposit delivered by the depositor has defects or requires special safe 
keeping measures in light of its nature, the depositor shall inform the depository of the relevant 
situation. If the depositor failed to inform, the depository is not liable for damages. Likewise, 
according to CCL Article 417, if a trust item was defective, perishable or susceptible to 
deterioration at the time it was delivered to the trustee-trader, upon consent by the trustor, the 
trustee-trader may dispose of the item; where the trustee-trader is unable to contact the trustor 
in time, it may dispose of the trust item in a reasonable manner. These two provisions are 
related to contracts which rarely need to set subjective quality standards against the delivery of 
defective subject matter as long as they do not cause losses to the depositary or trustee-trader, 
which is why the provisions limit themselves to affirming the obligation to inform or the right 
to dispose. As we can see, these provisions would make no sense if the defects were defined 
from a subjective perspective of contractual agreement (no quality standards to conform to), 
which means they must be defined objectively, with regard to the instability of the subject 
matter. 
In addition, there are a few rules that mention “defects” in the Chinese Auction Law 
(CAL). CAL Articles 18, 27, and 35 are related to the obligation of the trustor and auctioneer to 
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disclose the defects of the auctioned object, and CAL Article 61 mainly regards the obligations 
of the trustor and auctioneer to compensate for damages in case they breach such obligation to 
disclose. These rules are unique, compared with similar rules in German law and Japanese law, 
both of which generally impose no liability for defects on the auctioneer unless some 
exceptions.
①
 In Chinese law, the trustor and auctioneer must disclose the defects which they 
have been aware of. The defects can only be defined from an objective perspective as there can 
be no detailed meeting of intention between the trustor or auctioneer and the many bidders, 
who may have different intentions. Defects in the subject matter for auction should be 
understood as lack of certain quality that can be normally expected by a rational third party; 
however, these defects are not necessarily inconsistent with the agreement, meaning that the 
seller should be held to no more than an obligation to inform.  
To sum up, all the provisions that mention “defects” in the Chinese positive law are 
concerned mainly with the bargaining process and with contracts that do not normally set 
express quality standards on the subject matter. Accordingly, the obligation of the seller is 
usually limited to an obligation to inform of any defects, and this would only really make sense 
if “defects” were defined in an objective rather than subjective sense. 
3.1.3.2 Different meanings of defects and the adoption of nonconformity 
According to the two preceding subsections, we can distinguish between two different 
meanings of defects. One is the “defects” in the sense of nonconformity to the contract, a 
meaning featuring prominently in academic research. Another is the “defects” in the sense in 
which it is actually used in the Chinese positive law. As Table 3.1 shows, there are significant 
differences between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
① See BGB Article 445 and JCC Article 570. 
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Table 3.1   
Defects with complex meanings 
 Defects as used to in academic research Defects as occurring in positive law 
Relevant 
Provisions 
CCL Articles 153, 154, 155, 216, 244, 
262, 62, 111, 148, and 158 
CCL Articles 169,191,370,and 417; CAL 
Articles 18, 27, 35, and 61 
Legal Effects Remedies for breach of contract Obligation to disclose 
 
Standards for 
Determination 
First, fail to satisfy the requirement of 
contractual agreement;  
Second, in the absence of contractual 
agreement, fail to satisfy the requirement 
of the purpose of contract, usage of 
transaction, national standard or industrial 
standard, and other standards provided by 
law. 
Fail to satisfy the ordinary standard of the 
same kind item or normal expectation of a 
rational third party. 
 
It is not proper to use defects in a too general sense, as this may lead to confusion in legal 
decisions due to lack of guidance on the positive rules. In order to bridge the gap between the 
two meanings of defects and to improve the interpretative theory, I would like to propose the 
concept of “nonconformity” as a basic analyzing instrument in study. Among the 
characteristics of this concept, we can count that: (a) it exists no later than the transfer of risk 
from the seller to the buyer; (b) it is judged mainly by a subjective standard, especially through 
the contractual agreement; (c) it is applied to both ascertained objects and unascertained 
objects; and (d) it is mainly related to remedies for breach of contract. 
There are four aspects of distinction that can be observed between defects and 
nonconformity in positive law: (a) defects always exist in the bargaining process when no 
effective contract has yet been concluded, while nonconformity exists no earlier than the 
conclusion of contract; (b) defects exist only in ascertained objects, while nonconformity may 
exist in either ascertained objects or unascertained ones; (c) the standards for determining 
whether a defect exists mainly depend on objective factors, usually in terms of the ordinary 
purpose and normal expectation of a rational third party, while the standards for nonconformity 
mainly depend on the agreement itself, with objective standards coming into use only if the 
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contract does not specify subjective ones; and (d) the major legal consequence associated with 
“defects” is the duty to disclose, while in the case of nonconformity the consequence should be 
remedies for breach of contract. 
3.2 The development of the obligation to tender conforming subject matters 
After deciding on conformity and nonconformity as the basic concepts for analysis in this 
dissertation, the following section will focus on the rise of the obligation to tender conforming 
subject matters. Both foreign laws and Chinese law recognize that the seller should bear such 
an obligation. 
3.2.1 The obligation to tender conforming subject matters in foreign legal systems 
3.2.1.1 The obligation of conformity of goods in the CISG 
CISG Article 35 explicitly states that conformity of goods is one of the seller’s obligations. 
It means the seller must deliver goods in conformity with the contact. Breach of such an 
obligation would constitute “failure to perform”, and the buyer could then pursue any of the 
remedies provided under CISG Article 45, including supplementary performance, avoidance of 
contract, price reduction, and damage compensation. However, there are generally conditions 
before the buyer to require these remedies, namely the serving of a notice of nonconformity 
and the exercise of the seller’s right to cure (Sono, 2009, pp. 118-119). As to the standards of 
conformity, according to CISG Article 35(1), priority should be given to the requirement of the 
contractual agreement; in the absence of contractual requirements, subsidiary standards should 
be used to decide the standard of goods for sales. These standards are stipulated in Article 
35(2), including:  
“(a) [being] fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily 
be used; (b) [being] fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to 
the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances 
show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's 
skill and judgment; (c) possess[ing] the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to 
the buyer as a sample or model; and (d) [being] contained or packaged in the manner usual 
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for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and 
protect the goods.” (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 416-426)  
The great success of the CISG has made this kind of legislative technique gain in 
worldwide influence.
①
 
3.2.1.2 The seller’s obligation of conformity in European law 
Since we have briefly discussed the content of conforming goods in U.S. law in subsection 
3.1.1.2, I will now turn to the understanding of the notion in European law. 
The EU Consumer Sales Directive of 1999 explicitly stipulates the requirement of 
conformity with the contract. Article 2(2) of this Directive states that:  
“Consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they: (a) comply 
with the description given by the seller and possess the qualities of the goods which the 
seller has held out to the consumer as a sample or model; (b) are fit for any particular 
purpose for which the consumer requires them and which he made known to the seller at 
the time of conclusion of the contract and which the seller has accepted; (c) are fit for the 
purposes for which goods of the same type are normally used; (d) show the quality and 
performance which are normal in goods of the same type and which the consumer can 
reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and taking into account any public 
statements on the specific characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller, the 
producer or his representative, particularly in advertising or on labelling.” 
However, the approach of “presumption” is confusing, and the relationship among these 
requirements needs to be clarified. For example, it is confusing to say: the consumer goods are 
presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they are either fit for any particular purpose 
for which the consumer requires them and which the seller should have known and has 
accepted, or fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally used. On the 
contrary, the ordinary purpose should be used only if the preceding standards are not available 
and once it applies, the goods should be, but not presumed to be conforming with the contract. 
As to the pCESL, Articles 99 to 102 of it explicitly stipulates the requirement of 
                                                             
① As to other legislations impacted by the CISG around the world, see Basedow (2005, p. 498). 
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conformity with contract. pCESL Article 99 (1) provides that, to conform with the contract, 
“the goods or digital content must: (a) be of the quantity, quality and description required by 
the contract; (b) be contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract; and (c) be 
supplied along with any accessories, installation instructions or other instructions required by 
the contract.” If the contract does not stipulate any requirements of conformity for the goods, 
those requirements should be decided according to pCESL Articles 100-102. Article 100 lays 
down the “criteria for conformity of the goods and digital content”:  
“The goods or digital content must: (a) be fit for any particular purpose made known to the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show 
that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for the buyer to rely, on the seller’s 
skill and judgment; (b) be fit for the purposes for which goods or digital content of the 
same description would ordinarily be used; (c) possess the qualities of goods or digital 
content which the seller held out to the buyer as a sample or model; (d) be contained or 
packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a 
manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods; (e) be supplied along with such 
accessories, installation instructions or other instructions as the buyer may expect to 
receive; (f) possess the qualities and performance capabilities indicated in any 
pre-contractual statement which forms part of the contract terms by virtue of Article 69; 
and (g) possess such qualities and performance capabilities as the buyer may expect. When 
determining what the consumer may expect of the digital content regard is to be had to 
whether or not the digital content was supplied in exchange for the payment of a price.”①  
It can be observed that the standards for determining nonconformity of goods and digital 
contents provided in this article are more complex than the ones provided in the EU Consumer 
Sales Directive of 1999, largely due to the application scope of the pCESL has been extended 
to include digital content. It needs to be noted that one innovative design can be found in 
pCESL Article 99(2), which states: “in order to conform with the contract the goods or digital 
content must also meet the requirements of Articles 100, 101 and 102, save to the extent that 
the parties have agreed otherwise.” Eidenmuller et al. (2012) criticize that this clause would 
                                                             
① COM (2011) 635 final.  
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bring trouble to the understanding and application of conformity rules.
①
 This criticism makes 
sense, for the standards provided in pCESL Articles 100, 101 and 102 should only apply in the 
case that it lacks explicit requirement concerning the quantity, quality, manners for contain or 
package, installation instructions, and other similar conditions in the contract. If there are 
explicit contractual agreements, it is unnecessary and even confusing to apply pCESL Articles 
100, 101 and 102 simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, though the proposal is still in discussion and may not be adopted as such, it 
is plausible to say establishing rules on the obligation of conformity is the direction that pCESL 
is moving towards, and such obligation of conformity is likely to be more widely accepted in 
European law in the future. 
3.2.1.3 The seller’s main obligation of conforming tender in German law 
Both the CISG and the EU Consumer Sales Directive of 1999 have significantly 
influenced the modernization of German obligation law. After the modernization, the “seller’s 
main obligation of conforming tender” has been put on a par with the main obligations of title 
transfer (Eigentumsverschaffung) and of delivery (Brox & Walker, 2006, §2 Rn. 2-9). 
Meanwhile, the settlements for defects in thing and defects in title, which were separate in the 
past, have been merged together. It has been argued out: “Germany set forth corresponding 
provisions in the respect” of CISG Article 35 (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 412). 
Legislators of the new German obligation law have also mentioned that the conforming tender 
under BGB Article 433 was inspired from related rules in the CISG (Beckmann, 2008, p. 2). 
Freedom from defects (Mängelfreiheit) in BGB Article 434 is almost identical to “conformity 
with the contract” (Vertragsmäβigkeit) (Honsell, 2010, p. 385). It is plausible to say that both 
the new German law and its theory have accepted the idea and the approach to consider 
providing conforming tender as one of the seller’s main contractual obligations. More 
accurately speaking, it is the remedies for breach of contractual obligation that has absorbed 
the special remedies for latent defects, while it is the “seller’s main obligation to provide 
conforming tender” that has taken the replace of “statutory warranty” in the old German law 
(Westermann, 1995, §434, §459).  
                                                             
① They even considered these articles fell behind with the CISG, the EU Consumer Sales Directive of 1999, and even the Sale 
of Goods Act (1979) (Eidenmuller et al., 2012, p. 333). 
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3.2.2 The obligation to tender conforming subject matters in Chinese law 
As I mentioned in section 3.1, the CCL has directly adopted the concept conformity and 
built a series of rules on determining conformity. In this part, I would like to clarify certain 
categories of obligation of conformity and discuss the methods to determine the content of this 
obligation. 
3.2.2.1 The categories of obligation of conformity 
In the CCL, the requirements of the obligation of conformity of goods can be inferred from: 
(1) the explicit requirement in contractual agreement (CCL Art. 153 sentence (1)); (2) the 
quality instruction, as well as the sample provided by the seller (CCL Art. 153 sentence (2), Art. 
168), and (3) various supplementary standards, including national standard, industrial standard, 
ordinary standard, and other standards supported by the purpose of contract (CCL Art. 62 item 
(1)). The former two requirements can be understood as obligations arising from the consensus 
of contracting parties’ intentions, while the last one including various standards should be 
considered as “implied contents” provided by the law of “gap filler” (White & Summers, 2010, 
p.146). 
Agreed obligations of conformity of the subject matter include not only explicitly specified 
contents in the contract, but also other kinds of “agreements”, such as quality instructions and 
samples provided by the seller. According to CCL Article 153, “The seller must deliver subject 
matters which are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which 
are contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract”. The NPCSC’s Legislative 
Affairs Commission stated in the Paraphrase on Chinese Contract Law that:  
“Similar content has been stipulated in CISG Article 35…strictly speaking, the instructions 
on the goods’ quality provided by the seller are also a kind of agreement on quality 
between contracting parties. It belongs to expressed agreement on subject matters for sales. 
It is helpful to refer to UCC §2-313…” (Hu, 1999, pp. 233-234)   
Thus, according to this Commission, the legislation of these rules in the CCL has been 
inspired by the CISG and the UCC; instruction on quality is considered as a kind of agreement, 
similar with the expressed warranty of the UCC (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 1992). 
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On the other hand, when there is no explicit agreement and no accurate content can be 
interpreted from the contract, obligations as to the quality of the subject matter must be 
determined in light of supplementary standards provided by the law. The similar system is 
called implied warranty in U.S. law.
①
 According to the Paraphrase on Chinese Contract Law, 
CCL Article 154 aims at:  
“solving the problem of determining quality requirements for subject matters if there is no 
explicit agreement on quality in the contract… In continental law systems, it is solved by 
warranty against defects, while in Anglo-American law it is addressed by implied 
warranty.….The CISG explicitly stipulates the seller’s obligation on quality, which is 
similar with implied warranty system in Anglo-American law…This article (CCL Art. 154) 
is based on the reasonable content of those two systems, in particular referring to the 
implied warranty in Anglo-American law…” (Hu, 1999, pp. 233-235).  
Although there was a mistake in the paraphrase concerning implied warranty, as this 
system exists only in U.S. law, but not in U.K. law, it has indeed pointed out that CCL Article 
154 was created in light of related rules in those legal systems, especially the implied warranty 
in U.S. law. It should be admitted that, the approach of implied warranties is very close to the 
approach provided in CCL Article 64, in respect that both are supplementary standards 
provided by the law and both mainly refer to the objective standards, such as industrial 
standard. 
3.2.2.2 The determination of the content of conformity obligation 
CCL Articles 153, 154, 61, and 62 lay down a series of rules on the determination of the 
quality requirement. Firstly, quality should be determined according to the requirements of the 
contractual agreement, as well as the quality instructions or sample provided by the seller. 
Secondly, in the absence of explicit agreement on quality, the supplementary agreement 
concluded by contracting parties should be referred to (CCL Art. 61 sentence (1)). Thirdly, in 
case the contracting parties cannot reach a supplementary agreement, the quality requirement 
should be determined according to the related contractual provisions and usage of transaction 
                                                             
① As to the recent development of implied warranty, see Lord (2005). 
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(CCL Art. 61 sentence (2)). Finally, if the quality requirement cannot be determined by 
applying the above-mentioned standards, the national standard or industrial standard shall 
apply; in the absence of national and industrial standards, ordinary standard or special standard 
required by the purpose of the contract shall apply (CCL Art. 62 item (2)). Despite the need for 
clarification on some points, it is fair to say that the CCL system prioritizes the intention of the 
contracting parties, while establishing objective standards as a secondary reference. This 
approach conforms with the idea reflected in the CISG. Professor Mo (1999) compares the 
CCL and the CISG, and summarizes as following the substantial common factors between them: 
(a) both require the seller to deliver goods conforming with the contractual agreement; (b) both 
require the goods to be delivered in accordance with the special instructions provided by the 
seller; (c) both require the goods to meet the ordinary purpose or expected purpose of the same 
kind; and (d) both require the goods to be contained or packed in a way that can preserve and 
protect the goods (pp. 235-236). 
Nevertheless, there are still several issues that should be addressed when applying those 
rules. The first problem is that when there is a dispute on the quality requirement, there is a 
potential conflict of application of rules, because the rules on determining the content of the 
contract provided in CCL Article 61 and the rules on interpreting the contract provided in CCL 
Article 125 can both govern the issue. According to CCL Article 125(1), the intention of the 
parties to the contract should be interpreted according to the literal content, the context and the 
purpose of contract, and in accordance with the usage of transaction and the principle of good 
faith. According to CCL Article 61, however, if a term, such as quality requirement, has not 
been expressed or was stated inexplicitly, unless supplementary agreement has been reached, 
the contents should be determined in accordance with the context of the contract or usage of 
transaction. Thus, the relationship between these two articles is unclear. CCL Article 125 
provides for all sorts of interpretative methods for interpreting the mutual intention in a 
contract, while CCL Article 61 provides for a few methods to determine the content of contract. 
There are, in some measure, overlapping and conflicting requirements, which need to be 
clarified.  
In my opinion, the determination of contractual content according to CCL Article 61 
applies differently in the following two cases.  
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If the dispute is about ambiguous quality requirement in contractual provisions, CCL 
Article 61 provides means for determining the exact meaning in the absence of an explicit 
agreement. In such a case, except if the contracting parties reached a supplementary agreement, 
the determination of the contents of the contract are still part of the interpretation of the 
contract. The interpretation should be in light of the standards provided in CCL Article 125, i.e. 
literal content, system, the purpose of contract and usage of transaction, because it is 
unnecessary and even unreasonable to deprive of the application of these methods, especially 
the purpose of contract provided in CCL Article 125, as CCL Article 61 does by omission.  
If the dispute is about whether there is any agreement on quality in the contract, the first 
step that should be taken is examining whether there are provisions contained requirement on 
quality. Advertisement or oral description during the process of bargain may usually be the 
focus of interpretation. If it is concluded that there is no agreement on quality, the first sentence 
of CCL Article 61 may apply, and supplementary agreements may be concluded by the 
contracting parties; if such agreement cannot be finalized or reached, the second sentence of 
CCL Article 61 applies, and the judge should fill the gap in light of relevant provisions and 
usage of transaction. If it fails, then the judge should move on to CCL Article 62, to apply 
supplementary standards. Anyway, in such a case, CCL Article 61 applies as a gap-filler, which 
should be triggered after the interpretation of the contract. 
The second problem follows with the second case above, on the existence of an agreement 
on quality in the contract. When CCL Article 61 plays a role as gap filler, since Article 62 
cannot be applied until Article 61 fails to solve this problem, accordingly, the purpose of 
contract cannot be employed under CCL Article 61, then how could the judge fill the gap while 
he cannot pursue the guidance of contractual purpose? Obviously, the legislator has not put 
enough priority on the purpose of contract. Putting the purpose of contract behind usage of 
transaction, national standard, and industrial standard (CCL Art. 61, Art. 62 item (1)) is 
questionable. The so-called “supplementing the agreement with relevant provision” to a large 
extent means supplementing the agreement in light of the purpose of the contract that has been 
reflected in relevant provisions, for relevant provisions cannot fill the gap on its own. Anyway, 
the purpose of a contract is an element that should be considered from the beginning of gap 
filling, and other standards need to be considered in light of it.  
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3.3 Redefining the function of warranties 
The necessity to analyze the function of warranty lies in the existence of a few rules on 
warranty liability for defects in the CAL and the JILSC. In light of the modern law theory, 
warranty should not play a role in establishing special remedies for latent defect, but should be 
an instrument for determining the content of contractual obligations, especially in the case of 
sales of specific goods. As I will show below, warranty liability for defects has generated a new 
function to specify the supplementary obligation in a contract when there is no prescribed 
contractual requirement on quality. It mainly provides supplementary obligation based on the 
ordinary purpose of the contract. Warranty liability for defects, therefore, can be interpreted 
into the seller’s main obligation to tender conforming subject matters.  
3.3.1 The function of warranty in foreign legal systems 
For the common law, despite there are some other opinions, the system of remedies is 
mainly considered to be based on the idea of redressing the consequences of breach 
(Farnsworth, 2004, p. 149). There never was a special liability for latent defects as in 
traditional civil law systems. The focus of academic research is the examination of the 
contracting parties’ intention and, with the help of different instruments, the determination of 
the contents of obligations based on the contract. 
3.3.1.1 The function of warranty in U.S. law 
For U.S. law, warranty means the merchants have an obligation to tender goods 
conforming to a certain quality standard, unless they agreed to the contrary (Benfield & 
Hawkland, 1986, p. 213). The UCC has been using a pair of instruments: express warranties 
and implied warranties. The former basically refers to affirmations of fact or promises, 
descriptions of the goods, samples or models that have become part of the basis of the bargain 
(UCC §2-313); the latter includes a warranty of merchantability (UCC §2-314) and a warranty 
of fitness for particular purpose (UCC §2-315). Besides, an implied warranty of habitability 
has also been developed for lease contracts (Brower, 2011;
 
Price & Pinkston, 2010). 
Warranty of merchantability means: unless excluded or modified by contracting parties in 
accordance with UCC §2-316, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
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contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind”. UCC 
§2-314 (2) provides that the goods to be merchantable must satisfy the requirements, such as 
“in the case of fungible goods, [being] of fair average quality within the description”, “[being] 
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used” and “[being] adequately contained, 
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require”. 
As to warranty of fitness for particular purpose, it is provided that unless excluded or 
modified by contracting parties in accordance with UCC §2-316, “where the seller at the time 
of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and 
that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,” 
there would be an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
Although implied warranties have a function to establish a bridge to strict products 
liability in the 1950s and early 1960s (Henderson & Twerski, 2008, p. 14; Vetri et al., 2003, p. 
948), the most important function of it is, however, to provide obligations between contracting 
parties. Implied warranties have done so by clarifying and supplementing the duties on goods 
for sales, as well as on real property for lease. It allows the appropriate distribution of the 
responsibility for loss, and the appropriate protection of the interests of consumers and 
low-income tenants (Priest, 1981; Super, 2011). 
3.3.1.2 The function of implied terms in English law 
The concept of “warranty” in English contract law has a different meaning and function, 
comparing to the one in U.S. law. In English law, the development and application of warranty 
is related to discharge of contract. English jurists have divided contract terms into three 
different categories: conditions, warranties and intermediate terms. Breach of conditions may 
justify the aggrieved party to terminate the contract; on the other hand, breach of warranties 
would not, only allowing the aggrieved party to claim damages (Treitel, 2003, p. 789). Because 
warranties in English law have no special relations with the quality of goods, it is not suitable 
to compare warranties in English law with the ones in U.S. law (Beale, 2008, pp. 1421-1422). 
The comparable concept in English law should be implied terms and expressed terms. Among 
them, emphasis should be given to the implied terms provided in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
(SGA 1979), such as implied terms as to title (SGA 1979 §12), implied terms as to compliance 
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with description (SGA 1979 §13) and implied terms about quality and fitness for purpose (SGA 
1979 §14). As to sale by sample (SGA 1979 §15), it may be either an express term or an 
implied one (Beale, 2008, pp. 1429-1450). 
The function of implied terms in the SGA 1979 is to clarify and supplement the seller’s 
duties. Professor Treitel (2003) divides them into three main groups: terms implied in fact, 
which are not expressly set out in the contract, but which the parties must have intended to 
include; implied terms in law, a way of specifying some of the duties mainly stated by statutes, 
justified by policy (for example, business efficacy); and implied terms by custom (pp. 201-214). 
The most important implied terms of goods for sales are provided in the SGA 1979, and of 
course, belong to implied terms in law. 
Implied terms in English law are duties specified or “made implicitly” by the law or 
custom, based on the purpose of the contract and certain policies. Thus, even if a specific 
object is never free from defects, if the seller has induced the buyer to reasonably expect no 
defects, the seller would still be bound by this expectation he helped create. Otherwise, he 
should be liable for breach of contractual duties. 
3.3.1.3 The function of guarantee in the new German law 
In the new German obligation law, rules on special remedies for warranty have changed a 
lot. Although the warranty more or less still has the function of establishing stricter liability 
(than the general fault-based liability), it merely refers to specific guarantees provided by the 
seller. According to the first paragraph of BGB Article 276(1), there may be stricter liability if 
the law has so provided or if the seller guaranteed so. The most important cases are guarantee 
on quality (Beschaffenheitsgarantie) and guarantee on durability (Haltbarkeitsgarantie) 
provided in BGB Article 443. These guarantees may establish stricter liability in contracts for 
tendering goods (Sachenbezogene Verträge), such as contract for sales, lease, and work (Brox 
& Walker, 2006, pp. 211-212). However, the so-called “stricter” liabilities for nonconforming 
goods does not mean this liability is separated from the general remedy idea, but merely means 
the liability has been made stricter because the seller or a third party has so guaranteed. 
Therefore, the function of guarantee is actually to provide stricter obligations based on the 
seller or a third party’s promise. 
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3.3.2 Redefinition of warranty liability in Chinese Law   
The function of warranty to establish special liabilities in the old BGB never existed as 
such in the CCL. On the contrary, the “supplementary terms”, such as those from CCL Article 
62, are more or less similar with the implied warranties in the UCC and implied terms in the 
SGA 1979, both of which basically aim to specify the seller’s duties in the case that the 
contractual terms are not explicit enough. In this part I would like to analyze how to interpret 
rules on warranty liability for defects in the Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales 
Contract issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2012 (JILSC). 
The foremost task is to find out the purpose of those rules in the JILSC. Since special 
liability for latent defects has been merged into the general concept of liability for breach of 
contract, the focus of contract law research in many civil law systems seem to have shifted 
towards determining the exact content of each party’s contractual obligations. In Japan, 
Professor Shiomi (2010) argues that the research made within the framework of the contractual 
liability theory chiefly concerns the binding effect of the contract and the determination of the 
content of contractual obligations; the former mainly arises from the principle of “promise 
ought to be kept” (pacta sunt servanda) (pp. 2-3). Likewise, in China, there is a problem about 
whether, in case of the purchase of specific object, the seller is liable for defects if he did not 
disclose the existence of defects he was aware of. If he should be liable, then to what extent? If 
the buyer bought a specific object with knowledge of the defects, is he still able to require 
remedies for them? These questions are left unanswered in present Chinese law and are mainly 
related to the determination of the content of contractual obligations. In my view, the JILSC 
has employed traditional rules of warranty liability in civil law countries, but the purpose of it 
is not to resurrect the special remedies regime, but to help clarify the content of obligations in a 
contract. 
Given the viewpoint established above, we should redefine warranty liability for defects in 
the JILSC. The guidance of redefinition include: first of all, special meaning should be given to 
the concept “warranty”. Ignoring the special meaning and function of this concept is not 
desirable and may lead to confusion in understanding. Secondly, the requirements of legal 
practice needs to be taken into close account, as the empirical study in the second chapter has 
shown that warranty liability for defects is often understood as the a priori obligation of 
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warranty itself and this kind of interpretation is indeed rather reasonable. The function of 
warranty liability to specify duties of the seller regarding the quality of the subject matter has 
obviously similarities with that of the concept of implied warranties in U.S. law. It may be a 
promising approach to redefine warranty liability for defects in the JILSC as a specific duty on 
subject matters. More specifically speaking: 
First of all, the so-called warranty liability for defects in the JILSC should not be 
understood as an a posteriori legal consequences for breach of warranty. The term “liability” 
indeed has different meanings in different cases. Normally it means legal consequences arising 
from the breach of certain legal obligations (Liang, 2007, p. 83). However, as I have argued in 
Chapter 2, “warranty liability for defects” is a confusing concept; the proper way is to use it to 
refer to a priori obligations of warranty, while using the term “remedy for defects” to refer to 
the a posteriori legal consequences for breach of that warranty. 
Secondly, special meaning should be given to “warranty”. Not all duties based on the 
contract are suitable to be treated as a priori warranty obligation. Explicitly specified duties 
are not suitable to be considered as such a priori warranty obligations. According to CCL 
Article 153: “[t]he seller must deliver the subject matter which is of the quantity required by 
the agreement”. It is clear that the legislators did not adopt the device of warranty here, and 
problems would arise if we called it a “warranty obligation”, because the meaning of warranty 
cannot be explained in this context. On the contrary, it is the duties implied in or supplemented 
to the contractual agreement and, which are related to certain quality, quantity or other similar 
conditions, that can reflect the special function of warranty and help this concept make sense. 
Thus, the proper way is to limit the concept of warranty to the obligations implied in or 
supplemented to the contract, i.e. to situations when there was no explicit agreement initially. 
Hence, I suggest the new definition of warranty liability for defects to be: in the absence 
of an explicit agreement to the contrary, the seller warrants the subject matter to be in 
conformity with the supplementary standards provided by the law. 
According to JILSC Article 32, Even if the seller’s warranty liability has been limited or 
excluded by contractual provisions, the seller’s claim based on such limitation or exclusion 
shall not be admitted if he, intentionally or with gross negligence, fails to inform the buyer of 
such defects. This article is basically meant as a restriction on CAL Article 61, which provides 
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that where an auctioneer and trustor declare, prior to the auction, that they do not guarantee the 
genuineness or quality of the subject matter of auction, they need not bear the warranty 
liability.  
A typical agreement aiming at excluding warranty liability may be as follows: “The good 
is sold as it is and the seller does not give any warranty on it”. Although such kind of 
agreement can be enforceable, there must be some restrictions.
①
 JILSC Article 32 provides one 
of them, according to which, the buyer may not act in bad faith, intentionally not disclosing the 
defects that he was aware of, nor is he permitted to act against the basic requirement of 
cautiousness, failing to disclose the defects because of gross negligence. If the seller broke 
these restrictions, in light of the principle of good faith and fairness, the special agreements 
regarding limitation or exclusion of warranty should not be valid. In my opinion, In JILSC 
Article 32, warranty liability should not be interpreted as special remedies, but should be 
interpreted as one device that helps determine the content of contractual obligations. In other 
words, limitation and exclusion on warranty liability should be interpreted as limitation and 
exclusion on implied contractual obligations. If the agreement aiming to limit or exclude 
warranty liability is void, the seller should have to perform in light of “warranty liability”, i.e., 
implied contractual obligations implied by the law. 
According to JILSC Article 33, even if the seller fails to disclose the defect under JILSC 
Article 32, insofar as the buyer has already known the defects and recognized the essence of 
them, he may not basically require the seller to bear warranty liability. Those defects are 
normally what can be easily discovered by the buyer. If it can be concluded that, in light of all 
circumstances in the case, the buyer has taken the defects into account and demanded a lower 
price, it is reasonable to treat the defects as accepted and there should be no ground for the 
buyer to require the seller to make a tender without such defects. In such a case, the buyer who 
later pursues remedies based on those defects should be considered as self-contradictory 
(widersprüchlich) (Looschelders, 2007, p. 57), and therefore should not be favored. Obviously, 
JILSC Article 33 also aims to address the determination of the content of contractual 
obligations, and warranty liability should not be interpreted as special remedies, but is suitable 
                                                             
① Among the most important there are rules on standard provisions governed by CCL Article 39, and on the consumer 
protection provided in Article 19 of Chinese Law related to Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests. 
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to consider as certain obligation in the absence of explicit agreement against defects. The 
rationale of this interpretation is: if there is a specific and explicit agreement against the defects, 
the buyer would have reason to expect that the defects to be removed after the conclusion of 
contract; accordingly, the mere fact that he had been aware of defects cannot justify the 
exclusion of the seller’s warranty liability. ①  
All in all, rules on warranty liability in the JILSC are actually aiming at dealing with 
issues of determining the content of obligations in a contract. Limitation and exclusion on 
warranty liability should be interpreted as limitation and exclusion on implied contractual 
obligations. Redefining warranty liability as a special device related to contractual obligations 
may not only maintain the special function of warranty, but also satisfy the purpose of those 
rules on warranty liability in the JILSC. 
3.4 Conclusion of this chapter  
Nonconformity has become recognized worldwide as a basic analysis instrument in 
international sales law. The concept of “defects”, on the other hand, does not qualify as a 
fundamental concept in Chinese Contract Law, as it has only been employed in the bargaining 
process. There are substantial differences between the concepts nonconformity and defects in 
Chinese positive law, and it is preferable to distinguish them and use nonconformity as 
fundamental concept when interpreting the CCL.  
From the perspective of the prevailing unitary theory in China, the general remedies for 
breach of contract have absorbed the special remedies for defects, while the new instrument of 
the seller’s obligation to tender conforming subject matters may replace the traditional one - 
warranty against defects. Warranty liability left in Chinese law should be redefined, to be an 
instrument for determining the content of obligations in a contract in the absence of explicit 
agreement as to defects. Under this new definition the unification of remedy system for breach 
of contract can be well maintained and the special purpose to determine the content of 
obligations in the JILSC can also been realized. 
                                                             
① Similar views has been advocated by some CISG specialist, according to whose standpoint, although the seller is not liable 
for lack of conformity if at the time of conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack 
of conformity (CISG Art. 35), he is still liable for “contractually-agreed quality of the goods or their packing” (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 427-428). 
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Chapter 4  Construction of the Seller’s Right to Cure 
In the preceding two chapters I have clarified fundamental instruments for analysis and 
argued that tendering conforming subject matters should be one of the seller’s main obligations 
in Chinese law. In this and the following chapter I would like to discuss the improvement of 
specific remedy systems in case of a breach of such obligation. In this chapter I will focus on 
the seller’s right to cure, and the analysis would be made in light of the ideas of striking a 
balance of interests between contracting parties and of maintaining the inner coherency of the 
remedy system.  
Since the special remedy regime for latent defects has been merged into the general one 
for breach of contract, once the seller has breached its obligation to tender conforming subject 
matters, the buyer may, according to CCL Articles 111 and 107, pursue all sorts of remedies for 
breach. CCL Article 111 provides that the buyer may choose any remedy he considers as 
reasonable, among supplementary performance (repair, replacement, and remaking), damages, 
reduce price, and return of goods.  
However, a problem arises from this kind of design: once the nonconformity arises, is the 
buyer able to choose any remedy he considers as reasonable, disregarding the seller’s proposal 
to cure the nonconformity? The reason we address this question is that under the CCL there is 
neither a general duty of the buyer to fix an additional period for the seller’s supplementary 
performance at first, nor one to accept a cure. Consequently, it is possible for the buyer to act 
opportunistically, refusing the seller’s bid to cure to keep his own performance, and the only 
defense of the seller is to prove that the buyer failed to properly mitigate the loss (CCL Art. 
119). It seems that the seller is basically at the mercy of the buyer if he breached the contract.  
On the other hand, from the perspective of the coherency of remedy system, the lack of 
protection of the seller’s interests in cure is not consistent with policies behind the rules on 
termination of contract and on notification of nonconformity. In the CCL, the standard for 
termination of contract in the case of nonconformity in quality is frustration of the purpose of 
the contract; such a strict standard indicates that the legislative policy is encouraging the 
breaching party to save the contract through cure. Likewise, CCL Article 158 requires the 
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buyer to inform the seller of any nonconformity within a reasonable period of time after he 
discovered or should have discovered it, otherwise he will be barred from any remedy under 
the contract law. Such a harsh consequence should also be based on policies aiming at 
protecting the seller’s interests in cure and mitigating the related loss. These legislative policies 
or purposes would be frustrated if there were no effective restrictions on the buyer’s choice of 
remedies.  
In short, establishing a right to cure for the seller is not only important for a balance of 
interests between the contracting parties, but also necessary for the coherency of the remedy 
system. In the following sections, I will firstly introduce experiences in foreign legal systems, 
then show the necessity to establish a seller’s right to cure in China, and finally discuss the 
nature, elements, and effects of this right in detail when constructing it. 
4.1 The seller’s right to cure or supplementary performance in foreign legal 
systems 
Both German and U.S. law protect the interests of the seller in curing the breach. In the 
German legal system, it is usually the buyer’s duty to fix an additional period for 
supplementary performance if he intends to pursue other remedies for a removable 
nonconformity. In the U.S., a device called the right to cure has been established to protect the 
seller who has tendered nonconforming goods but wishes to save the contract by timely 
replacement or repair; it is generally the buyer’s duty to accept such cure. Furthermore, in the 
pPROL of Japan, the drafters have not only established the buyer’s right to require 
supplementary performance (追完請求権), but also introduced the seller’s right to cure (追完
権); both of them basically require the buyer to wait a reasonable time for supplementary 
performance or cure.  
4.1.1 The seller’s “right to provide a second tender” in German law 
After the modernization of German obligation law, the buyer who received a defective 
tender is entitled to require supplementary performance (Nacherfüllungsanspruch). Where 
some defects appear, it should first be determined whether those defects are removable 
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(behebbar) or irremovable (unbehebbar) in nature (Looschelders, 2007, Rn. 83). If the defects 
are removable, certain remedies of the buyer, including termination, price reduction, and 
damages in lieu of performance (Schadensersatz statt der Leistung) are only available after the 
fruitless (ergebnislos; fruchtlos) lapse of a proper period appointed by the buyer for the seller’s 
supplementary performance (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, Rn. 123; Looschelders, 2007, Rn. 82). 
Although the priority of the seller’s supplementary performance (Vorrang der Nacherfüllung) 
over other remedies is not explicitly expressed, it can be inferred from the provisions of BGB 
Articles 281 and 323 (Looschelders, 2007, Rn. 82). The first sentence of BGB Article 281(1) 
provides that where the obligor did not tender the due performance, or did not tender it as 
obligated (nicht wie geschuldet), and the proper period appointed by the obligee for 
supplementary performance elapsed fruitlessly, the obligee may, subject to BGB Article 280(1), 
demand damages in lieu of performance (Krüger, 2007, §281). As we can see, damages in lieu 
of performance can only be claimed if the obligor fails to seize his second chance to remove 
the defects. Likewise, BGB Article 323(1) provides that in a bilateral contract, where the 
obligor did not provide the due tender, or did not provide the tender in conformity with the 
contract, the obligee may, after the fruitless lapse of a proper period appointed by the obligee 
for supplementary performance, terminate the contract; the only exception to this rule is 
provided in BGB Article 323(2) (Dörner et al., 2002, §323). We can infer that, in principle, a 
sale contract cannot be terminated by the buyer in case of nonconformity until the seller fails to 
seize his second chance to remedy the defects. In this spirit, given price reduction is, according 
to BGB Article 441(1), applied in lieu of terminating the contract (zurücktreten), the exercise 
of price reduction basically is also conditional on the fruitless lapse of a proper period of time 
fixed for the seller’s supplementary performance. 
Professors Brox and Walker (2006, §4 Rn. 40) point out that the supplementary 
performance can be viewed as a right of the seller to provide a second tender (Recht des 
Verkäufer zur zweiten Andienung) in the sense of “last chance” (letzte Chance).① Such a right 
exists only in the case of removable defects, and its priority over other remedies has been 
confirmed by the new German obligation law. It has been argued that such a right is beneficial 
to the contracting parties’ legal interests, as where defects appear, the primary concern of the 
                                                             
① As for relevant researches, see Ebert (2004). 
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parties is neither termination nor price reduction, but repair or replacement (Brox & Walker, 
2006, §4 Rn. 40). In recent years, German scholars have discussed whether the buyer can 
remove the defects by himself and later require the seller to compensate for the cost; the 
problem is argued to be whether the interests of the seller to provide a second tender have been 
deprived of (Lorez, 2003; Oechsler, 2004; Herresthal & Riehm, 2005). Another issue that has 
been raised is whether, in the case of a replacement for a consumer, the seller is entitled to 
demand some charge for the buyer’s consumption of a defective product (Fest, 2005; Gsell, 
2006). 
Although “the right to provide a second tender” in the new German law is meant to 
protect the seller’s interests, it does so rather weakly. The buyer still has a right to choose 
(Wahlrecht) between repair and a fresh tender as remedies, and such a right is not based on 
rules of alternative obligation under BGB Article 262, but on so-called “elective competition” 
(elektive Konkurrenz). Therefore, the restriction provided in BGB Article 263(2) cannot apply, 
and the buyer can choose between different remedies more than once, subject merely to the 
principle of good faith (Brox & Walker, 2006, §4 Rn. 41; Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, Rn. 125). 
The buyer’s right to change remedies has also been more simply called the buyer’s “right to 
alter” (ius variandi) (Krüger & Westermann, 2008, §439 Rn. 5). 
Nevertheless, if the buyer’s right to choose and change remedies has no substantial 
restriction, the right of the seller to provide a second tender is likely to be emptied of its 
meaning. Under the new German obligation law, the ways to protect the seller’s interests 
include: (a) according to BGB Article 439(3), the right of the seller to refuse the remedy 
chosen by the buyer if its cost is excessive; (b) according to BGB Article 439(3), the potential 
limitation of the buyer’s right to choose to a single remedy measure, depending on the value of 
subject matters without defects and the seriousness of the defects; (c) according to BGB Article 
264, the transfer of the right to choose to the seller in case the buyer fails to choose remedies 
timely after the fruitless lapse of a period appointed by the seller; and (d) as mentioned above, 
the systematic governing of this issue by the principle of good faith (Schurhölz, 2005, pp. 
31-34). 
Actually, during the process of modernizing the German obligation law, it was proposed 
to entitle the seller a right to cure (Nacherfüllungsrecht). However, it was eventually rejected 
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by the legislators (Schurhölz, 2005, pp. 29-30). Disagreeing with this rejection, Professor 
Westermann argues that it is the seller who is in the best position to judge which is the proper 
measure for cure (Krüger & Westermann, 2008, §439 Rn. 1). Likewise, Professor Zimmermann 
(2005) comments this rejection by arguing that:  
“the solution adopted by the law is unconvincing in view of the fact that the seller’s 
position can be affected very seriously by the choice made by the buyer whereas the 
buyer’s position is safeguarded by the consideration that the seller would, in any event, 
only be able to choose a form of supplementary performance which completely removes 
the defect and thus satisfies the buyer’s reasonable interests… it is usually the seller who 
can more easily assess the chances, and determine the effectiveness, of the different forms 
of supplementary performance.” (p.100) 
Despite the shortcomings of the seller’s right to provide a second tender, the German law 
has finally established certain mechanism for protecting the reasonable interests of the seller, in 
respect of remedying the defects. By contrast, the seller’s right to cure in the U.S. legal system 
has a stronger effect on protecting the seller’s interests, and it has influenced related rules in 
international conventions and model rules. 
4.1.2 The seller’s right to cure in U.S. law 
In U.S. law, UCC §2-508 provides for two types of cure: cure before the performance’s 
due date and cure after it. UCC §2-508(1) provides that if some tender or delivery by the seller 
was rejected because of nonconformity and the time for performance has not yet expired, “the 
seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract 
time make a conforming delivery.” UCC §2-508(2) then provides that where the buyer rejects a 
nonconforming tender which “the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable 
with or without money allowance”, the seller may have an additional reasonable time to 
“substitute a conforming tender” insofar as he seasonably notifies the buyer. (American Law 
Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2010, p. 2189) 
The first type of cure is quite reasonable: as long as the time for performance has not yet 
elapsed, there should normally be no obstacle for the seller to cure the defect, provided he gave 
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notice of his intention to do so. As to the second type of cure, there are two points that need 
some clarification. The first one concerns the so-called “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
tender would be acceptable. According to the official comment of UCC §2-508, “such 
reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade 
as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract,” (ALI & 
NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2190) Professors White and Summers (2009) argue that “presumably, in the 
absence of special circumstances, when the seller delivers goods which are not identical to 
those called for in the contract but which are the functional equivalent, the seller has reasonable 
cause to believe they will be acceptable.” (p. 511) For example, a retailer of Sony receives 
goods from a manufacturer and “simply sells them off the shelf, the retailer too has reasonable 
cause to believe that the goods will be acceptable and is entitled to further reasonable time in 
which to cure.” (White & Summers, 2009, p. 511) Furthermore, whether the seller has 
knowledge of defects is not an important factor in deciding whether he has a right to cure 
(White & Summers, 2009, pp. 511-512). The second issue is the determination of an 
“additional reasonable period”. As the New Jersey Supreme Court held, this “depends on the 
surrounding circumstances, which include the change of position by and the amount of 
inconvenience to the buyer”, as well as “the length of time needed by the buyer to correct the 
nonconformity and his ability to salvage the goods by resale to others.” (White & Summers, 
2009, p. 513) 
Although the only form of cure the UCC provides for is replacement, in practice, the U.S. 
courts generally also permit repair as an effective form of cure (White & Summers, 2009, p. 
514). Moreover, there have been some discussions on whether money allowances, generally 
used as a price reduction or price adjustment, can be an effective form of cure. For example, 
Professors White and Summers (2009) argue that: “price adjustments sufficient to recompense 
the buyer for deficiency in quantity or quality must certainly be the most common form of cure 
by business people.” (p. 515) It seems that even though UCC §2-508 “does not recognize this 
behavior [price reduction] as a form of cure,” business trade usages and legal practice both do 
(White & Summers, 2009, p. 515). Therefore, it could be considered that there are in fact three 
forms to cure nonconformity in U.S. law: retender conforming goods, repair, and money 
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adjustment with the support of trade usage.
①
 
The system of the seller’s right to cure under UCC §2-508 aims at restricting the buyer’s 
right to reject goods under UCC §2-602 and to revoke acceptance of goods under UCC §2-608. 
These two rights are normally seen as an intermediary device for the buyer to cancel the 
contract (UCC §2-711(1)). By exercising the right to cure, the seller may prevent the 
cancellation of the contract. In other words, the function of the seller’s right to cure is to 
protect him from losing the bargain, by providing him with another chance to remedy the 
nonconformity. There are strict conditions for the seller who wishes to exercise the right to cure, 
such as seasonableness and absence of unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer. Moreover, if 
the breach has given rise to a “shaken faith”, the buyer may nevertheless refuse the seller’s 
request to cure (White & Summers, 2010, pp. 443-444). 
The seller’s right to cure under U.S. law has a strong effect, imposing the buyer a duty to 
accept an effective cure. If the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept a cure which has satisfied the 
conditions of UCC §2-508, the consequences will be serious. It will “deprive the buyer of all 
remedies against the seller for breach arising from the contract,” and the buyer will either be 
liable for the “price of the nonconforming goods” under UCC §2-709, or for the 
“contract-market differential as to conforming goods” under UCC §2-708 (1), or for “the 
difference between the resale price of those goods and the contract price” under UCC §2-706 
“less the amount attributable to the nonconformity.” (White & Summers, 2009, pp. 516-517)  
In this subsection and the preceding one, it can be observed that both German and U.S. 
law give the seller some opportunity or right to provide a second tender or to remedy the 
nonconformity. If the cure or the second tender was wrongfully refused by the buyer, the buyer 
would normally be barred from other remedies based on the nonconformity.
②
 Nevertheless, 
there are still some substantial differences between the U.S. and German systems: the former 
explicitly entitles the seller to cure while the latter only provides a comparatively weak “right 
to provide a second tender”, which would be more appropriately considered as some legal 
protection due to an additional appointed period. Moreover, under U.S. law it is the seller who 
decides which form the cure should take, while in German law, it is the buyer that has the right 
                                                             
① These three ways to cure have also been mentioned in Sales Law and the Contracting Process written by Alan Schwartz and 
Robert E. Scott (Piché, 2003). 
② As to further analysis on their effect, see subsection 4.3.4 of this chapter. 
Chapter 4  Construction of the Seller’s Right to Cure 
86 
to choose the remedy for nonconformity. Nevertheless, both designs aim to strike a balance of 
interests between the seller and the buyer, and are therefore a valid source of inspiration for 
other legal systems. 
4.1.3 The seller’s right to cure in the CISG 
The CISG, as an internationally recognized uniform sales law, establishes a system of cure 
in Articles 34, 37 and 48, which were borrowed directly from the UCC without any significant 
change (White & Summers, 2009, pp. 507-508). On the other hand, CISG Article 46 also 
provides that the buyer may require delivery of substitute goods or repair, and CISG Article 47 
provides the seller with an additional, reasonable period of time for his supplementary 
performance. The design of these two latter articles is quite close to the system of 
supplementary performance under the new German obligation law. It is hence safe to say that 
the CISG has implemented both the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to require 
supplementary performance. However, since the seller’s right to cure constitutes, as mentioned 
above, in fact a stronger protection of the seller’s interests than the additional period for 
supplementary performance, the effect of the seller’s right to cure is likely to “cover” the effect 
of the supplementary performance device on this point. On the other side, there is a potential 
conflict between the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to require supplementary 
performance if the form of cure chosen by the seller is different from the one required by the 
buyer; therefore, the CISG has to create a duty of communication for contracting parties to 
coordinate their response. 
4.1.3.1 Types, elements, and effects of cure under the CISG 
There are different types of cure under the CISG. Article 34 concerns the seller’s duty to 
hand over documents relating to the goods. It provides that the seller must hand documents 
over at the time, place, and in the form required by the contract; if the seller has handed over 
documents before that time, he may, up to that time, cure any nonconformity in the documents, 
insofar as the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense. Meanwhile, the buyer’s right to claim damages under the CISG is 
unaffected. CISG Article 37 concerns the cure of nonconformity of goods in the period before 
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the due date of the performance. It provides that if the seller has delivered goods before the 
date for delivery, “he may, up to that date, deliver any missing part or make up any deficiency 
in the quantity of the goods delivered, or deliver goods in replacement” of any nonconforming 
goods delivered, or remedy any nonconformity in the goods delivered, insofar as the exercise 
of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. 
Like Article 34, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for under the CISG. 
It can be observed that the requirements that there be “no unreasonable inconvenience” 
and “no unreasonable expense” for the buyer are constituent elements of an effective cure 
before the delivery date. These two elements should be determined in light of all sorts of 
circumstances in individual case. A repair which would cost quite a long time or a replacement 
in a case where the buyer has installed the goods as a part of his production line would be good 
examples of cures which would cause unreasonable inconvenience or expense (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 444). 
Although the seller’s right to cure before the delivery date in the CISG is basically 
borrowed from U.S. law (see UCC §2-508), it is argued to have also been well accepted by 
continental countries (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 440-441). Although the buyer has 
no general obligation to take delivery of goods tendered before the fixed date (CISG Art. 52(1)), 
if the buyer refused to take such a delivery, the position of the seller would not be worse; while 
if the buyer took such a delivery, the seller will still have the opportunity to cure any potential 
nonconformity of goods. After all, “the wording of Article 37 does not restrict the seller to one 
attempt,” therefore, as long as the act of cure does not bring unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense, it is possible for the seller to cure more than once (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 443-444). 
As to cure after the due date of performance, CISG Article 48(1) provides that, even after 
the date for delivery, the seller may, subject to Article 49, cure any failure to perform his 
obligations at his own expense, “if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of 
expenses advanced by the buyer.” However, in the meanwhile, the buyer retains any right to 
claim damages provided for in the CISG. Clearly, the conditions for exercising an effective 
cure after the date for delivery are much stricter and more specific than the ones before the date 
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for delivery. The constituent elements of this cure include that it should be: (a) at the seller’s 
own expense, (b) without unreasonable delay, (c) without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience, and (d) without causing the buyer uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of 
expenses advanced by the buyer.  
The effects of the seller’s right to cure have been provided in CISG Article 48(2), 
according to which, if the seller has acquired a reasonable period for cure, the buyer may not, 
during that period of time, resort to any remedy that is inconsistent with performance by the 
seller. Thus, the seller’s exercise of his right to cure actually suspends part of the remedies that 
the buyer can claim. For example, if the buyer demands delivery of substitute goods under 
Article 46(2), and the seller offers repair based on Article 48(1), since the seller has the right to 
choose how he will cure the breach, his choice of repair prevails over the buyer’s choice of 
substitute goods; this approach also applies to the opposite case (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 
2005, pp. 569-570). Accordingly, the prerequisite for the seller’s right to cure to prevail over 
the buyer’s choice of remedy is that the seller satisfies the strict constituent elements of cure 
provided under CISG Article 48.  
If the buyer wrongfully refused the cure, the legal consequence would be the loss of all 
remedies, including price reduction. This has been clearly provided in CISG Article 50, which 
states: “if the seller remedies any failure to perform his obligations in accordance with article 
37 or article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept performance by the seller in accordance with 
those articles, the buyer may not reduce the price.” Price reduction is a remedy aiming at 
striking a balance of interests between contracting parties. If this remedy cannot be permitted 
under the circumstances mentioned above, the buyer must perform his obligation to pay the 
whole price for the goods. Furthermore, the buyer should not be allowed to pursue the remedy 
of damages in lieu of performance; otherwise, the rules in Article 50 would be actually 
meaningless. In short, if the buyer has wrongfully refused an effective cure provided by the 
seller, he cannot require any remedy that aims to redress the consequences of the breach that 
could have been elimated by the cure. 
One restriction related to the seller’s right to cure - “subject to Article 49” - has induced a 
lasting debate over the relationship between the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to 
avoid the contract. According to the letter of CISG Article 48(1), the buyer’s right to avoid the 
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contract in the case of a fundamental breach has a priority over the seller’s right to cure. In 
other words, if the buyer exercised his right of avoidance based on a fundamental breach of 
contract in accordance with CISG Article 49(1)(a), or the additional period fixed by the buyer 
in accordance with CISG Article 49(1)(b) has fruitlessly elapsed, the seller may not provide 
supplementary performance any more (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 567). Professor 
Müller-Chen argues that there exists a “largely international consensus” on this fundamental 
breach point, yet the following problem has drawn the attention of academic research: to what 
extent can the buyer’s right of avoidance override the seller’s right to cure (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 567)? The essence of the debate is whether the fact that the nonconformity 
can be successfully cured can exclude or suspend the fundamental nature of the breach of a 
contract (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 567).  
It is necessary to point out that although the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles) have kept consistence with the CISG in most 
areas,
①
 they have adopted a different approach to deal with the relationship between the 
seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to avoidance. UNIDROIT Principles 2004 Article 
7.1.4 provides in its second paragraph that the right to cure is not precluded by the buyer’s 
notice of termination. According to the comment on this article:  
“If the aggrieved party has rightfully terminated the contract pursuant to Articles 7.3.1(1) 
and 7.3.2(1), the effects of termination are also suspended by an effective notice of cure. If 
the non-performance is cured, the notice of termination is inoperative. On the other hand, 
termination takes effect if the time for cure has expired and any fundamental 
non-performance has not been cured.”②  
This means the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles disagreed with the solution provided 
in the CISG and made a proposal with the opposite effect – privileging the seller’s right to cure 
over the buyer’s right to terminate the contract in case of fundamental breach. 
                                                             
① As Professor M. J. Bonell (2002, p. 347) has argued, the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG are not necessarily 
incompatible and indeed can even usefully support one another. They differ from the other merely in specific provisions. 
② http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf. Note that this 
comment is not changed in UNIDROIT Principles 2010. See 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf. 
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4.1.3.2 Duty to communicate 
As mentioned above, the CISG has not only introduced the seller’s right to cure, but also 
adopted the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance, and the principle of an 
additional period for such performance. Therefore, conflict may arise if the seller chooses one 
form to cure while the buyer requires the nonconformity to be removed in another. Thus, CISG 
Article 48(2)-(4) have established an obligation of communication, based on the principle of 
good faith, for both the seller and the buyer, aiming at addressing the potential conflict. CISG 
Article 48(2) provides that if the seller requires the buyer to make known whether he will 
accept supplementary performance or cure, and the buyer does not respond to that request 
within a reasonable time, then the seller may provide supplementary perform “within the time 
indicated in his request”; during that period of time, the buyer may not “resort to any remedy 
which is inconsistent with performance by the seller.” CISG Article 48(3) then adds: “A notice 
by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a 
request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision.” The fourth 
paragraph of CISG Article 48 provides that a request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) 
or (3) of Article 48 is not effective unless received by the buyer. These rules in Article 48 are 
very helpful in judicial practice, since the debate over the relationship between the seller’s right 
to cure and the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance is unlikely to cause serious 
problem if there is sufficient communication between the contracting parties (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 562). 
4.1.4 The seller’s right to cure in Japan’s pPROL  
In Japan’s pPROL, a system called the obligee’s right to require supplementary 
performance (追完请求権) has been proposed. According to the pPROL, in case of partial 
performance, the performing party is entitled to require repair, replacement, reconstruction, or 
other similar supplementary performance; the specific forms should be determined in light of 
the interpretation of the contract (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 199). Supplementary performance refers to 
additional performance which aims at completing the full performance (Uchida, 2005, p. 128). 
As to the nature of the right to require supplementary performance, the drafters of the pPROL 
consider that it is merely one form of the right to require performance in the case of “partial 
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performance”, and therefore, must be in the same nature as the latter; accordingly, any legal 
ground that would exclude the right to require performance would also apply to the former 
(JCCRC, 2009b, pp. 200-201). 
Meanwhile, the pPROL has also introduced the right to cure (追完権). According to 
pPROL §3.1.1.58(1), the conditions for the exercise of the right to cure include: (a) the 
notification by the obligor of the period and the content of cure which would be undertaken 
without unreasonable delay; (b) the reasonableness of the time of period and the content of 
performance, in light of the purpose of the contract; and (c) the absence of an unreasonable 
burden on the obligee as a result of the obligor’s cure. pPROL §3.1.1.58(2) adds: “where a 
partial performance constitutes a fundamental breach, the obligor’s right to cure has no 
prejudice to the obligee’s right to terminate the contact.” (JCCRC, 2009b, p. 209) According to 
the explanation of the pPROL, the establishment of the obligor’s right to cure is based on the 
experiences of UCC §2-508, CISG Article 48(1), UNIDROIT Principles (2004) Article 7.1.4, 
and PECL Article 8:104; it seems that the drafters of the pPROL preferred to adopt the 
approach of the CISG, letting the buyer’s right to termination prevail over the right to cure 
(JCCRC, 2009b, p. 211). However, a Japanese scholar, Matsui (2003), argues that, provided the 
elements of the right to cure have been properly established, the process of determining 
whether the buyer can terminate the contract should have taken the possibility of effective cure 
into account, and that therefore, it may be of no practical significance to deal with the conflict 
between the buyer’s right to terminate and the seller’s right to cure (p. 236). 
pPROL §3.2.1.16 provides four remedy measures for the buyer in case of defects in 
delivery, including: (a) to require to tender the subject matter free from defects, (b) to require 
price reduction, (c) to terminate the contract, and (d) to require damage compensation (JCCRC, 
2010, p. 71). pPROL §3.2.1.17 further deals with the relationship among those remedies, as 
well as the relationship between them and the seller’s right to cure. pPROL §3.2.1.17(3) 
provides that when applying pPROL §3.2.1.16(1)(a), where it is possible both to substitute the 
tender and to repair, the buyer may, by his own intention, choose either of them; However, the 
seller may tender a substitute subject matter in lieu of the repair which has been required by the 
buyer, or repair the original subject matter in lieu of the replacement which has been required 
by the buyer (JCCRC, 2010, p. 76). It is obvious that although pPROL §3.2.1.17(3) has 
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permitted the buyer to choose remedies by his own intention, limitations have been imposed to 
protect the seller’s interests: in certain circumstances the seller’s actual tender of cure has a 
priority over the buyer’s inconsistent requests.  
All in all, during the process of modernizing their obligation law, Japanese jurists argue 
for introducing the system of the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance and the 
one of the seller’s right to cure, and attempt to deal with the potential conflict between them, 
by establishing certain devices to ensure the priority of the seller’s choice. These proposals 
reflect that Japan’s pPROL is striving to make a compromise between different systems and 
establish a harmonious remedy system able to strike a balance of interests between contracting 
parties. 
4.2 The lack of and needs for interests-balance system in the CCL 
4.2.1 The lack of interests-balance system in the CCL 
“Balance of interests is one of the basic ideas and principles of law…both excessive and 
insufficient protection for the individual’s interests conflict with the requirements of the 
modern society” (Gao, 2006, pp. 86-87). The idea of the balance of interests applies not only to 
the relationship in which one party has a weaker bargaining position than the other, such as 
labor or consumer contract, but also to the relationship between the aggrieved party and the 
breaching party. A Chinese scholar, Professor Qu, stated that: “balancing the interests of 
different individuals is a fundamental principle of legislation, as well as that of application of 
law… civil law would lose its way if interests-balancing was abandoned” (Qu, 2002, p. 38). 
Urges to balance the interests of different parties were particularly vocal during the drafting of 
the Chinese Labor Contract Law and the Chinese Tort Law. For instance, the drafters of the 
Labor Contract Law had a tendency to overprotect the interests of laborers. Although compared 
with commercial contract, there is a general recognition that the labor party has an unequal 
bargaining power and that there needs to be special protection against exploitation, such 
“special protection” should have restrictions and the “idea and purpose of labor law should be 
‘to promote equality through inequality’.” (Feng, 2006, p. 25) During the drafting of the 
Chinese Tort Law, it has been pointed out that the populist emotions flowed out and the 
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protection of the aggrieved party has been partially emphasized (Zhao, 2010), while the 
protection of the freedom of individuals has been largely ignored. Similarly, there have been 
calls to pay more attention to the balance of interests between the infringer and the aggrieved 
party (Zhang, 2009). By contrast, in the context of the Chinese Contract Law, Chinese jurists 
seem to rarely question whether the interests of the breaching party and the aggrieved party 
have been well balanced, and whether the rights and duties of the breaching party have been 
properly designed. 
During the development of Chinese contract law in the past several decades, the ground of 
liability for breach of contract has shifted from the principle of fault to the principle of the 
binding effect of contract itself, which gives rise to the concept of liability without fault (Han, 
2011b, pp. 590-592). Accordingly, the idea of sanction and punishment on the breaching party 
should be removed. However, the present Chinese liability system in contract law does not pay 
enough attention on the balance of interests of the breaching party and the aggrieved party, and 
therefore excessively protects the latter. As mentioned above, there is neither a supplementary 
performance period for the seller, who tendered nonconforming subject matters, to provide a 
second tender nor a right for him to cure under the CCL; there are no instruments for balancing 
the interests of the parties in such a case except for the general principle of good faith.  
In a word, Chinese contract law should have paid more attention to the balance of interests 
between contracting parties, but not focus on “punishing” the breaching party with all kind of 
means. Actually, the need for the protection of the seller’s interests in case of nonconformity 
has already become clear in judicial practice. 
4.2.2 The need for the system of cure in legal practice 
In legal practice, when determining which remedy right of the buyer should be admitted, 
the courts have paid attention to the protection of seller’s interests in cure in most cases, and 
sometimes instructed that the seller should be given a chance to repair before the buyer 
returned the goods.  
In the decision of HuYiZhong MinSi (Shang) Zi No.84 (2005) involving a sale of 
cellphones, the seller X did not deny quality problems in 2302 cellphones, but he argued that 
these problems could be solved by repair, while the buyer Y argued that the percentage of 
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cellphones to be repaired was too high and therefore, these cellphones should be returned. The 
court found that:  
“In the 2302 cellphones that Y intends to return, there are 1407 that were unsold for 
various reasons. There is no ground to support return of goods based on the argument that 
quality problems have caused loss of commercial credibility. 608 cellphones of 735 have 
been repaired, and therefore the buyer should accept them; as to the 127 cellphones left 
and other 54 pieces returned to the seller, there is no evidence provided by the seller that 
they had been properly repaired, the demand of the buyer to return these goods thus can be 
admitted, the seller must return the purchase money accordingly; as to other 106 
cellphones, they are still in the process of repairing or delivering to the seller, there is no 
ground for granting the return of them.”① 
In this case, the return of goods has been considered as partial termination of contract. In 
the decision above, the court imposed strict conditions on the exercise of returning goods: If 
the cellphones have been repaired or not been given a chance to repair, the remedy of return 
would not be granted to the buyer. It is only if the cellphones have not been adequately repaired 
in time that the buyer can be awarded the remedy of return. In this decision the judge has 
considered the interests of both parties and found that a second chance to repair should be the 
general condition of return. Inspiring from this instruction, we can conclude that the seller’s 
prompt and effective repair or other forms of cure of breach may be a reasonable ground to 
suspend the buyer’s remedy of return. 
A similar standpoint has been adopted by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial 
Interpretation. In the Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract (JILSC), Article 22 
provides that where the buyer has notified the nonconformity in quality within the inspection 
period, quality guarantee period, or a reasonable period, if the seller fails to repair the subject 
matter as demanded or, due to an emergency the buyer repairs the subject matter by himself or 
through a third party, the courts shall grant the compensation for reasonable expenses by the 
seller to the buyer who has so claimed. We can observe that the condition of demanding 
compensation for reasonable expenses include: (a) notification by the buyer of the 
                                                             
① Unless otherwise stated, judicial decisions referred to in this dissertation all come from the database of Beida Fabao, see 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp.. 
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nonconformity in quality within the inspection period, quality guarantee period, or reasonable 
period; and (b) failure by the seller to repair the subject matter as demanded or, impracticability 
for the buyer to deliver the goods to the seller for repair due to an emergency situation. It can 
be inferred that, conversely, in case the seller can repair the subject matter as demanded or 
there is no such emergency situation, the buyer may not repair the subject matter by himself or 
through a third party, otherwise he will be barred from requiring relevant expenses for repair. 
Obviously, the priority of seller’s interests in cure is indirectly confirmed by the JILSC. 
In legal practice, it is not satisfactory to entitle the buyer to choose any remedy he deems 
reasonable. It is unavoidable that some buyers will make arbitrary decisions, or that some 
buyers fail to choose a proper remedy due to their shortcomings of knowledge. Of course, if the 
buyer and the seller frequently communicate with each other in good faith to solve the problem, 
dispute may be avoided altogether. Unfortunately, this is not something on which we can rely 
in real life. Many suits have been brought due to the lack of communication in good faith, and 
the courts have little choice then but to balance the interests between contracting parties on a 
case-by-case basis, determining what constitutes a reasonable remedy. Judicial decisions and 
the SPC’s judicial interpretation have shown that the seller’s interests in cure need to be 
protected in one way or another. 
4.2.3 The need for the system of cure to maintain the coherency of remedy system 
The establishment of a system of cure is also necessary for the coherency with policies 
behind the rules on termination of contract and notification of nonconformity. 
Firstly, the system of cure is necessary to maintain the coherency with policies behind the 
rules on termination in the case of nonconformity in quality. According to the fourth item of 
CCL Article 94, if one party delays its performance of obligation or breaches the contract in 
some other ways, thereby frustrating the purpose of the contract, the other party may terminate 
the contract. And according to the first sentence of CCL Article 148, where the quality of the 
subject matter tendered does not conform to the quality requirements, thereby frustrating the 
purpose of the contract, the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract. These two articles are 
the basis of the buyer’s right to terminate the contract in the case of nonconformity in quality. 
Compared with the third item of Article 94, which provides that there is a right to termination 
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if one party has delayed the performance of its main obligation and also failed to perform 
within a reasonable period after a notice by the other party, it can be found that the CCL has 
not provided similar conditions for termination of contract in the case of nonconformity in 
quality or quantity. In other words, the only way for terminating the contract in the case of 
nonconformity in quality or quantity is the frustration of contractual purpose. Under these 
circumstances, the system of supplementary performance or cure should be indicated from a 
reasonable interpretation of the law. Since much nonconformity in quality or quantity can be 
cured by repair, replace, or other supplementary performance, the cure of the breach should be 
not only permitted, but also to some extent encouraged, for the sake of saving the contract. 
In some cases, the buyer may intend to escape from a bad bargain, and therefore raise an 
improper claim, imposing a high cost on the breaching party. In such a case, it would be 
desirable to protect the seller’s interest in cure. A system that enables the seller to refuse 
unreasonable requirements of the buyer and to tender instead a proper form of cure could 
protect the seller against bad faith and hardship. 
Secondly, the system of cure is necessary for the coherency with the policies behind the 
rules on notification of nonconformity. In many legal systems the buyer has been required to 
notify the nonconformity of goods within a reasonable period of time after he discovered or 
should have discovered the breach, under penalty of losing all his remedies for nonconformity. 
Examples of this approach include BGB Article 377 and UCC §607(3). The notice period has 
been considered as a device to protect the interests of the seller (Canaris, 2006, p.437). In the 
view of some German courts, the justifications for the notice rule include promoting prompt 
settlements and encouraging supplementary performance (Boujong, Ebenroth, & Joost, 2001, 
p.478). Some U.S. scholars also point out that the foremost justification for the notice rule is to 
“enable the seller to make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure to 
the end of minimizing the buyer’s loss and reducing the seller’s own liability to the buyer.” 
(White & Summers, 2009, p. 655) Clearly, the major ground for the notice rule is to facilitate 
supplementary performance or cure of breach. 
CCL Article 158 has established a similar requirement for the notification of breach. If the 
buyer does not notify the seller within the agreed period, or if there is no agreed period and the 
buyer fails to notify within a reasonable period after he discovered or should have discovered 
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the nonconformity, the subject matter will be deemed to be conforming to the contract. This 
rule requires a similar justification. It is plausible to say that the main functions of the notice 
rule should be to promote the cure of the breach, to provide chances for investigations, and to 
mitigate the loss due to breach. And only with the help of notification, it is possible for the 
seller to timely cure the breach; difficulties for investigation and for cure, the loss arising from 
the breach will certainly increase with the time elapsing. Therefore, from the perspective of 
maintaining the coherency with the policies behind the notice rule, it is necessary to establish 
the system of cure. 
4.3 Constructing a seller’s right to cure in China 
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the seller’s right to cure or provide a second 
tender is necessary to ensure balance of interests between contracting parties and the coherency 
with policies behind the rules on termination and on notification period. Yet among the various 
proposals for the replacement of the current General Principles of Civil Law of 1986 by a 
comprehensive Chinese Civil Code (e.g., X. Z. Sun, 2013; L. M. Wang, 2013), it seems few 
has explored the construction and implementation of an obligor’s right to cure.  
Professor Shen is one of the earliest scholars to pay attention to the seller’s right to cure. 
He introduced and discussed the seller’s right to cure in UCC §2-508 and its official comment 
as early as 1995. After recalling the background of it, he pointed out that although the rule for 
cure is provided for in the Article of sales (UCC §2-508), it can be extended by analogy to 
other kinds of contracts (Shen, 1995, p. 19-21). Professor Shen also argued that “strictly 
speaking, cure is not a right, but a power”; with reference to Hohfeld’s view in Fundamental 
Legal Concept, he stated that “where there is no correlative duty, there should be no ‘right’, yet 
‘power’ is different, for it refers to legal ability to do certain acts to alter legal relations” (Shen, 
1995, p.19). Professor Shen’s pioneering introduction and discussion of the seller’s right to 
cure is a valuable source of inspiration, and I will comment it in the next section. 
In one influential proposal for drafts of a Chinese Civil Code, directed by Professor Liang, 
Professor Han has drafted a provision on the “breaching party’s cure”, based on the 
experiences of the CISG and some international model rules (Liang, 2011, p. 183). This 
proposal has adopted a similar approach to the CISG, but different from the UNIDROIT 
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Principles, as it does not allow the cure of the breaching party to preclude the aggrieved party’s 
exercise of its right of termination (Liang, 2011, p. 183). 
In addition, Professor Jiao and Mr. Lu (2009) have examined the obligor’s right to cure in 
the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, and argue that the foundation of rules on cure is the 
“idea of co-operation” (p. 66). This idea, they say, has been recognized by Article 5.1.3 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles 2004, which explicitly requires “co-operation between the parties”, as 
well as PECL Article 1: 202, which establishes a “duty to co-operate” (Jiao & Lu, 2009, p. 66). 
These proposals or studies are inspiring, but unfortunately they do not seem to thoroughly 
discuss the specific constituent elements and legal effects of cure. These are the issues I will 
address in the following subsections. 
4.3.1 The nature of the “right” to cure 
In the proposal drafted by Professor Han, the effect of the seller’s proposal of a cure is to 
suspend the buyer’s remedies that are inconsistent with the form of cure chosen by the seller. 
The question is whether the tender of a cure may constitute a right of the seller. And if it does, 
what kind of right could it be? More to the point, how should we construct the mechanism for 
protecting the seller’s interests in cure? 
As to the right to provide a second tender in German law, some scholars believe that, 
although it has been called a “right”, it is not strictly speaking a right from a civil law 
perspective. In their opinion, if it were a right, it could be nothing else but a right to claim: a 
claim to the aggrieved party to accept the second tender; “however, evidently, the logic cannot 
stand if a breach of contract may consequently give rise to a right of the breaching party to 
claim the aggrieved party to take the delayed performance” (Du & Lu, 2012, pp.108-109.). In 
my view, it should be admitted that the so-called “right to provide a second tender” in German 
law is actually a metaphor of the effect of an additional supplementary period. The 
supplementary period aims to protect the seller’s interests, not in terms of entitling the seller a 
right, but rather by imposing limitations on the exercise of the buyer’s remedy rights. If it is 
called a right, it can only be understood as a “right” in a broad sense, i.e., certain “interests 
admitted and restricted by the law, plus the legal mechanism to protect them”, but not a right in 
the narrow sense, which may enable one party, with the help of the power of political 
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organisms, to force another party to a certain conduct or to refrain from a certain conduct 
(Pound, 1984, pp. 42-43). The latter is the most common type of rights in civil law. For 
example, A requires B who illegally occupies A’s property to vacate it, C prevents D from 
entering into C’s house, and E requires F to fulfill its obligations as promised (Pound, 1984, p. 
43). 
On the other hand, the seller’s right to cure in U.S. law has a much stronger effect. Once 
the seller exercises his right to cure the breach, the buyer has a duty to accept the cure. In other 
words, there was initially no duty for the buyer to accept anything; it is the cure provided by 
the seller that generates a new obligation for the buyer. Indeed, there is a sanction: if the buyer 
refuses or fails to accept an effective cure, he will be liable for breach of contract. Given the 
effect of the seller’s right to cure is to generate a new obligation between contracting parties, 
this kind of “right” is, as Professor Shen argued, actually a power. However, his argument is 
based on the theory of Hohfeld, who has defined right in a narrow sense and basically limited it 
to the meaning of a claim right (Hohfeld, 1946, pp. 36-42). If we discuss the nature of this 
“power” in the continental civil legal systems, such kind of “power” would actually be defined 
as a formation right (Gestaltungsrecht): a right that enables the party who exercises it to create 
or change a legal relationship between him and another party by a unilateral declaration of his 
intention.  
The CISG has adopted a different approach, based on the compromise between civil law 
and Anglo-American law. It has, on one hand, introduced the mechanism of the seller’s right to 
cure and, on the other hand, established a general duty for the buyer to take delivery of the 
seller’s tender. Therefore, even if the seller has initially provided nonconforming goods, the 
buyer is not generally entitled to refuse to take delivery. In other words, the seller’s cure cannot 
generate the obligation to take delivery of the second tender, because an obligation to take such 
a delivery actually preexisted the cure (unless, of course, the buyer has some specific legal 
ground to refuse the tender).
①
 Hence, the effect of cure in the CISG is not to generate a new 
relationship of obligation, but only to prioritize the seller’s cure over the buyer’s inconsistent 
claims. Such kind of right can still find its position in traditional civil law theory. Indeed, 
Professor Larenz has defined so-called “objection rights” (Einwendungen), which will enable 
                                                             
① The right to refuse to take delivery will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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X to impact the effect of Y’s right and to make Y, at least partially, be influenced by X’s own 
right (Larenz & Wolf, 1997, p. 359). The most important type of the “objection rights” is the 
right to object against a claim (Einrede) (Larenz & Wolf, 1997, p. 360). This type of right has 
also been inherited by Chinese civil law, and the Einrede has become widely recognized as to 
impact the other party’s right. The seller’s cure in the CISG is the very example of an objection 
right, because it does not generate a new legal relationship, but merely impacts the other 
party’s claim and suspends it.  
Any legal system that intends to introduce the system of cure would face the following 
questions: what kind of effect should be given to cure? Which kind of right may it be 
categorized as? For China, which has inherited the traditional categories of rights from 
continental civil law systems, these are important questions for constructing and understanding 
a new system of cure.  
As discussed in section 4.2, the CCL lacks a device that can satisfactorily handle 
situations of nonconformity of the subject matter while balancing the interests between the 
aggrieved party and the breaching party, as well as maintaining the coherency with the policies 
behind the rules on termination and notification of nonconformity. Therefore, we should 
construct a device adequately protective of the seller’s interests in cure. As we saw in section 
4.1, many German scholars seem to think it is the seller who is most suitable to decide which 
form to choose for supplementary performance; likewise, according to U.S. law, it is the seller 
that may decide the form of cure. Following these approaches, I suggest constructing a system 
of cure in which the specific form of cure can be decided by the seller.  
In China, there is in general a duty of the buyer to take the delivery provided by the seller, 
and such an obligation still exists vis-à-vis the second tender, as long as there is no agreement 
or rules to the contrary. Therefore, the scope and function of cure in Chinese law will be 
limited to suspending claims of the buyer that are inconsistent with the seller’s cure. In other 
words, the seller’s right to cure in Chinese law would not be a right to claim the other party to 
accept the tender, but a right to suspend the other party’s inconsistent remedy rights, which is 
indeed a type of objection rights. 
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4.3.2 Price reduction as a specific form of cure? 
It is generally recognized that the specific forms of cure include repair and replacement. 
The question is whether price reduction should be also considered as a form of cure. From the 
perspective of commercial practice, the answer seems to be yes. This is exactly the view of 
some U.S. scholars, who believe that although it cannot be interpreted from a literal reading of 
the UCC, price allowance still can constitute an effective cure, if the usage of transaction 
requires it (e.g., Sebert, 1990). 
It has to be noted that, in many areas, price reduction is indeed the only proper way to 
cure a breach. Take the trade of coal for instance, which in China represents a trade amount of 
about one billion tons per year. One important characteristic of coal trade is that the price is 
determined according to the quality of the coal tendered. Many contracts contain express 
provisions as to the promised quality and quantity of coal, but it happens regularly that the 
seller tenders nonconforming goods. It is impossible to require the seller to “repair” the 
nonconforming coal, and in most cases it is impracticable to replace it. Under these 
circumstances, both contracting parties may prefer to cut the price down. For example, in the 
decision of Xu Shang Chu Zi No. 0062 (2010) made by the Intermediate People’s Court of 
Xuzhou City, Jiangsu Province, it has been found that the defendant offered two batches of 
coal, the calorific value per kilogram of which were 4905 kcal and 4912 kcal, far from the 
agreed 5400 kcal. The buyer has consequently suffered great losses. The defendant did not 
deny the quality problems, but repeatedly sent consultants and proposed to reduce the coal 
price to 675 RMB per ton. Meanwhile, the defendant tried to return part of the purchase money 
for each batch: 2 million RMB for the first and 2.09 million RMB for the second. However, the 
plaintiff and the defendant eventually failed to reach consensus on the settlement. In this case, 
although the buyer refused the price reduction, the seller actually had a chance to save his 
contract by cutting the price. This suggests that price reduction may be a proper way for 
settlement in certain circumstances. 
However, as I will discuss in the second section of Chapter 5, price reduction is a kind of 
modification of the contract and should therefore be achieved by consensus between the 
contracting parties. It should not be imposed unilaterally by the seller as part of his right to 
cure. Even if the seller had successfully reduced the price in the preceding case, it would only 
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mean that the contracting parties have adjusted their contract and therefore changed their 
respective obligations. It is the modification of contract that has eliminated the breach, not the 
seller’s proposal of price reduction per se. Although in some circumstances price reduction 
may be the only proper way for settling the problem of nonconformity, the seller’s interests in 
such case should not be protected by the system of cure, but by the system of impracticability 
of performance. Thus, it is neither necessary nor suitable to consider price reduction, the nature 
of which is modification of contract, as a form of the seller’s cure of nonconformity, which is 
decided according to the original contract.  
4.3.3 Constituent elements of the right to cure  
The first element of an effective cure is promptness, i.e., the time for the cure of the 
breach should not be of an unreasonable length. The earlier doctrine for determining what 
constituted an unreasonable delay focused on examining whether the time elapsed might 
prejudice the buyer, taking into account the type of goods, the ways to use goods, and other 
objective factors (Matsui, 2003, pp. 205-206). The current doctrine is influenced by CISG 
Article 47(1), in which the standards to determine promptness have tended to be more specific 
and clearer: if the seller cannot be expected to complete the cure within a reasonable period 
after he knew or should have known about the breach, then it can be considered that there is an 
unreasonable delay (Matsui, 2003, p. 206). As to the length of a reasonable period in this 
circumstance, it is proposed to follow the same criteria as those proposed for CISG Article 47. 
The factors that should be considered include:
①
 Firstly, the length of the performance: 
generally speaking, the longer the period for preparing the performance, the longer the 
reasonable period for cure should be given. Secondly, the characteristics of the contract’s 
subject matter: for instance, complex machinery or equipment that needs multiple accessories 
usually requires a longer period than goods that are easy to purchase on the open market, and 
so a longer period for cure may be reasonable for these complex goods. Thirdly, the nature of 
the transaction: for instance, if seasonal goods are involved, the reasonable period for cure may 
be relatively short. Fourthly, the influence of the breach: for instance, if the breach leads to 
serious problems for the buyer, the reasonable period for cure should be kept relatively short, to 
                                                             
① As to detailed discussion, see Matsui (2003, pp. 206-209). 
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prevent the interests of the buyer to be significantly harmed. Fifthly, the seller’s 
acknowledgement of the interests of the buyer in a prompt delivery: some scholars believe that 
if the seller was aware of an interest of the buyer in a prompt delivery, the reasonable period 
for cure must be held to be shorter (Matsui, 2003, pp. 208-209)  
The second element of the right to cure is “without unreasonable inconvenience”, i.e., the 
cure should not cause unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer, such as disruption on 
production, or potential losses for the buyer’s clients (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 
566). Moreover, if the cure is very costly, the cost itself might be held to constitute an 
unreasonable inconvenience. Take the ICC Arbitration Court’s decision No. 7531 in 1994 for 
instance, which involved a dispute between a Chinese seller and an Australian buyer.
①
 The 
seller sold scaffold fittings to the buyer, who later claimed lack of conformity of the goods and 
declared the contract avoided. Subsequently, the buyer sold the goods and sued the seller for 
damages, because only part of the goods had been sold and at a lower price. The seller argued 
that according to CISG Article 48, he should be entitled to cure the breach, and that the buyer 
failed to provide him with such an opportunity. However, the arbitral tribunal found that:  
“the estimated costs of sorting out the bad fittings from the good would have amounted to 
more than one-third of the purchase price, and therefore [the tribunal] found a fundamental 
breach on the grounds that ‘an important part’ of the 80,000 scaffold fittings did not 
conform to the sample.” (Koch, 1998, pp. 239-240)  
As a result, the tribunal ruled in favor of the buyer’s claim against the seller. In this case, 
the huge cost of cure, which amounted to more than one-third of the purchase price, has been 
considered as an unfavorable factor for an effective cure. This kind of cost may be considered 
as an example of unreasonable inconvenience. 
The third element of the right to cure is “without unreasonable uncertainty for 
reimbursement”. Of course, the cure should eventually be at the seller’s expense, but it may be 
necessary for the buyer to pay some charges at first (e.g. for the return of the goods) and get 
reimbursed by the seller at a later date. There can be no effective cure if there is unreasonable 
uncertainty regarding the reimbursement of those charges. Therefore, the problem of 
                                                             
① http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/947531i1.html. 
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reimbursement may be an independent element to consider for the exercise of the right to cure 
(Matsui, 2003, p. 212). If the buyer has a reasonable doubt about whether the seller would pay 
him back, especially based on the credibility and the past behavior of the seller, it is fair to 
entitle the buyer a right to require the seller to provide guarantee or security (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 566). If the seller refuses to do so, the cure will not be effective and will 
be unable to suspend the buyer’s claims. 
The last element is that the right to cure should be exercised against an inconsistent claim 
of the buyer. It is a necessary element for constructing the cure as a right. If there is no 
inconsistent claim of the buyer, the repair or replacement should at most be considered as a 
supplementary performance by the seller, but not as his right. As discussed above, the right to 
cure impacts the exercise of the buyer’s rights by suspending claims inconsistent with the 
seller’s cure, but it cannot generate an obligation of the buyer to accept the cure, as such an 
obligation already preexists the exercise of the right to cure. 
4.3.4 Legal effects of the right to cure 
Firstly, the seller’s right to cure may suspend the buyer’s claim for supplementary 
performance that is inconsistent with the seller’s chosen cure. For instance, if the elements for 
the right to cure are satisfied and the seller decides to tender new goods as cure, any claims of 
the buyer to repair the initial goods will be suspended, meaning they are momentarily unable to 
give rise to a duty for the seller to repair. A similar situation occurs in cases where the buyer 
required replacement of goods, when in fact the seller had already prepared well for their repair. 
Here, the seller’s effective cure through repair suspends the buyer’s claim for replacement. 
Secondly, the seller’s right to cure may suspend the buyer’s claim for damages in lieu of 
performance. In a case involving nonconforming goods, there are several types of loss that may 
be suffered by the aggrieved party, such as a reduction of the value of goods, the loss attributed 
to the fact that the buyer cannot use them as expected, and the damages caused to the buyer’s 
own body or other property. The right to cure can only suspend claims for damages “in lieu of 
performance”. This is a newly identified type of damages which has taken the place of 
damages due to nonperformance (Schadensersatz wegen Nichterfüllung) under German law 
(Schermaier, 2007, §280-285, Rn. 101). This concept has also been adopted by Japan’s pPROL 
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(JCCRC, 2009b, p. 257). Claims for damages in lieu of performance mainly occur in the 
following circumstances: (a) the agreed obligation is impossible to perform, and other kinds of 
performance are unreasonable to expect in light of the purpose of the contract; (b) the obligor 
has explicitly refused to perform its obligation, regardless of whether the performance is due or 
not; (c) where the obligor fails to perform, and still fails to perform even after a demand and 
the lapse of a proper period fixed by the obligee; and (d) the contract has been terminated 
(JCCRC, 2009b, pp. 257-258). According to the contractual liability theory in Japan, the 
damage compensation should not exceed the benefits that would have been gained by the buyer 
if the full performance had been completed (Shiomi, 2009, pp. 86-87). 
If the buyer directly requires damages in lieu of performance, without giving the seller an 
opportunity to repair or replace, the seller may suspend the effect of the damages claim by 
tendering an effective cure. After the cure has been tendered, the buyer may claim damage 
compensation, based on the delay of performance (Uchida, 2005, p.128). Given there is 
generally some uncertainty on the amount of damages before the completion of the cure, the 
seller’s right to cure can also have a function on suspending the buyer’s claim for damages due 
to delay. However, if the nonconformity has caused extra losses, such as physical damages and 
losses related to other properties, the claim for damages of these extra losses would not be 
suspended by the seller’s right to cure. 
Thirdly, the right to cure may suspend the buyer’s request of price reduction. In the next 
chapter, I will argue that the construction of price reduction in Chinese law should be 
reconsidered. In the Chinese legal system, damage compensation in the law of sales contract is 
based on strict liability, and therefore, the special function of price reduction assumed in other 
legal systems has been comparatively reduced. Under the CCL, the exercise of price reduction 
is not based on the condition of termination and there is no device to assure a balance of 
interests between the aggrieved party and the breaching party. As a result, if the buyer can 
reduce the price by himself, without giving the seller any chance to remedy the breach, it will 
be harsh on the latter. Therefore, under Chinese contract law, the buyer should require the seller 
to reduce the price, rather than reduce the price by a unilateral declaration of his own intention. 
The buyer’s request of price reduction should actually be interpreted as an offer to adjust the 
contract, so that the buyer’s offer of price reduction would be suspended by the seller’s 
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tendering of an effective cure. 
Fourthly, the relationship between the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to 
termination should be specially discussed. In the process of drafting the CISG, the relationship 
between those two rights has caused great disputes. The focus of this dispute is on whether the 
buyer’s right of termination prevails or not over the seller’s right to cure, and the essence of the 
disagreement is whether or not the nonconformity of goods itself may constitute a fundamental 
breach that would allow the buyer to avoid the contract regardless of the seller’s ability to 
tender of an effective cure (Matsui, 2003, p. 212). Professor J. Honnold (1999), who has 
participated the drafting process of the CISG, pointed out that: “There was widespread 
agreement that whether a breach is fundamental should be decided in light of the seller’s offer 
to cure and that the buyer’s right to avoid the contract should not nullify the seller’s right to 
cure.” (p. 320) On the other hand, he also admitted: “However, it was difficult to find language 
that would clearly express the proper relationship between avoidance and cure.” (Honnold, 
1999, p. 320) By contrast, In the commentary edited by Professors Schlechtreim and 
Schwenzer (2005), it has been stated that if there is a fundamental breach of contract under 
CISG Article 49(1)(a), “the seller cannot claim a supplementary period of time for subsequent 
performance by relying on Article 48(1). Apparently, there is largely international consensus on 
this point” (p. 567); however, the commenters also point out that a problem arose from the 
beginning regarding “to what extent the right to avoidance of the contract should override the 
right to remedy by subsequent performance”, and that the particular fear was that “the seller’s 
right to cure would become obsolete if the objective seriousness of the defect would already 
constitute a fundamental breach of contract that would lead to the buyer’s having a right to 
avoid the contract.” (Schlechtreim & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 567) 
Although different views can be observed from Professor Honnold’s commentary, and the 
commentary edited by Professors Schlechtreim and Schwenzer, both of them suggest that if a 
dispute indeed arises between the contracting parties, the major reason may be the lack of 
sufficient communication in good faith (Honnold, 1999, p. 321; Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 
2005, p. 568). As we saw in section 4.1.3, paragraphs 2 to 4 of CISG Article 48 have hence 
established a duty of communication for contracting parties, to avoid these potential disputes. 
 In my view, the basic function and legal purpose of the right to cure should be to limit 
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the buyer’s opportunities to terminate the contract, and it is unreasonable to determine whether 
there is a fundamental breach without addressing the issue of cure. One of the most likely 
reasons for a buyer who argues there is a fundamental breach is that he did not acknowledge, or 
at least was not well aware of, the seller’s plan to cure, when in fact the seller’s right to cure 
could play an important role in the rescue of the contract. If the breach that the buyer has 
suffered was definitely and ultimately impossible or unnecessary to cure, then the seller would 
probably not be considered to have a right to cure, as his proposal of cure would be unlikely to 
satisfy the elements for an effective cure outlined above, especially the ones on “promptness” 
and “without unreasonable inconvenience”. In other words, the proper construction of the 
elements of the right to cure may have solved the problem of potential conflict between cure 
and termination. If there is indeed a right to terminate based on fundamental breach due to 
nonconformity, there should be no chance for a right to cure to exist; conversely, if there is 
indeed a right to cure, the breach should not be considered as fundamental. Cure thereby gives 
a good faith seller a good opportunity to prevent a fundamental breach and thus the termination 
of the contract. 
4.4 Conclusion of this chapter 
After the breach of a contract, the seller still has a right to cure and can therefore suspend 
the claims of the buyer that are inconsistent with the seller’s chosen form of cure. This kind of 
design may seem baffling at first: why should the seller be entitled to anything when it is he 
who breached the contract? Does this go against the spirit of contract law, which should be to 
compensate the aggrieved party? Yet these doubts actually arise from an insufficient awareness 
of the need for a balance of interests, and from the dominance of the understanding of liability 
as sanction on the breaching party.  
 Many foreign legal systems we saw in this chapter provide various remedies for the 
aggrieved party, without going so far as to totally disarm the breaching party. They grant the 
seller a last chance to mend the breach in order to ensure the reasonableness of the remedy 
system and to give good faith sellers an opportunity to save the contract. In the new German 
law, this last chance comes in the form of the seller’s right to provide a second tender, which 
arises from the additional period normally fixed for supplementary performance; in U.S. law, 
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this last chances comes in the form of the seller’s right to cure; in the CISG and Japan’s 
pPROL, it comes in the form of both the period for supplementary performance and the right to 
cure. These devices all aim at ensuring the reasonable exercise of the buyer’s remedy rights 
and striking a balance of interests between the contracting parties. In Chinese law, there are no 
such devices in the current law. Yet establishing a system of cure is necessary not only for 
protecting the seller’s interests in legal practice, but also for the coherency of the legal system. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explore how to construct the seller’s right to cure. 
In this chapter, I have discussed in detail various aspects of the seller’s right to cure. 
Firstly, the system for protecting the seller’s interests in cure should be constructed as an 
objection right, which has the effect of suspending the buyer’s inconsistent remedy claims. 
Secondly, the forms of cure include repair, replacement, but not price reduction. Thirdly, the 
elements of the right to cure include: promptness, absence of unreasonable inconvenience, 
absence of unreasonable uncertainty for reimbursement, and contradiction of the buyer’s 
inconsistent claims. Finally, the effects of the right to cure include: the suspension of the 
buyer’s inconsistent claim for supplementary performance and of his claim for damages in lieu 
of performance. As to the relationship between the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right of 
termination, I argued that there should be no real conflict as long as the elements of the right to 
cure have been properly established.  
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Chapter 5  Reconsideration and Reconstruction of the Buyer’s 
Remedy Rights for Nonconformity 
After discussing the introduction of the seller’s right to cure, I would like to deal with the 
problems in the exercise of the buyer’s remedy rights in case of nonconformity. Of course, we 
cannot discuss each and every remedy in this chapter, thus the focus will be given to those that 
have been considered most unsatisfactory from the perspectives of the balance of interests 
between contracting parties and the inner coherency of the remedy system. Therefore, I would 
like to discuss the buyer’s right to refuse nonconforming goods in the first section, and the 
exercise of his right of price reduction in the second. 
5.1 Reconstruction of the buyer’s right to refuse nonconforming subject 
matters 
In Anglo-American law, the foremost remedy for the buyer in case of nonconformity in 
goods for sales is the right to reject. Many Chinese scholars have taken note of this remedy and 
tried to interpret some rules under Chinese Contract Law (CCL) in the light of the structure of 
this right. For example, Xia and Fu (2008) consider that CCL rules concerning advance 
performance (CCL Art. 71), partial performance (CCL Art. 72), performance with exceeding 
quantity (CCL Art. 162), and performance with nonconformity in quality (CCL Art. 148) have 
all confirmed the buyer’s right to reject goods in China. H. Wang (2009), however, argues that 
the rights in CCL Articles 71 and 72 are actually objection rights (Einreden), which are of a 
different nature than rejection rights, which can lead to termination of the contract. She further 
argues that the system of the buyer’s right to refuse nonconforming goods in Chinese law 
should be perfected based on the experiences of Anglo-American law (p. 398). On the other 
side, the CCL has already established the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance 
as the foremost remedy in case of nonconformity (CCL Arts. 107, 111). It is necessary and 
urgent to analyze, from the perspective of the inner coherency of the remedy system, whether 
the buyer’s right to reject nonconforming goods should be established on a par with the buyer’s 
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right to require supplementary performance, and if not, how we should understand and 
interpret rules on the buyer’s right to refuse to accept nonconforming goods and the right to 
refuse to take their delivery in Chinese positive law. 
In the following sections, I will first compare the buyer’s right to reject nonconforming 
goods in Anglo-American law with the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance in 
German law, and then suggest that it is not suitable to establish a system of rejection in China, 
because this right basically is the functional equivalent to the right to require supplementary 
performance. Next I attempt to provide new interpretation for CCL Article 148, the only article 
that explicitly provides for rules on refusal to accept nonconforming goods in quality. Finally, I 
argue in favor of the construction of a system based on a right to refusal to take delivery 
instead of one on the rejection, and the establishment of similar conditions for refusal to take 
delivery whether the nonconformity is in quality or quantity.  
5.1.1 Rejection and request for supplementary performance in comparative law 
5.1.1.1 The right of rejection in Anglo-American law 
In the case of nonconformity in goods for sales, the widely recognized and advocated 
remedy of the buyer in Anglo-American law is the right to reject nonconforming goods. 
Professor Schlechtriem, a famous CISG specialist, points out that the impossibility to apply the 
right of rejection under the CISG is viewed as one of the reasons for which the U.K. refused to 
ratify the CISG, and for which the application of the CISG is often contractually excluded in 
the U.S. (Schlechtriem, 2006, p. 85). Professor Bridge (2007) argues, in favor of the remedy of 
rejection, that English sales law and the CISG are two bodies of law of different characters to 
international sales transactions of different types: “the CISG would be better suited to contracts 
for the sale of manufactured goods, whereas the Sale of Goods Act would be more suitable for 
commodity sales” (p. 17).① When the European Commission attempted to issue a directive to 
harmonize further consumer rights throughout the European Union, the law commission of the 
U.K. strongly argued in favor of maintaining a right of rejection for the buyer (Naidoo, 2011, 
pp. 807-812). Next, I would like to briefly introduce the effects and functions of right to reject 
                                                             
① See also Bridge (2007, p. 17). Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem (2009) respond to this view and point out that the CISG is 
very well suited to the necessities of modern trade, including commodity trade (pp. 477-478).  
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in U.K. law and U.S. law. 
In the U.K., the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA 1979) and the related case law have 
become main sources of sales law,
①
 and the right of rejection is widely provided for in the 
third chapter of SGA 1979. For example, SGA 1979 §30 concerns rejection in the case of 
wrong quantity, and SGA 1979 §35A, which was implemented by the Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act 1994, relates to the right of partial rejection.
②
 According to these rules, a valid 
rejection can only exist if there is “a clear notice that the goods are not accepted and at the risk 
of the vendor” (Bridge, 2010, §12-034). 
SGA 1979 §§11(3), 11(4), 15A, and 15B lay down the prerequisites for the exercise of the 
right to reject in various cases. According to these provisions, the right to reject can only be 
exercised in case of breach of a condition, but not in case of breach of a warranty. In needs to 
be noted that under U.K. law, conditions and warranties are interpreted as two different sorts of 
contractual promises. A condition is a promise made by a party whereby any failure to perform 
by one party, “irrespective of the gravity of the event that has in fact resulted from the breach,” 
would entitle the other party to treat the contract as discharged; a warranty, on the other hand, 
is an agreement with reference to the subject matter, but collateral to the main purpose of such 
contract, and the breach of it “gives rise to a claim for damages, but not a right to reject the 
goods and treat the contract as repudiated” (Beale, 2008, pp. 1421-1422). Hence, the right to 
reject under U.K. law is a device that has close connection with the discharge of a contract and 
has a restrictive standard of exercise; if the prerequisites for exercising this right are not met, 
the buyer may not pursue the remedy of discharge of contract, but can merely claim for 
damages (Bridge, 2010, §12-029).  
As to the effect of rejection in English sales law, briefly speaking, once the buyer rejects 
the goods, the property will be revested in the seller (Beale, 2008, §43-321), and the risk and 
expense related to the goods also switch back to the seller’s side “if they [did] not so already” 
(Beale, 2008, §43-321; Bridge, 2010, §12-067). The buyer becomes “an involuntary, or at least 
a gratuitous bailee”, who is in principle no longer entitled to deal with the goods except by the 
express or implied authority of the seller, but owes a duty of care in relation to the goods 
                                                             
① This Act is based on the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and has been consolidated by existing statutes in the 1970s (Bridge, 2010, 
§1-004). It has been reformed by three amendments during the past decades, including: the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 
1994, the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, and the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 (Beale, 2008, §43-001). 
② All provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 referred to in this dissertation come from the database of Westlaw. 
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(Bridge, 2010, §12-067). Accordingly, the buyer is not liable for ordinary negligence, but 
merely for deliberate injury to the goods or gross negligence (Bridge, 2010, §6-011).
 
Furthermore, according to SGA 1979 §36, the buyer bears no duty to return the goods when he 
rejects them: “it is sufficient if he intimates to the seller that he refuses to accept them”. 
As to the right to rejection in U.S. law, the general principle established in UCC §2-601 is 
that the buyer may reject if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to 
the contract. This is also called the “perfect tender” rule (White & Summers, 2010, p. 415). In 
fact, it has been considered that as early as in the Uniform Sales Law of 1906, the related rules 
dropped the doctrine of substantial performance, but was identical with the requirement of the 
perfect tender rule (Travalio, 1984, pp. 935-938). However, Professors White and Summers 
(2010) express doubt on the real importance of such doctrine of the perfect tender rule, arguing 
that there are many restrictions on this rule in the UCC and that “the Code changes and the 
courts’ manipulation have so eroded the perfect tender rule that the law would be little changed 
if 2-601 gave the right to reject only upon ‘substantial’ non-conformity.” (pp. 300-301) They 
have pointed out that “of the reported Code cases on rejection, few actually grant rejection on 
what could fairly be called an insubstantial nonconformity.” (White & Summers, 2010, pp. 
300-301) Given the argument raised in the literature on this topic, it seems that the conditions 
of rejection in the U.S. may not be as strict as suggested by the letter of the UCC.  
In U.S. sales law, according to UCC §2-401(2), unless otherwise explicitly agreed, the 
title of goods passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his 
performance “with reference to the physical delivery of the goods”. As to the effect of rejection 
on the title of goods, according to UCC §2-401(4), “a rejection or other refusal by the buyer to 
receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified” may revest the title of goods in the seller. 
And as to the effect of rejection on the risk of the goods, UCC §2-510(1) provides that “where 
a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to give a right of rejection 
the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.” It can be observed that the 
right of rejection under U.S. law may not only revest the title of goods in the seller but also 
make the risk stay on his side. Furthermore, according to UCC §2-711, if the buyer rightfully 
rejects the goods, he can cancel the contract and recover “so much of the price as has been 
paid” (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2229). This means the right to rejection in U.S. law is 
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considered, as in the U.K., as an important step before discharge of the contract. 
5.1.1.2 The right to require supplementary performance in German law 
After the modernization of German obligation law, the foremost remedy for 
nonconformity provided in sales law came to be the buyer’s right to require supplementary 
performance (Nacherfüllungsanspruch). Following the majority opinion of the drafters of the 
new BGB, the supplementary performance remedy has taken the place of the ones that used to 
be provided in the old BGB, namely termination and price reduction (Jacobs, 2003, p. 371).
 
The new remedy is the logical result of the new rules in BGB Article 433, which provides in its 
paragraph (1), that the seller is obliged to provide the subject matter free from defects in thing, 
as well as defects in title (Jacobs, 2003, p.371). The right to require supplementary 
performance is not completely new, as it was already mentioned in the first paragraph of 
Article 480 of the old BGB: “The buyer of a thing designated only by species may demand, 
instead of termination or price reduction, that instead of the defective thing one free from 
defect be delivered to him.” (Westermann, 1995, §480) Nevertheless, in the new BGB, this 
remedy has been extended to apply to unascertained sales (Jacobs, 2003, p. 373). 
The forms of supplementary performance include repair and replacement; the former is 
also called removal of defects (Beseitigung des Mängels), and the latter is also known as 
delivery of a thing free from defects (Lieferung einer mangelfreien Sache) (Brox & Walker, 
2006, §4 Rn. 41). The right to require supplementary performance is considered as a 
modification or development of the original right of demanding performance and is therefore 
not dependent on the fault of the seller (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, Rn. 121; Looschelders, 
2007, Rn. 84, 85). It should be mentioned that the classification as modification is of 
considerable legal importance. For example, it means that the short prescription and some other 
special rules that aim to restrict the buyer’s remedies will apply, such as those from BGB 
Articles 439(3), 442, 444-445, and HGB Article 377 (Looschelders, 2007, Rn. 85). According 
to BGB Article 439(3), if the expense for one form of supplementary performance is 
excessively high, the seller may refuse such performance. The claim of the buyer can in certain 
cases be restricted to an alternative form of supplementary performance, depending on the 
importance of the defect and on whether any other forms of supplementary performance that do 
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not substantially prejudice his interests are available. Furthermore, according to BGB Article 
323(1), if the obligee was tendered nonconforming goods, he should normally first require 
supplementary performance from the obligor and fix an additional period for it, under penalty 
of losing access to other remedies, such as termination, damages in lieu of performance, or 
price reduction.  
It has to be noted that in German law there are no general rules on the obligee’s right to 
refuse to take delivery or right to reject nonconforming goods. According to BGB Article 266, 
the obligor has no right to tender partial performance. However, although the refusal to take 
partial performance in such a case may usually not constitute default of the obligee (Medicus & 
Lorenz, 2010a, §157), it is not recognized as a right. By contrast, there are some widely 
advocated limitations on the obligee’s refusal to take delivery. If the obligor believes he should 
not bear more obligations or is unable to tender the full performance, the obligee should take 
the delivery (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010a, §162). 
5.1.1.3 Comparison and inspiration 
The right to reject goods and the right to require supplementary performance can be 
compared from the perspectives of conditions for exercise, legal effects, and systemic 
functions. 
Concerning the conditions for exercise, we can observe that both the right to reject in 
Anglo-American law and the right to require supplementary performance in German law can 
be triggered by material nonconformities which impact the main purpose of the contract. A 
nonconformity which has no material impact on the main purpose of contract may not give rise 
to a right to reject in U.K. law, but may under U.S. law, and will normally be able to justify the 
buyer’s right to require supplementary performance under German law. On the other hand, 
whether the nonconformity can be or is suitable to be removed is of no relevance for the right 
to reject in Anglo-American law, but is crucial for requiring supplementary performance in 
German law. In short, there are substantial differences concerning conditions for the exercise of 
these two remedies, and the conditions for rejection even differ from U.K. to U.S. law. 
The Anglo-American right of rejection is also very different from the German right to 
require supplementary performance in its legal effects. The right to reject may revest the title of 
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goods in the seller and make the risk stay at the side of the seller, while the right to require 
supplementary performance merely imposes the seller an obligation to provide such 
performance. In fact, the effects of the right to rejection are close to that of the right of 
termination in civil laws regarding risk and the title of the goods. However, the exercise of the 
right to reject should not be considered as termination of contract itself, but merely as the 
“normal first step” to treat the contract as discharged or cancellation in Anglo-American law. 
Furthermore, the right to reject is a short-term right, which should be exercised in a prompt 
period.
①
  
However, when comparing similar rules in different legal systems, it is only by comparing 
their systemic functions that their essential differences can be demonstrated. From the 
perspective of systemic functions, the right of rejection may achieve in Anglo-American law 
the same effects as the right to require supplementary performance in German law.  
First, both of these rights are the principal channels by which the buyer can object on the 
nonconformity in quality or quantity. In Anglo-American law, rejection of goods refers to 
refuse to accept these goods, but not merely the refusal to take physical delivery of those goods. 
The major difference between taking delivery of the goods and accepting them is that taking 
delivery refers to taking physical control over the subject matter in fact, while acceptance 
indicates some kind of approval in law of the subject matter, without necessarily involving 
physical control.
②
 Hence, when the buyer exercises the right to reject, he undoubtedly objects 
on the quality or quantity conditions of the subject matter. The buyer’s right to require 
supplementary performance under German law also expresses the buyer’s objection on the 
quality or quantity conditions of the subject matter, but by directly requiring the seller to repair, 
replace, or provide other supplementary performance. These two rights therefore have similar 
functions regarding the raising of objections on the goods in quality or quantity. 
Second, the main objective of the German right to require supplementary performance and 
the Anglo-American right to reject is to induce the seller to mend nonconformities by 
providing supplementary performance or cure. In the U.K., the sales law does not provide any 
                                                             
① As to the similarity and divergence of the right to reject in U.K. law and the right to terminate the contract in civil laws, see 
MacQueen (2011, pp. 111-115), Naidoo (2011, pp. 808-812). 
② Professor Bridge (2010) has made explicit distinction between acceptance and taking delivery: “For example, the buyer may 
fail to take delivery of the goods for some time, but nevertheless subsequently accept the goods. Or he may accept the goods 
(in the sense of signifying his approval of them after examination), but subsequently fail to take delivery of them.” (§9-003). 
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such remedy as the right to require repair or replacement except in the case of consumer 
contracts.
①
 This may be confusing for a civil law scholar: what is a buyer able to do if he or 
she wants a repair or replacement instead of a return of the goods? The English dealers do not 
seem bothered by this issue. As an English scholar points out, “the right to reject provides a 
useful bargaining tool. It means that sellers have an incentive to ensure effective and speedy 
repairs or risk losing the bargain altogether.” (Naidoo, 2011, p. 808) In other words, when the 
buyer exercises the right to reject, the seller is under pressure to negotiate with the buyer about 
repair or replacement, otherwise the buyer could cancel the contract, making the seller lose all 
interests in the bargain and be liable for damages.
②
 Even after the introduction of additional 
consumer protection in the SGA 1979, English scholars still argue that the right to reject is the 
most powerful weapon for protecting the buyer’s interests, and is sufficient to play the same 
role as the right to require supplementary performance in Germany (Hood, 2008, p. 316). In 
German law, the function of the right to require supplementary performance is self-evident, as 
this right allows the buyer to directly require the seller to repair, replace, or take other measures 
to provide supplementary performance. Therefore, the function of right to reject in 
Anglo-American law and the one of right to require supplementary performance in German 
law just seem to be different roads to the same goal on this point. 
Third, both of these rights provide a “buffer zone” against the discharge of contract. In 
Anglo-American law, the first step for treating the contract as discharged is usually rejection 
(the other approach is revocation of acceptance),
③
 and during the period separating the 
exercise of the right to reject from the cancellation of the contract, the seller has an opportunity 
to save the contract by cure. Likewise, under German law, the right to require supplementary 
performance may also provide a “buffer zone” against termination of contract as, save in a few 
exceptions, the buyer may not terminate the contract if he did not firstly require supplementary 
performance and fix an additional period for this performance. During that period, the seller 
has a reasonable chance to save the contract by providing this performance. These two rights 
                                                             
① In fact, the incentive for the U.K. to introduce remedies of repair, replacement and price reduction for the consumers was the 
transposition of the EU Consumer Sales Directive of 1999 (Willett, Morgan-Taylor, & Naidoo, 2004, p. 94). 
② It needs to be noted that, under U.K. law, repair is generally suggested to be a collateral contract (Hood, 2008, p. 316) or a 
separate transaction (Bridge, 2010, §12-033), and hence that the arrangement for repair does not necessarily exclude the 
buyer’s right to reject. For example, if a seller refuses to inform the buyer the cause for repair, the buyer may still reject a 
repaired subject matter (Low, 2007, p. 536). 
③ See e.g. UCC §2-510. 
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hence have similar functions in this respect. 
Table 5.1  
Comparison between the right to reject and the right to require supplementary performance 
 Right of rejection in U.K. 
law 
Right of rejection in U.S. 
law 
Right to require 
supplementary performance 
in German law 
Standard 
for the 
exercise  
breach of conditions breach in any respect (UCC); 
material breach 
(commentary) 
removable defects 
Legal 
effects 
property revested in the 
seller; risk stays on the 
seller’s side 
property revested in the 
seller; risk stays on the 
seller’s side 
the seller has a duty to 
provide supplementary 
performance 
Systemic 
functions   
(a) induce the seller to 
replace or repair; (b) 
provide a “buffer zone” 
against discharge of 
contract 
(a) induce the seller to cure 
by, e.g. replacement or 
repair, (b) provide a “buffer 
zone” against cancellation of 
contract 
(a) promote the seller to 
remove defects by 
replacement or repair, (b) 
provide a “buffer zone” 
against termination 
 
Table 5.1 above provides a general illustration on the comparison of the right to reject in 
U.K. law, the right to reject in U.S. law, and the right to require supplementary performance in 
German law in respect of conditions for exercise, legal effects, and systemic functions. In light 
of these comparisons, I would like to address the problem raised at the beginning of this 
section, namely, whether it is necessary to introduce in the Chinese legal system an 
Anglo-American style right to reject. 
It can be observed that, compared with the right to require supplementary performance, 
the most significant characteristic of the right to reject does not lie in its conditions for exercise, 
but in its legal effects. If we introduced the right to reject into the Chinese legal system with its 
legal effects unchanged, the following issues would be worthy of attention. First, if the 
condition for exercising the right to reject is constructed to be any sort of nonconformity except 
insignificant ones, then, on one side, the legal effects would be harsh for the seller, on the other 
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side, the conditions for exercise and the systemic function of right to reject would largely 
overlap with the right to require supplementary performance. Specifically speaking, when there 
is a removable nonconformity, the buyer may either reject the goods, which will induce the 
seller to timely repair or replace, to save the contract, or require supplementary performance, 
which will also promote the seller to repair or replace, to save the contract. The only reason for 
which it would make sense to introduce the right to cure would be to provide a device for 
irremovable nonconformity, in which case the buyer’s right to require supplementary 
performance cannot apply. Second, if the exercise of the right to reject is made conditional on a 
frustration of contractual purpose due to nonconformity, while the legal effects might not be 
unjust as such, the triggering conditions and the legal effects of the right to reject would be 
identical to that of the right to terminate the contract, unnecessarily duplicating it. Besides, if 
the contractual purpose has been frustrated, is there any meaning for the buyer to merely reject, 
but not terminate the contract? To sum up, given that the legal effects of the right to reject and 
the right to terminate are quite close, and that the functions of the right to reject can be largely 
covered by the one of the right to require supplementary performance, if, in a legal system, the 
right to require supplementary performance has been established as the foremost remedy for 
the buyer in case of nonconformity, and the right to terminate the contract has been recognized 
as the basic system for ending contractual relationship, then the introduction of a system of 
rejection would inevitably lead to a confusing overlap of systemic functions or legal effects. 
For this reason, it does not appear necessary to introduce the right to reject in Chinese law. 
It needs to be noted that the CISG, as an international sales law that has made 
considerable compromise between civil law and Anglo-American law, did not adopt both the 
right to require supplementary performance and the one to reject, but chose to solely establish a 
system for requiring supplementary performance. On one hand, taking delivery has been 
confirmed as one of the buyer’s main obligations (CISG Art. 60) and refusal to take delivery 
can be admitted in a very limited scope. On the other hand, the right to refuse to accept (reject) 
nonconforming goods has been excluded from the remedy rights of the buyer. 
5.1.2 Clarification of the refusal to accept in CCL Article 148 
In the preceding subsection I argued that it was not necessary to introduce an 
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Anglo-American right to reject to perfect the present Chinese legal system. Nevertheless, there 
is one question that remains to be addressed: how should we interpret Article 148 of the CCL, 
which explicitly provides a rule concerning refusal to accept nonconforming goods? According 
to CCL Article 148:  
“Where the purpose of the contract is frustrated due to failure of the subject matter to meet 
the quality requirements, the buyer may refuse to accept the subject matter or terminate the 
contract. If the buyer refuses to accept the subject matter or terminates the contract, the 
risk of damage to or loss of the subject matter is borne by the seller.” 
Whether from the perspectives of the letter of law, comparative law, or legislative purpose, 
refusal to accept in this article can hardly be interpreted as meaning refusal to take physical 
delivery.  
First, the phrase “refuse to accept the subject matter” in CCL Article 148 is obviously 
different from the phrase “refusal to take delivery” in CCL Article 162. Interpreted from the 
perspective of the letter of the law, it is proper to make distinctions, rather than to treat them 
simply as the same concept. 
Second, the CCL’s drafting history also suggests that acceptance in CCL Article 148 
should not be understood as taking physical delivery. According to Paraphrase on Contract 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is edited by the Legislative Affairs 
Commission of the NPCSC, the idea of CCL Article 148 was borrowed from the experiences of 
the UCC and acceptance refers to the buyer’s certain approval of the subject matter (Hu, 1999, 
p. 229). The comparable provision is UCC §2-510, the first paragraph of which provides: 
“Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to give a right of 
rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.” (ALI & NCCUSL, 
2010, p. 2192) This rule mainly deals with the distribution of the risk of loss, and is precisely 
the parent provision of CCL Article 148. Therefore, acceptance in CCL Article 148 should refer 
to a certain approval of the condition of goods. 
Third, it appears the main legislative purpose of CCL Article 148 was to address the issue 
of risk allocation in case of nonconformity in quality. If refusal to accept the subject matter in 
this provision was understood as a refusal to take physical delivery, then its role, as a specific 
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rule concerning distribution of risk of loss will be unnecessary to play, because if the buyer 
refuses to take physical delivery, the possession of goods is still on the seller’s side, which 
means the risk of loss has never been transferred to the buyer. In other words, the special rule 
of CCL Article 148 would be redundant with general rules on risk allocation if the phrase 
“refusal to accept the subject matter” were defined as refusal to take delivery. 
Hence, whether it be from the perspective of the letter of the law, from that of comparative 
law, or from that of the legislative purpose, the phrase “refusal to accept the subject matter” in 
CCL Article 148 should not be interpreted as refusal to take delivery. Instead, the function of it 
should be to express the buyer’s objection on the condition of goods in quality or quantity. 
Next, I would like to analyze the conditions and legal effects of refusal to accept in CCL 
Article 148. 
Regarding the conditions of exercise of this refusal, it should be noted that the right to 
refuse to accept (reject) has not been constructed with as strict conditions in Anglo-American 
law as in CCL Article 148. In the U.K., any nonconformity to the contract that is material or 
not slight may justify the buyer’s right to reject (SGA 1979 §30). In the U.S., the UCC 
provides the so-called “perfect tender rule”, which entitles the buyer to reject if there is any 
nonconformity in the goods, even though the literature suggests the standard for the exercise of 
the right to reject is in practice dependent upon a material breach. However, according to CCL 
Article 148, it seems that it is only in case of nonconformity of goods in quality that frustrates 
the purpose of the contract that the buyer is able to refuse to accept. The following questions 
hence arise: Why is the buyer not permitted to refuse to accept the subject matter when there is 
some normal nonconformity with the contract in it? If the concept of acceptance is indeed 
connected with some kind of approval on the condition of the subject matter, does the strict 
standard for refusal to accept not contradict the requirement in the contract itself? 
In my view, given that the concept of “acceptance” should be understood as certain 
approval of the performance, then as long as the performance is nonconforming to the contract 
in any aspect that cannot be ignored, the buyer should be able to refuse to approve it. 
Interpreting frustration of contractual purpose as a necessary condition for refusal to accept is 
too high a threshold. As a matter of fact, the main purpose of CCL Article 148 is to address the 
issue of risk allocation between the buyer and seller; establishing a strict standard for refusal to 
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accept is not the main purpose. Therefore, it is possible to consider frustration of contractual 
purpose as only a sufficient condition for refusal to accept, rather than a necessary one. In other 
words, the buyer may certainly refuse to accept the subject matter with a nonconformity so 
serious as to frustrate the contractual purpose, but there could also be other nonconformities 
that justify such a refusal. I suggest that any nonconformity that cannot be ignored in light of 
the agreement and contractual purpose may entitle the buyer to object and consequently refuse 
to accept. The rationale for this interpretation would be the principle of pacta sunt servanda: 
since there is a requirement for quality in the agreement concluded by contracting parties, any 
nonconformity with the contract should be deemed unacceptable to the buyer, in the name of 
the binding force of the agreement.  
The next issue is to determine what legal effects the refusal to accept should be given. 
Under Anglo-American law, the legal effects of rejection include the revesting of the property 
in the seller and the transfer of the risk of loss to the seller. As discussed above, since both the 
systems of requiring supplementary performance and termination have been established in 
Chinese law, it is neither necessary nor suitable to introduce such a right to rejection. Although 
the concept of refusal to accept in Article 148 should be interpreted similarly with 
Anglo-American rejection in the sense that both of them stand for an objection on the 
performance without necessarily refusing to take physical delivery, the legal effects of rejection 
in Anglo-American law should not be transplanted into Chinese law. In my view, only a 
termination of contract should be able to revest the property in the seller on Chinese law; the 
legal effects of refusal to accept should therefore be limited. Normally, refusal to accept has no 
special meaning but expressing objection on the performance, however, in case that 
nonconformity in quality has constituted a fundamental breach, refusal to accept may 
exceptionally lead to transferring the risk to the seller without physically returning the subject 
matter to him. Specifically speaking, in case the nonconformity has frustrated the contractual 
purpose, as long as the subject matter is still under the buyer’s control, the risk of loss normally 
does not automatically transfer back to the seller. However, if the buyer expresses his refusal to 
accept in such a case, even if the subject matter has not been returned to the seller, the risk may 
transfer by itself. According to this interpretation, the original notion of acceptance and the 
legislative purpose of CCL Article 148 will be well maintained. 
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In summary, only if we (a) interpret the phrase refusal to accept in CCL Article 148 as 
refusal to approve, but not refusal to take physical delivery, (b) interpret frustration of 
contractual purpose as a sufficient rather than necessary condition, and (c) restrict the legal 
effects of refusal to accept to a special rule related to transfer risk, can the logic, legislative 
purpose, and special systemic function of CCL Article 148 be maintained. 
5.1.3 Discussion of the buyer’s refusal to take delivery 
Since CCL Article 148 has not specified conditions for the exercise of the refusal to take 
delivery, the question left unanswered is what the conditions for refusal to take delivery of 
goods with nonconformity in quality would be. In Chinese law, taking delivery has been 
recognized as the buyer’s duty. The system of the buyer’s refusal to take delivery has been 
basically established through CCL Articles 71, 72 and 162. CCL Article 72 provides that the 
obligee may refuse partial performance, unless such performance does not prejudice his or her 
interests. According to this article, insofar as the partial performance prejudices his or her 
interests, the buyer would be given an option: either take delivery of partial performance and 
then require supplementary performance, or refuse to take delivery and wait for full 
performance (Hu, 1999, p. 121). The condition for refusal to take delivery provided in Article 
72 is agreeable in principle. However, there are no explicit conditions of refusal to take 
delivery in case of nonconformity in quality, leaving a legal loophole. 
In judicial practice, the conditions of refusal to take delivery are essential when the courts 
decide whether it is the default of the obligee or the delay of the obligor, or determine the time 
of the transfer of risk, or calculate the liquidated damages due to delay in performance. Hence, 
it is urgent to thoroughly analyze the conditions for the exercise of the buyer’s refusal to take 
delivery in case of nonconformity in quality. In the next two parts, I would like to introduce 
several cases involving such a refusal in case of nonconformity in quality and make 
suggestions for the construction of conditions for this remedy.
①
 
                                                             
① As to performance before the fixed date provided in CCL Article 71, there are also some issues needed clarification. For 
example, according to CCL Article 71, the buyer is in principle entitled to refuse performance in advance, and the interests in 
the period for preparing performance are not considered at the obligor’s side. Nevertheless, since the topic of this dissertation 
is nonconformity in respect of quality or quantity, but not performance in advance, I have to discuss this issue in other place. 
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5.1.3.1 Problems in legal practice  
Among the six cases below,
①
 cases A1 to A3 relate to sales of real property; each of them 
involved quality problems without relevance to the main structure of building, and each 
plaintiff in these three cases claimed for liquidated damages on the ground of the seller’s delay 
in performance. Cases B1 to B3 concern sales of movable property; each of them involved a 
normal quality problem which did not significantly impact the utility of goods, yet each 
plaintiff was granted refusal to take delivery. 
 
Case A1: The DongZhongFa MinYiZhongZi No.139 (2013) decision involved a dispute 
between a real estate corporation A, located in Dongguan City, and a buyer B. The court found 
that although A received a certification concerning the completion of the building from the 
administration on Nov. 30, 2010, there were still some quality problems in it, such as 
substandard installation of windows or doors, damaged cement productions, and cracks in the 
wall. The court found that: “considering there are quite a few parts that need fixing, and that 
some of the quality defects may impact the normal life of the property users, it is reasonable for 
the buyer to refuse to take over this building.” As we can see, the court confirmed here the 
reasonableness of the buyer’s refusal to take over (take delivery) on the ground that the quality 
problems in the building might impact the buyer’s living. The court consequently allowed the 
liquidated damages to be calculated as agreed in the contract. 
 
Case A2: The Xiang MinChuZi No.339 (2013) decision concerned a dispute between a 
real property corporation C and a buyer D. After receiving the notification of tender, D went to 
examine the department and discovered seepage and some cracks in the wall, as well as in the 
floor. Therefore, D refused to move in and demanded C to fix these problems. Afterwards, D 
required C to pay liquidated damages, calculated on the basis of 0.03% of the down payment 
per day. The court held that the parties had agreed in their contract that quality problems 
beyond the main structure of building did not affect the process of hand-out, and according to 
the contract should be fixed by the seller after the delivery. The scope of the problems included: 
                                                             
① Unless otherwise stated, judicial decisions referred to in this dissertation all come from the database of Beida Fabao, see 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp.. 
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seepage, cracks and hollows in wall and floor, as well as loose face bricks. The court found 
that:  
“The flat has indeed some quality defects, such as seepage and cracks. However, according 
to the contract, these quality defects should be addressed by repair after the buyer notifies 
the seller, but may not justify the buyer’s refusal to take over. As to the influence of the 
defects on utility, the buyer may demand damage compensation…which should equal the 
actual loss… the plaintiff may require expense for renting department of the same kind 
nearby.” 
The court confirmed the effect of the agreement which provided the standard for the buyer 
to refuse to take over and, accordingly did not uphold the buyer’s claim for liquidated 
damages. 
 
Case A3: The HuErZhong MinEr(Min)ZhongZi No. 1695 (2009) decision is one of a 
series of decisions concerning disputes between a real property corporation E, located in 
Shanghai, and its buyers. When inspecting the flats, E’s buyers discovered all sorts of quality 
problems, such as holes in the floor, broken lights, seepage, cracks, and blocking of bathtub. 
These buyers refused to take over and required the seller to fix these problems; meanwhile, 
they also demanded liquidated damages, calculated on the basis of 0.03% of the down payment 
per day. In the decision mentioned above, the court found that:  
“The quality problems claimed by the buyer…do not belong to what may justify the 
buyer’s right to refuse to take over. However, E has already promised to fix these problems 
and thereby postponed the date for delivery. This is a new agreement which confirms that 
the delivery has not been completed. Therefore, the delay in performance is confirmed.” 
The court, consequently, allowed the claim of the buyer for liquidated damages. 
 
Case B1: In the case of ZheJia ShangZhongZi No.331 (2010), a furniture company A, 
located in Haining city, ordered sofa cloth from a company B, located in Hangzhou city. The 
court found that “neither on the sample, nor on the products for trial, were there any 
wheel-shaped stripes”, yet the integration report confirmed that the 11000 meters of cloth 
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ordered by A on March 3
rd
, 2009 had wheel-shaped stripes. B did not deny the existence of 
those wheel-shaped stripes, but argued that they were tolerable under today’s technology 
standards and therefore did not constitute nonconformity in quality. The court held that:  
“The cloth tendered by B has wheel-shaped stripes and is therefore nonconforming to the 
contract. According to CCL Article 148, A may refuse to take delivery. On the other hand, 
the court noticed that A had accepted some sofa cloth with wheel-shaped stripes. 
Nevertheless, that will not preclude the A’s right to refuse to take delivery of the last 11000 
meters of cloth.”  
In this case, although CCL Article 148 was referred to as the foundation of the buyer’s 
refusal to take delivery, it is disputable whether the cloth tendered has frustrated the contractual 
purpose. 
 
Case B2: In the case of ZheHang ShangZhongZi No.97 (2010), the plaintiff Dai ordered 
several air conditioners from a company C, located in Zhejiang. Regarding whether Dai might 
refuse to take delivery of an air conditioner, the court held that the COPR (coefficient of 
performance of refrigeration) of the air conditioner first tendered by C was 3.0, while the COPR 
of the air conditioner retendered was 2.8. Although the contract did not provide specific 
requirement on the COPR, since the first tender was 3.0 and the buyer did not object on that, it 
should be considered that the agreed COPR was 3.0. When C replaced the air conditioner, the 
COPR should not have fallen below that standard. Consequently, the air conditioner replaced 
did not protect Dai’s interests, but, on the contrary, harmed her interests in consumption. 
Therefore, Dai should be entitled to refuse to take delivery. 
 
Case B3: In the case of HuYiZhong MinSi(Shang) ZhongZi No.148 (2004), the plaintiff 
Dong ordered a red Ferrari, the price of which was 2.99 million RMB, from the defendant D, 
an automobile company located in Shanghai city. Dong had been informed from D that there 
was a small defect on the surface of the car, which was at that time the only red Ferrari 
transported to D. Nevertheless, the plaintiff required the car to be tendered in an “absolutely 
perfect” condition. Before transporting another car from Tianjin, the defendant required the 
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plaintiff to provide a written statement, promising to accept any car that might have a small 
defect. The plaintiff refused to provide such a statement. The district court and the appeal court 
both held that Dong, as a consumer, had ordered a car valued 2.99 million RMB; the high value 
of the car made the requirement for a perfect tender reasonable. In this decision, the seller’s 
delay in performance was therefore found to constitute a breach. 
 
Analysis: In case A1, although the completion of the building had been confirmed by the 
administration, there were still quality problems in the department involved. The court was of 
the view that these problems would have an impact on the residential purpose of the contract, 
and therefore found that it was reasonable for the buyer to refuse to take over. In case A2, 
although similar quality problems existed, there was an agreement on the conditions for the 
buyer to refuse to take over, according to which the buyer might not refuse if the quality 
problems did not impact the main structure of the building. Since the seepage and cracks were 
exactly contained in the list of those problems that should be fixed after the delivery, the court 
denied the buyer’s right to refuse to take over. In case A3, there were also similar quality 
problems that did not impact the main structure of the building, and there was no agreement as 
to the condition for the buyer to refuse to take over as in case A2. Nevertheless, the court went 
directly to the conclusion that those quality problems did not provide justifications for the 
buyer’s right to refuse to take over. It can be inferred from case A3 that even if there was no 
specific agreement, a strict standard was imposed to the buyer who intended to refuse to take 
over a real property with nonconformity in quality. 
We can observe that there are divergences concerning the conditions for the buyer to 
refuse to take over a real property with quality problems. One court employed the standard of 
impact on normal residential purpose, one imposed a stricter requirement (impact on the main 
structure of the building) based on the contractual agreement, and the last one imposed a 
similar strict requirement on the buyer with no clear ground. Not all of them referred to CCL 
Article 148.  
By contrast, in cases B1-B3, related to movable properties, the courts all confirmed the 
right of the buyer to refuse to take delivery. As seen from the facts revealed in judicial 
decisions, the quality problems in cases B1-B3 were unlikely to frustrate those contractual 
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purposes. In case B1, although the wheel-shaped stripes might reduce the quality of the sofas, 
but the reduction of value was not significant and did not preclude the buyer to use the cloth on 
a sofa. In case B2, even if the reduction of the COPR of the air conditioner constituted a 
nonconformity, the divergence was slight and the impact on normal use was very limited. As to 
case B3, a high-priced sports car would definitely call for high quality both inside and outside, 
therefore, a small defect on the surface would constitute a nonconformity. However, even the 
most delicate work and maintenance by mankind can hardly ensure an “absolutely perfect” 
condition. Even though a defect on the surface of a Ferrari cannot be overlooked, there seems 
no reason to consider it to be unacceptable and to definitely frustrate the contractual purpose. 
As we can see, the court upheld the right of the buyer to refuse to take delivery in all these 
three cases on movable properties, even though none of the nonconformities seem so severe as 
to frustrate the contractual purpose. 
Evidently, the views on the buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery differ depending on the 
type of sales. In the sales of real property, the courts tend to make the buyer take over first and 
then pursue other remedies, while in the case of movable property, there seems to be no 
obstacle for a buyer to refuse to take delivery as long as a material nonconformity occurs. The 
reasons for this divergence possibly include the following. Firstly, the buyer’s exercise of his 
right to refuse to take delivery is more efficient and reasonable in the case of movable goods 
than in the case of real property. This is because for movable properties, the nonconformities 
can normally be removed by replacement, and the repair is often practical only if the goods 
have been returned to the seller, while for real properties it is normally difficult to replace and 
the work of repair must be undertaken at the place where the property is located. Secondly, the 
cooperation of the buyer in taking delivery is more important in real property sales, in order to 
protect the seller’s interests in timely performance. The reason for this is that for movable 
properties, even if the buyer has wrongfully refused the goods, the seller can still perform his 
obligations by escrow; while in the case of real property, there is no room for the seller to do so. 
Finally, in recent cases involving sales of real property, the liquidated damages that are 
calculated on the basis of certain percentage of the down payment per day has usually been 
agreed on in contracts. Under these circumstances, if the buyer may refuse to take over on 
ground of any minor quality problems, the liquidated damages could be much higher than the 
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actual loss suffered by the buyer. In judicial decisions that were reluctant to confirm the 
buyer’s right to refusal to take over a real property, it is possible that consideration had been 
given to this factor.  
5.1.3.2 Foundation and principles of the buyer’s refusal to take delivery 
Before discussing the foundation and principle of the buyer’s right to refuse to take 
delivery, we have to recall the buyer’s duty to take delivery. Professors Medicus and Lorenz 
(2010a) conclude that under German law the obligee’s failure to take delivery has effects on 
three legal aspects: (a) on the mitigation of liability (Haftungsmilderungen), i.e. the obligor 
will not be liable for general negligence, but only for gross negligence and willful default, (b) 
transfer of risk from the obligor to the obligee, and (c) repayment of extra charge suffered by 
the obligor (pp. 247-249). Professors Brox and Walker (2010) argue that the obligee may also 
be responsible for delay in performance, insofar as the relationship of obligation requires him 
to take delivery, such as the case provided in BGB Article 433(2) (p. 306).
 
In Japan
①
 and 
China,
②
 there are no significant divergences in the legal effects of the buyer’s failure to take 
delivery. 
Despite some disputes over the nature of the taking of delivery,
③
 most civil law scholars 
believe that the ground for the requirement of taking delivery is the need for cooperation 
between contracting parties (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010, p. 244; Shi, 2000a, p. 425). Thus, the 
justification of buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery lies in the suspension of the duty to 
cooperate. The essential problem is: in what kind of circumstances will the buyer not be bound 
by such a duty? 
In my view, since the buyer has been entitled to require supplementary performance in the 
case of nonconformity, and taking delivery has been established as a general duty of the buyer, 
if the nonconformity can be suitably removed by supplementary performance, it is not 
necessary to entitle the buyer to refuse to take delivery, otherwise, the economic loss may 
                                                             
① Professor Uchida (2005) concludes that the effects of the obligee’s failure to take delivery should be: (a) the obligor will not 
be liable for nonperformance in the period of the delay; (b) the obligee’s Einrede to not perform the contract will be excluded; 
(c) the duty of care will be mitigated when tendering specific goods; (d) the extra charge will be burdened by the obligee; and 
(e) the risk transfers to the obligee (pp. 89-90). 
② See, e.g., Shi (2000a, pp. 437-442). 
③ As to different effects of default of the obligee based on statue liability theory, nonperformance theory or compromised 
theory, see Han (2011b, p.433); see also J. Ma (1998). 
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worsen and the system of requiring supplementary performance may be shelved. However, it is 
possible that in certain circumstances a nonconformity discovered at the time of delivery 
cannot be suitably removed by supplementary performance. For example, in the case of a 
nonconforming air conditioner as in case B2 above, forcing the buyer to take delivery makes it 
possible for the seller to fix the air conditioner on the spot and immediately put it into 
operation. If the buyer had pursued supplementary performance, the air conditioner would have 
had to be removed and fixed again, which is obviously inconvenient. Likewise, a flat with 
doors and windows that are not well fixed may not have nonconformities in its main structure, 
but should also be cured immediately, because the safety and privacy of the buyer cannot be 
well protected in such a flat. Hence, it is plausible to say that the buyer will not be bound by 
the duty to cooperate in taking delivery, if the nonconformity can be removed at the time of 
delivery and that failure to do so will evidently impact the buyer’s interests in consumption or 
transaction, given the specific circumstances and purpose of the contract. 
The CCL provides for rules on refusal to take partial performance, and therefore 
confirmed the right to refuse to take delivery of nonconforming goods in quantity (Hu, 1999, p. 
121). According to CCL Article 72: 
“An obligee may refuse the obligor’s partial performance, except where such partial 
performance does not harm the obligee’s interests. 
Any additional expense incurred due to the obligor’s partial performance shall be borne by 
the obligor.” 
In light of this rule, in a case where the tendered goods are nonconforming in terms of 
quantity, the buyer could either take this partial delivery and require the seller to provide 
supplementary performance, or refuse to take it and suspend his payment until the seller 
provides a conforming tender by full delivery. This approach is agreeable if there are 
restrictions on its interpretation, notably regarding the part of CCL Article 72 that prevents 
refusal to take delviery if the partial performance does not harm the obligee’s (here, the buyer’s) 
interests. Specifically speaking, if the “harm to the obligee’s interests” was interpreted in a 
broad sense, taking into account even the most minor prejudice then the exception would never 
apply and the buyer would always be entitled to refuse partial performance as any partial 
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performance may impact the interests of the obligee in some way, e.g. by causing additional 
cost for taking another delivery and inconvenience for impossibility of control the full 
performance in a certain period. This is why “harm to the obligee’s interests” should be 
interpreted in a narrow sense prohibiting the buyer’s refusal in cases where it would be 
unreasonable or contradicting the principle of good faith. Furthermore, the application of this 
article should be subject to the usage of trade. If refusal to take delivery is unreasonable in light 
of specific usage of transaction, the right to refuse cannot be justified.  
Next, I would like to clarify some fundamental principles for constructing conditions for 
refusal to take delivery in case of nonconformity in quality. 
The first principle is that things of the same nature should be addressed in the same way. 
In the absence of legal justifications, any nonconformity will constitute a failure of full 
performance, whether the nonconformity is in quantity or quality. These two types of 
nonconformity do not differ on this point. In foreign legal systems mentioned above, quality 
problems and lack of quantity have generally been basically dealt with in the same way. In 
Chinese law, there is no reason to treat them differently, either.  
The second principle is about maintaining the coherency of the remedy system. As I have 
argued above, a legal system which has recognized the buyer’s right to require supplementary 
performance as a basic remedy for nonconformity of goods should not introduce an 
Anglo-American style system of rejection. The construction of buyer’s right to refuse to take 
delivery of nonconforming goods should also be subject to the coherency of remedy system 
established in the CCL.  
The third principle can be called as “suiting the remedy to the case”. In legal practice, 
some courts tend to raise the standard of the buyer’s right to refuse to take over nonconforming 
subject matters, concerned with the heavy burden the seller might be faced with due to the 
contractual agreed liquidated damages. However, the condition of refusal to take delivery 
should not be determined in light of the possible consequences of liquidated damages. It is the 
rules on liquidated damages that should be left to apply if the agreement on liquidated damages 
causes unjust hardship to the seller. As to the conditions for exercising the right to refuse to 
take delivery, they should be decided according to specific rules on this matter. 
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5.1.3.3 Conditions and legal effects of the refusal to take delivery  
I have discussed the condition of refusal to take delivery of subject matters with a lack of 
quantity. In this subsection I would like to discuss the condition of refusal to take delivery of 
goods with quality problems, in light of the foundation and principles clarified in the preceding 
part. Generally speaking, in case the subject matter tendered by the seller does not conform 
with the contract, the buyer may refuse to take delivery if this nonconformity prejudices his 
interests in consumption or transaction and can be removed immediately, unless the agreement 
or the usage of transaction provides otherwise. The following points regarding the conditions 
for refusal deserve our attention. 
First, the standard of exercising the right to refuse to take delivery should not be as high 
as that for the right to terminate the contract (i.e. only nonconformities frustrating the purpose 
of the contract), nor should be as low as that of a “perfect tender rule” as introduced in UCC 
(i.e., theoretically, any nonconformity). Following the principles established above, the 
condition of refusal to take delivery of subject matters with quality problems should be at the 
same level of the one with a lack of quantity. If the seller wished to raise the standard for the 
exercise of this right of refusal, he or she would have to negotiate with the buyer and make 
another arrangement in the contract, just as the seller in case A2 did. There are reasons to think 
that the cost for negotiating for such an arrangement should be borne by the seller, but not the 
buyer. One reason is that it is the seller who is best placed to control the gravity of the 
nonconformity and to reduce related transaction costs. Indeed, economic research has 
suggested that “the vendor is the lowest-cost insurer against non-performance,” provided he 
has some control over the probability of externally caused nonperformance (Goetz & Scott, 
1977, p. 583). The seller can reduce the probability and extent of nonconformity by enhancing 
efficiency of management. If the seller fails to ensure the quality of subject matters, then he has 
to negotiate to raise the standard for the buyer to refuse to take delivery, to avoid further loss. 
Thus, the low standard of the buyer’s refusal to take delivery may induce the seller to enhance 
the efficiency of management, to avoid the cost for negotiating for a high standard for the 
buyer to exercise his right to refusal. In short, we could promote economic efficiency if we 
designed the right to refusal in a way that lets the transaction cost be borne by the seller.  
Second, the buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery should only be exercised at the time of 
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delivery. If the buyer has physically taken delivery of the goods, the only way left for him to 
remedy nonconformity is to require supplementary performance. The buyer may simply return 
the goods and notify the seller of the nonconformity, without having to make a choice among 
different measures of supplementary performance. The seller should then be held to provide a 
reasonable supplementary performance. This approach of interpretation is necessary for the 
coherency of remedy system.  
Third, the legal effects of the refusal to take delivery should be limited. We can agree with 
Professor Han (2011b) to consider it as a right to suspend (p. 318). This would mean that the 
legal effects of the right to refuse to take delivery would include: (a) the suspension of buyer’s 
duty to take delivery; (b) a delay in the seller’s performance (i.e. the delay resulting from the 
refusal is considered as a delay in the seller’s performance, which may lead to the triggering of 
liquidated damages). 
5.1.4 Conclusion of this section 
Regarding the buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery of and to refuse to accept 
nonconforming subject matters, it seems that the legislation of the CCL is unclear and that 
there is still much academic research to be done. This section argued that it would not be 
suitable to introduce an Anglo-American style right to reject in Chinese law, because it would 
overlap with the systemic function of the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance. 
Instead, it is the right to refuse to take delivery that should be further developed. 
The buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery of nonconforming goods is an independent 
remedy that should be carefully examined and constructed. CCL Article 72 provides the 
conditions for a refusal of partial performance, but its content should be clarified and some 
restrictions should be added when interpreting it. As to the nonconformity in quality, I have 
argued that a right to refuse to take delivery arises, save agreement or usage of transaction to 
the contrary, as soon as there is a nonconformity in quality that may prejudice the buyer’s 
interests in consumption or transaction and can be removed immediately. The legal effects of 
buyer’s refusal to take delivery should be held to be a suspension of the buyer’s performance 
and a delay in the seller’s. Moreover, the exercise of this right should be limited to the time of 
delivery; after the delivery, the buyer should only be allowed to pursue supplementary 
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performance.  
In the next section, I would like to discuss another disputable remedy for nonconformity – 
price reduction, trying to reconstruct the way to exercise it in Chinese law. 
5.2 Reconsideration of the exercise of price reduction 
5.2.1 Divergence between legal practice and legal theories regarding the exercise of 
price reduction 
The relevant provision for the remedy of price reduction in case of nonconformity is CCL 
Article 111: 
“Where a performance does not meet the prescribed quality requirements, the breaching 
party shall be liable for breach in accordance with the contract. Where the liabilities for 
breach were not prescribed or clearly prescribed, and cannot be determined in accordance 
with Article 61 hereof, the aggrieved party may, by reasonable election in light of the 
nature of the subject matter and the degree of loss, require the other party to assume 
liabilities for breach by way of repair, replacement, remaking, acceptance of returned 
goods, or reduction in price or remuneration, etc.” 
As we can see, in case of a nonconformity in quality, CCL Article 111 allows the buyer to 
require a price reduction as a reasonable remedy to it, provided there is no explicit agreement 
on specific measures of remedy. Price reduction has been thoroughly researched, and some 
studies have established a characteristic theoretic system (e.g., Han, 2008). The most common 
view at present is that price reduction can be realized by a unilateral declaration of the 
aggrieved party’s intention; in other words, the right of price reduction is a pure formation right 
(einfaches Gestaltungsrecht) (Han, 2008; Du, 2008; Cui, 2012; G. X. Zhu, 2012, p. 615).
 
Formation rights are rights to unilaterally create legal relationship and therefore have by nature 
a feature of “dominance” (Schwab, 2006, p. 143). A pure formation right does not even need 
the intervention of the authorities to have force at law (Medicus, 2006, p. 40); it is sufficient for 
the party exercising the right to notify the other party of its intention to produce a legal effect. 
As I will introduce below, the prevailing view in China is that the buyer can unilaterally reduce 
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the price in case of nonconformity by a simple notification to the seller, without needing to 
reach an agreement with him, or needing to resort to courts or arbitrators. It is obvious that this 
kind of interpretation has a significant influence on the autonomy of private parties and the 
balance of interests between them. Therefore, the way to exercise this right needs to be 
carefully examined and discussed. 
The latest opinion in Chinese judicial practice on this matter is reflected in the Supreme 
People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract (hereafter JILSC), which 
was issued in 2012. JILSC Article 44 provides that the buyer may “require the seller to reduce 
the contractual price”. Clearly, according the letter of Article 44, the buyer is not allowed to 
reduce the price by a unilateral declaration, but should require the seller to reduce the price for 
him.  
Even if we considered that the text in Article 44 could be interpreted in a different way, 
the Explanation of the JILSC, edited by judges of the Supreme People’s Court, undoubtedly 
defends a claim-based approach rather than a declaration-based one:  
“where contracting parties reach a consensus, the reduction of price can be realized by 
according to their agreement, and the effect of reduction arises as soon as the consensus is 
achieved; where they have different opinions, no matter whether price reduction is 
considered as a right of claim or as a right of formation, the reduction cannot be realized 
merely by declaration of one party’s intention. It must, on contrary, be realized through the 
court or an arbitration institution.” (Xi, 2012, p. 378)  
Evidently, the Explanation of the JILSC has emphasized the importance of the consensus 
of the contracting parties and the leading role of legal authorities. Although the Explanation of 
JILSC does not have the same authority as the Judicial Interpretation itself, it would be the 
foremost reference when lower courts have problems in applying the JILSC. Thus, we can 
expect that many courts would require contracting parties to agree on price reduction in future 
related cases. 
During the investigation of judicial decisions related to CCL Article 111, I did not find 
any case involving disputes on unilateral declaration of price reduction. Rather, I found that in 
quite a few cases it was actually the court that had actively promoted the price reduction. These 
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decisions were made before the issue of the JILSC, and therefore could reflect the opinions of 
lower courts in early judicial practice, which were in accordance with the claim right approach 
rather than the formation rights one. These views in judicial practice (the Explanation of JILSC 
and those early decisions) indicate that there is a divergence between legal practice and legal 
theories, according to which the right to price reduction should be realized by the buyer’s own 
declaration. A first question then arises: is the formation right theory helpful for the application 
of the rules on price reduction in Chinese legal practice? Given that the formation right theory 
in China was basically inspired from German legal theory, and that the conditions for 
exercising the right of price reduction under German law is built upon the one for terminating 
contract, then the second question is: is there really any basis for adopting the formation right 
theory as an interpretative theory as to the Chinese positive law? 
To answer these questions, I would like to first re-examine the understandings and 
definitions of price reduction in both German and Anglo-American law, and then, in light of 
this comparative legal study, question the logic of the prevailing theory in China, from the 
perspective of promoting the balance of interests between contracting parties as well as the 
inner coherency of the remedy system. Finally I would like to argue that price reduction under 
the CCL should be realized as a form of contract modification. 
5.2.2 The prevailing interpretive theory on the exercise of price reduction 
According to the dominant view in Chinese academia, price reduction is different from 
damage compensation and can be exercised by a unilateral declaration of one party’s intention. 
In the mainland China, Professor Han has firstly discussed in detail the structure of price 
reduction and argued that price reduction should be divided into two stages: the process of 
price reduction and the result of price reduction. He considers that the consequence of the 
result of price reduction indicates the seller’s liability for breach of contract, which has been 
stipulated in CCL Article 111. He adds that:  
“The right of price reduction itself is not the right to claim, but the previous step (i.e. the 
process of price reduction). The right of price reduction is the tool or instrument for 
realizing the interests in price reduction……it is the prerequisite of the claim, but not the 
claim itself.” (Han, 2008, p. 20)  
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 This view, however, is confronted with some criticisms.
①
 Professor Han (2008) also 
argues that: “compared with partial termination, it is preferable to construe price reduction on 
the idea of contract modification.” (p. 21) Moreover, he suggests that the seller’s right to cure 
should have a priority over the buyer’s claim for price reduction (Han, 2008, p. 24). 
Professor J. L. Du has done research from the perspective of perfecting the present system 
of price reduction in China. He argues that price reduction should be designed as a right of 
formation, but not a right of claim; that price reduction should also be applied in case of defects 
in title; that the price reduced should be determined proportionally according to the value the 
subject matter actually has as compared to the value it should have; and that the time for 
determination should be the one of the formation of the contract, but not the one of tendering 
delivery (Du, 2008). It needs to note that the elements and effects of price reduction discussed 
in his article should be considered as suggestions for lawmaking, but not as interpretation of 
the Chinese positive law. 
Professors Ma and Yu (2007) also consider the right of price reduction as a right of 
formation (p. 690), and so does Professor H. P. Su (2011). Professor Su argues that in the case 
that one party has tendered nonconforming subject matter and the non-breach party has 
therefore suffered loss, “if the non-breach party is willing to take over the defective subject 
matter and demand price reduction, then it should be considered that the non-breach party has 
unilaterally modified the content of contract, and that it has made adjustment in light of the 
situation of performance.” (p. 275)② The standpoint of G. X. Zhu (2012) is more or less the 
same: “Price reduction is actually a right that may change legal relationship or legal statues by 
one party’s declaration of his intention.” (p. 615) 
Professor Cui (2006) suggested, in one place, that “observed from the perspective of 
compensating for the buyer’s loss, it is acceptable to consider price reduction as a kind of 
damage compensation in most cases”, whereas in another place he stated that:  
“It needs to be noted that the price reduction is realized on the ground of striking a balance 
between the value and the quality of the subject matter, and is therefore not subject to the 
rules of mitigation and of contributory negligence. Accordingly, it can be admitted together 
                                                             
① As to criticism opinion, see Cui (2012, pp. 96-98); as to one different opinion, see Du (2008, p. 51). 
② It needs to be noted that Professor Su (2011) also considers that the breaching party’s right to cure should have priority over 
the non-breach party’s right to reduce the price (p. 276). 
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with liquidated damages, even if the agreement of liquidated damages basically aims at 
compensating for the loss.” (p. 38)  
In my opinion, if the price reduction can by itself compensate for the loss and be 
considered as a kind of damage compensation, then it is not proper to admit it together with the 
enforcement of liquidated damages that also aims at compensating for loss; on the other hand, 
if the price reduction is based on the idea of striking a balance between the value and the 
quality of the subject matter, then its nature should not be considered as a kind of damage 
compensation. Therefore, there seems to be some contradictions in the opinions of Professor 
Cui. Nevertheless, regarding the exercise of the right of price reduction, he explicitly agrees 
with the prevailing view: “The right of price reduction is not a right of claim, but a right of 
formation, and accordingly, not governed by the rule of limitation on action” (Cui et al., 2010, 
p. 198). 
Although some scholars have not explicitly expressed their opinions over this issue, it is 
plausible to conclude that the formation right theory dominates Chinese scholarship on price 
reduction. Nevertheless, it needs to be reminded that the formation right theory is basically 
transposed from German law. However, there does not seem to have been any thorough 
analysis in China of the logic and structure of the right to price reduction in German law; 
accordingly, the differences between Chinese contract law and German obligation law seem to 
have been largely overlooked. In the next subsections, I would like to examine the special 
function and condition of price reduction in German law, and point out that this kind of 
function and condition cannot be found in the CCL. I conclude that the lack of such factors in 
the Chinese positive law is fatal for the logic of formation right theory of price reduction. 
5.2.3 Function of and attitudes towards price reduction in comparative law 
5.2.3.1 The logic of price reduction as a right of formation in German law 
After the reform of German obligation law, BGB Article 441(1) provides that the buyer 
may, in lieu of termination, reduce the price by his declaration to the seller, regardless of the 
exception provided in the second sentence of BGB Article 323(5). This provision can be 
applied, mutatis mutandis, to other bilateral contracts which require delivery of subject matters. 
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According to this provision, the right of price reduction can be exercised by the buyer’s 
declaration (Erklärung) to the seller. In Germany, few people questioned the structure of the 
right of price reduction (Minderungsrecht) as a right of formation (e.g., Brox & Walker, 2006, 
§4 Rn. 73; Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, §78 Rn. 167). According to BGB Article 441(3), the 
price reduced should be equal to the difference between the value the subject matter should 
have (Soll-Wert) and the value it actually has (Ist-Wert), in other words, the difference between 
the value of an object with no defects and the value of one with a defect (Medicus & Lorenz, 
2010b, §78 Rn. 164). The prevailing view on price reduction currently held by most Chinese 
scholars, i.e. the formation right theory, originates in these rules in German legal system. 
However, the nature of price reduction as a “replacement of the remedy of termination” 
deserves more attention, as it has rarely been emphasized in the Chinese literature on this 
subject. BGB Article 441(1) states that: “price reduction is applied in lieu of termination 
(anstelle des Rücktritts)”. Such a definition ultimately determines the conditions for the 
exercise of price reduction and justifies the formation right approach in German law. 
Professors Dieter Medicus and Stephan Lorenz (2010b, §78 Rn. 166) point out that the 
rationale of the right of price reduction lies in the rules on termination, such as BGB Articles 
437 nos.2, 323 and 326(5).
①
 Regarding termination, the first paragraph of BGB Article 323 
explicitly provides that where there is a bilateral contract, and the obligor did not tender the 
due performance or has provided a nonconforming tender, if the obligee has appointed a proper 
period for the obligor’s tender or supplementary performance and this period has elapsed 
fruitlessly, the obligee may terminate the contract. The second paragraph then provides for the 
cases that do not require an appointed period. According to these provisions, the right of 
termination is normally subject to the appointment by the obligee of a proper period, during 
which the obligor is allowed to “cure” the nonconformity. A similar condition applies to the 
right of price reduction. The right of price reduction does not arise at the same time with the 
right to supplementary performance; on the contrary, it basically arises after the fruitless lapse 
of a proper period for supplementary performance (Brox & Walker, 2006, §4 Rn. 70). This 
should give the breaching party a reasonable opportunity to “cure” before the price is reduced. 
Unless the defects are minor, the conditions for exercising the right of price reduction are thus 
                                                             
① As to the similarity of the conditions of price reduction and termination, see also Looschelders (2007, §5 Rn. 117). 
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the same as the one for exercising the right to terminate the contract. This is, in my opinion, the 
crux of the matter when it comes to the logic of the formation right approach. 
First, during the period for supplementary performance, the seller’s interests in “cure” 
have been given a priority. Whether the supplementary performance can be fulfilled is basically 
controlled by the seller. If the period has fruitlessly elapsed, it should be deemed that the seller 
did not take the opportunity to fulfill his performance. In that case the buyer has very few 
choice except termination, price reduction, and damage compensation. Thus, if the buyer 
unilaterally reduces the price in lieu of termination, the balance of interests between 
contracting parties will not be negatively impacted. Second, in case the period for 
supplementary performance has fruitlessly elapsed, the buyer already has a unilateral right to 
terminate the contract (except if the defect is minor). If the buyer unilaterally reduces the price, 
the logic of this right can stand insofar as the price reduction is constructed as a remedy in lieu 
of termination. In short, only if the condition for exercising price reduction is based on the one 
for termination can the formation right approach keep its logic and not impact the balance of 
interests between contracting parties. 
Next, I would like to discuss the difference between price reduction and a similar remedy 
in German law – damages in lieu of performance (statt der Leistung) – in order to reveal the 
special function of price reduction. The right to damages in lieu of performance basically arises 
at the same time as the right to terminate and to reduce the price. This type of damages is 
established by the new German obligation law and takes the place of its predecessor, damages 
due to nonperformance (Schadensersatz wegen Nichterfüllung) (Schermaier, 2007, §280-285, 
Rn. 101). There are two specific forms of damages in lieu of performance. One is the so-called 
“small compensation”, which allows the obligee to keep the delivery and demand the 
difference in value (Wertdifferenz); the other is the so-called “big compensation”, which means 
the obligee will return the delivery and demand the whole value (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010b, 
§78 Rn. 180). No matter which form of damages the obligee claims for, according to BGB 
Articles 276 and 280, the requirement of the obligor’s fault (Vertretenmüssen) has to be 
fulfilled (Medicus & Lorenz, 2010a, §31 Rn. 356 ff). In other words, the obligor may defeat 
the obligee’s claim for damages by successfully proving a lack of fault on his part. By contrast, 
there is no such requirement for price reduction. That is to say that if the obligee pursues price 
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reduction, the obligor cannot escape the consequences of price reduction by proving the 
absence of fault. This allows price reduction to protect the buyer’s interests when damage 
compensation is unavailable. From this perspective, price reduction, as a useful remedy for 
defective subject matters, has an irreplaceable function in German legal system.  
However, if damage compensation in the field of sales law was not based on the principle 
of fault and the conditions for exercising price reduction were not based on the one for 
termination, would it still be necessary, or even suitable, to construe price reduction as a 
formation right? We cannot give an affirmative answer by merely referring to German legal 
theory. At this point, it would be helpful to introduce the understanding of reducing the price in 
Anglo-American law, which does not rely on fault for establishing liability for nonconformity 
in sales law. 
5.2.3.2 The understanding of reducing the price in Anglo-American law 
The concept of price reduction is said to be unfamiliar to both the U.K. and the U.S. 
(Bridge, 2010, §12-093; Piché, 2003, p. 519). In the U.K., if a breach in quality is treated as 
breach of a warranty, which means the buyer would not reject the goods, then the primary 
remedy provided to the buyer would be damage compensation, and the foremost standard for 
determination of damages would be the diminution of the value of goods (Beale, 2008, 
§43-443). That is to say, the difference between (a) the value of the goods if they had complied 
with the undertaking, measured at the time and place of delivery, and (b) the actual value of the 
goods in their actual condition, at the same time and place of delivery; this kind of calculation 
is known as a “prima facie” measure (Beale, 2008, §43-443; Bridge, 2010, §17-051). As to 
consumer sales, the U.K. has, following the instruction of the EU Consumer Directive of 1999, 
introduced the remedy of price reduction for consumer buyers. However, according to SGA 
1979 §48C, price reduction cannot be exercised by the buyer’s declaration of his intention. On 
the contrary, it states: “(1) If section 48A above applies, the buyer may (a) require the seller to 
reduce the purchase price of the goods in question to the buyer by an appropriate amount”. It is 
clear that the buyer cannot reduce the price unilaterally, but should instead require the seller to 
reduce the price. A British scholar points out that given the existence of the “prima facie” 
measure in damage compensation, it seems unlikely that the remedy of price reduction will be 
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of much value in U.K. law unless either the ruling price for the goods bought has dropped 
between sale and delivery, or the buyer has difficulty in proving damages (Bridge, 2010, 
§12-096). 
U.S. law never introduced a remedy of price reduction for the buyer. Furthermore, 
Professor Albert H. Kritzer (1989), a famous disseminator of the CISG (Moser, 2012; 
DiMatteo, 2011),
 
believes that there is no direct equivalent to price reduction in the UCC (p. 
375). It seems that the closest counterpart is the remedy provided in Section 2-717 of the UCC, 
which allows the buyer to deduct all or part of his damages resulting from any breach of the 
contract from any part of the price still due; however, this remedy should be considered as the 
right to set off, but not confused with the right of price reduction (Piché, 2003, p. 557).
 
 
Under U.S. law, it is damage compensation that generally takes the place of price 
reduction. According to UCC §2-714 (1), where the buyer has accepted the goods and given 
notification in accordance with UCC §2-607(3), “he may recover as damages for any 
nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s 
breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable”. The most commonly applied 
formula for damages here is, as UCC §2-714(2) provides, to compensate the buyer the 
difference at the time of acceptance between “the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted.” (White & Summers, 2010, p. 516) 
However, when the buyer made a bad bargain, he may not get as much recovery by pursuing 
the manner provided in UCC §2-714(2) as by pursing §2-713 and §2-712 (White & Summers, 
2009, p. 601). 
The reason that damage compensation in Anglo-American law can basically replace price 
reduction is not only because the formulas are similar, but also because the manner in which 
liability for damages is established. In Anglo-American law, it is not necessary to prove fault 
on part of the seller when establishing the seller’s liability for damages due to nonconforming 
goods (Watanabe, 2011, p. 941). Given these factors, price reduction appears rather 
unattractive to Anglo-American jurists (Farnsworth, 2004, pp. 204-207). 
5.2.3.3 The compromise made by CISG Article 50 
According to CISG Article 50, if the goods tendered by the seller do not conform with the 
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contract, then whether or not the price has already been paid, “the buyer may reduce the price 
in the same proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of the 
delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had at that time”. Price reduction 
has been recognized by many commentators as an independent remedy, originating from the 
system of “actio quanti minoris” in Roman law (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 596; 
Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 309). Although some CISG specialists, like Professors 
Schlechtriem and Müller-Chen, believe that price reduction should be construed neither as 
damages nor as partial avoidance of the contract, but rather as adjustment of the contract, the 
UNCITRAL’s Secretariat’s Commentary takes a different standpoint, according to which price 
reduction has a similar effect to a partial avoidance of the contract (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 
2005, p. 597). Some other scholars, like Bergsten and Miller, also believe that reduction of 
price can be justified “if it is seen as a partial avoidance of the contract” (Bergsten & Miller, 
1979, p. 274). 
Most provisions of the CISG are the result of a compromise between Anglo-American law 
and civil law, and Article 50 is a prime example thereof. Compared to earlier versions of the 
CISG, the time when the price should be calculated has changed from the time a contract is 
concluded, which is the same as in the BGB, to the one of delivery, which is close to the one 
when determining damage compensation in Anglo-American law (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, 
p. 452). Moreover, the term “declare” used in earlier versions of Article 50 has also been 
deleted, to prevent special weight being placed onto it (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 452). By 
comparing some influential commentaries on the CISG, we can find significantly different 
views between German and U.S. scholars. 
German scholars interpret the exercise of price reduction under the CISG as follows. First, 
price reduction is understood as a unilateral right of the buyer and can be exercised by a 
declaration that does not have to satisfy any formal requirements, while this declaration must 
be clear but need not be specific. Second, the right of price reduction is taken to be subject to 
“the resolutory condition of the offer of subsequent performance”, and cannot be exercised “as 
long as a time period fixed by the buyer for the seller’s supplementary performance is still 
running” (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 598-599). Those constructions make up a 
German-style approach: on the one hand, price reduction can be realized by unilateral 
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declaration of the buyer, and therefore can be understood as a right of formation; on the other 
hand, the seller’s supplementary performance or cure has a priority over the buyer’s right to 
reduce the price, and this can be viewed as a transformation of basing the conditions of price 
reduction on the ones of termination. 
The U.S. commentators, in contrast, focus on the relationship between price reduction and 
damage compensation and question the value of price reduction. Professors John O. Honnold 
and Harry M. Flechtner thoroughly examined in their commentary the main function of price 
reduction, that is to say to act as an instrument for balance of interests between the parties 
when the buyer cannot be compensated by damages, particularly when the seller is not liable 
for nonconformity. They argue that the scope of Article 50 is in fact quite narrow (Honnold & 
Flechtner, 2009, p. 447), and that the “genesis” of the price reduction device can only be 
appreciated from a historical perspective, i.e. “as a vestige of an important tool designed to 
cope with a traditional civil law doctrine (eroded but not abandoned) that a seller is liable for 
‘damages’ caused by defective goods only when he is guilty of fault or fraud.” (Honnold & 
Flechtner, 2009, p. 449) It appears that these U.S. scholars have correctly recognized the 
original justification of price reduction in Roman law and the fact that the CISG has adopted a 
unitary contractual approach and rejected the idea that the liability for damages should be 
conditioned on fault. Accordingly, from their point of view, the special mechanism of price 
reduction could be considered redundant, and there would be “little reason to retain this 
venerable legal tool” (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 449). 
The different interpretations on CISG Article 50 reflect a divergence between German and 
Anglo-American law, and indicate that the function and conditions of exercise of price 
reduction can be construed in different ways. In my view, whether price reduction should be 
retained as an independent remedy for nonconformity depends mostly upon whether the 
liability for damages in sales law is based on fault; whether the right of price reduction can be 
construed as a right of formation depends mostly upon whether price reduction can be 
understood as partial termination and whether its conditions can be based on the ones of 
termination.  
The issues we now have to address are: how is price reduction provided for and applied in 
Chinese law? Is there any ground for constructing a German-style price reduction in China? In 
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the next subsection, I would like to examine the historical development and the present 
situation of application of price reduction in Chinese law. 
5.2.4 The historical development and present situation of price reduction in China 
5.2.4.1 The historical development of price reduction 
Rules related to price reduction can be traced back to as early as the Chinese Economic 
Contract Law of 1981 (expired, hereafter CECL). CECL Article 39 (Article 34 after 
amendment in 1993) provided for the liability of the contractor in contract for constructions:  
“If, due to the inferior quality of survey and design work or because survey and design 
documents are not submitted in time, the work period is prolonged and losses are caused 
thereby, the survey and design unit shall continue to complete the designs and shall reduce 
or forfeit its survey and design fees and shall even make compensation for the losses.”  
CECL Article 40 (Article 35 after amendment in 1993) provided for the liability of the 
contractor in contract for hired work. If the quality or quantity of work delivered to the 
ordering party does not conform to the prescriptions in the contract, it shall, without charge, 
undertake to make repairs or supplement the quantity or, in light of the circumstances, reduce 
remuneration. Chinese scholars argue that “reducing survey and design fees” and “reducing 
remuneration” are the earlier provisions related to the liability of price reduction in China (e.g., 
Han, 2008, p. 18). 
Article 35 of the Regulation on Contracts for Sales of Industrial Products and Minerals in 
1984 (expired) provided that if the products supplied by the supplier did not comply with the 
contract in terms of description, type, quality, and other similar characteristics, then in case the 
ordering party agreed to use the products, the price should be determined in light of their 
quality, and in case where the ordering party could not use those products, the supplier would 
be liable for their repair, replacement, or return. Similarly, Article 11 of the Regulations on 
Contracts for Work in 1985 (expired) provided that if the contractor used the materials 
provided by the ordering party, the contractor should select materials in accordance with the 
contract and accept the examination from the ordering party; if the contractor concealed defects 
in the materials or used materials in a way that did not comply with the contract and the quality 
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of work had therefore been impacted, then the ordering party would be entitled to require a 
remake, repair, price reduction, or return of goods. Besides, according to Article 11 of the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretation on Disputes regarding Contracts for 
Construction Projects, which came into force in 2005, if the quality of construction project fails 
to comply with the agreement due to the fault of the contractor, and the contractor has refused 
to repair or reconstruct, the developer may require a price reduction.  
We can observe that the CECL originally provided price reduction only for the ordering 
party who agreed to use the nonconforming work, but not for the buyer who received a 
nonconforming object. The Judicial Interpretation concerning Disputes regarding Contract for 
Construction confirms the remedy of price reduction for the developer who receives a 
nonconforming construction; as to the exercise of price reduction, it provides that the aggrieved 
party may require the breaching party to reduce the price, but cannot reduce the price by 
himself. 
Regarding contract for sales, it is the Regulations on Contracts for Sales of Industrial 
Products and Minerals in 1984 that first gave the buyer who agreed to use nonconforming 
subject matter the right to require price reduction. To exercise the right of price reduction, the 
buyer had to require the seller to reduce the price, but could not reduce it by himself. 
In 1999, price reduction became a general remedy stipulated in the general part of the 
CCL, and its special rules for sales contracts (CCL Art. 155) and for contract for hired work 
(CCL Art. 262) have no material differences with the general rule. None of these rules allows 
the aggrieved party to reduce the price by himself; on the contrary, it has been clearly stated 
that it is the breaching party that should reduce the price.  
The following question is: how is price reduction normally exercised in judicial practice, 
and in which way has the function of it been realized? 
5.2.4.2 The realization of price reduction in Chinese judicial practice 
In January 2013, I investigated judicial decisions on price reduction in the database of 
Beida Fabao.
①
 A search with the keyword “reduction of price or remuneration” yielded 117 
relevant results, while one with the keyword “determining the price in light of the quality” 
                                                             
① http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp.. 
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found 70. In the former case, the decisions basically related to CCL Article 111, while in the 
latter case most of the decisions were related to the provisions concerning price reduction in 
private agreements. Among these decisions I could find no drastic disputes concerning the 
remedy of price reduction; on the contrary, price reduction rarely seems to have been the focus 
of arguments. 
In decisions which involved disputes concerning price reduction, quite a few involved the 
intervention of the court. In the decision of HuYiZhong MinEr (Min) ZhongZi No.2093 (2011), 
regarding the decoration of a counter in a department store, Corporation A demanded 
termination of contract, return of already paid remuneration, and liquidated damages for a 
nonconforming decoration project, while Corporation B counterclaimed for the unpaid 
remuneration and demanded liquidated damages for A’s delay in payment. The district court 
confirmed the existence of quality problems, but found that, according to CCL Article 111 and 
in light of the specific circumstances of this case, it was reasonable to reduce the remuneration 
at a certain proportion of the original sum:  
“Given that the decoration is specially made for the counter, and a high standard has been 
required for such a counter in the department store, in light of the actual quality of 
decoration project, the remuneration should be reduced by 40,000 yuan.”  
In this case, it needs to be noted that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had demanded a 
reduction of price, it was the court that actively intervened and reduced the price by a certain 
amount, based on CCL Article 111. 
A similar situation occurred in the decision of WuZhong MinSiZhongZi No.322 (2010). 
In this case, the intermediate court of Urumqi confirmed quality problems in an apartment and 
found that, according to CCL Articles 107 and 111, the contractor should be liable for the 
breach:  
“Given that [the contractor] did not fulfill his obligation to fix the problem, and that the 
ordering party has reconstructed the roof by himself, there is no chance for the contractor 
to repair or reconstruct. Thus, the contractor should be liable for breach by way of price 
reduction…The court find that the remuneration for the project should be reduced to a 
half.”  
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In this case, the court reduced the remuneration in light of the specific circumstances, 
despite neither of the parties having raised such a claim. This is another example related to 
active intervention of the court, in terms of price reduction. 
In the decision of ShanMinEr ChuZi No.496 (2006), the court of Shanjia county, Zhejiang 
Province, found that the furniture made by Corporation A for Hotel B was not conforming with 
the contract, and therefore A was held liable for the breach. Nevertheless, those pieces of 
furniture were specially made in accordance with the requirements of Hotel B, notably in terms 
of standard, color, and form. Given that the furniture could still be used and that Hotel B had 
already used them for nearly two years, the court did not admit the claim of Hotel B for a full 
return. The court found that:  
“According to CCL Article 111, given the specific circumstances of this case, it is proper 
to determine the price in light of the quality. …The court has made an interpretation on this 
point, but Hotel B still insists on its claim and fails to reasonably choose a remedy for 
liability for breach. Thus, the court find against the counterclaim of Hotel B.”  
In this decision, the court firstly made an interpretation regarding Hotel B’s choice of 
remedies and pointed out that the most reasonable remedy for Hotel B was price reduction. As 
Hotel B refused to change its claim, the court, unlike the preceding two, did not directly 
intervene in the legal relationship between contracting parties, but respected the autonomy of 
the litigating parties and finally overruled the unreasonable claim.  
During the examination of various cases in the database, I have not found any in which 
price reduction is realized by declaration of one party’s intention. In contrast, price reduction is 
often promoted by the court. And the approach of the court’s intervention appears quite close to 
that suggested in CCL Article 54, and that in CCL Article 114.  
According to CCL Article 54, if the contract was concluded on the basis of a substantial 
misunderstanding, or the contract was grossly unfair at the time of its conclusion, either of the 
parties may require the court or an arbitral tribunal to modify or revoke the contract; if one 
party induced the other party to enter into a contract against his true intention by fraud or 
duress, or by taking advantage of the other party’s hardship, the aggrieved party is entitled to 
require the court or an arbitral tribunal to modify or revoke the contract. It can be observed that 
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in the cases where the contract is unfair or one contracting party’s true intention has been 
interfered with by the other party’s improper behavior, the aggrieved party or either party may 
require modification or revocation of contract with the help of the court or arbitral tribunal. On 
the other side, if one contracting party wants to modify the contract without the intervention of 
the court or arbitral tribunal, it is necessary for it to reach an agreement with the other party. In 
other words, even in case of significant unfairness, the aggrieved party may not unilaterally 
modify the contract, but should demand the intervention of legal authorities. 
Similarly, the interference of a court or an arbitral tribunal is also necessary if one party 
intends to adjust the amount of liquidated damages. According to CCL Article 114(2), where 
the amount of liquidated damages excessively exceeds the loss resulting from the breach, a 
party may require the court or an arbitral tribunal to reduce the amount as appropriate. It can 
also be observed that the adjustment of liquidated damages should be determined by the court 
or arbitral tribunal. If either party intends to reduce the amount of liquidated damages as 
appropriate without the intervention of the court or an arbitral tribunal, this party cannot do so 
by unilateral declaration – it must find an agreement with the other party. 
5.2.4.3 Inspiration from preceding examination 
The historical development of price reduction in China demonstrates that this remedy was 
firstly applied in the area of contract for hired work, especially for construction projects, and 
then applied to sales contract. The idea of price reduction is to strike a balance of interests 
between contracting parties when the aggrieved party agreed to use a nonconforming subject 
matter. The system and idea of price reduction is by now rooted in Chinese legal practice and 
therefore cannot be simply treated as a copy of German rules. According to provisions 
concerning price reduction in earlier legislations, the aggrieved party should require the 
breaching party to reduce the price, but might not reduce the price by unilateral declaration of 
his intention.  
It needs to be noted that, under the CECL, damage compensation was based on the fault 
(Han, 2011b, pp. 590-591),
 
and therefore might, price reduction, as a special remedy which did 
not require fault, have an independent function in Chinese law as the one in German law. 
However, under the CCL of 1999, which has taken the place of the former CECL and other 
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specific contract laws, the principle of damage compensation in sales law has moved from 
fault-based liability to strict liability. Given the change of the law, the aggrieved party may now 
recover damages more easily. Therefore, the special function of price reduction has been 
removed, or at least eroded. 
During the investigation of judicial decisions, I found that the intervention of the court has 
a significant weight in cases involving price reduction. This situation suggests that the 
approach of applying price reduction is in practice close to the application of contract 
modification under CCL Article 54 and adjustment of liquidated damages under CCL Article 
114. The similarity of approaches adopted by these rules indicates the coherency of legal policy, 
which may treat all sorts of adjustment of the original agreement as special remedies that 
normally invite the intervention of judicial authorities if the parties cannot reach a separate 
agreement. Therefore, it is reasonable to question the soundness of the prevailing theory in 
Chinese scholarship on price reduction, which suggests the aggrieved party should be able to 
unilaterally reduce the price by declaration of its intention. 
5.2.5 Response to the formation right theory and proposal for a new approach 
5.2.5.1 Comment on the formation right theory 
The prevailing theory is questionable in respect of legal policy and of the coherency of the 
remedy system.  
First of all, if the right of price reduction in case of nonconformity is to be exercised by a 
unilateral declaration of the aggrieved party, then the conditions for triggering price reduction 
need to be based on the conditions of termination. In other words, price reduction should then 
only be exercised in circumstances where the right of termination could also be exercised, 
despite immaterial divergence in case of minor nonconformities.  
It can be observed from comparative legal study that price reduction in German law is 
treated as a kind of replacement for termination, and the conditions for exercising this right are 
almost the same as the one for termination (with just a single exception provided in BGB Art. 
441(1)). It makes sense to construe price reduction as a formation right under such 
circumstances, as the interests of the breaching party have been in some measure protected by 
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the high threshold for application. Indeed, since a formation right will force the counterparty to 
bear negative legal consequences without consideration of its intention, it must be protected by 
the law from the abuse of the other party’s right (Medicus, 2006, p. 42). In the German legal 
system, as discussed in section 5.2.3, it is only if the seller did not seize the opportunity to 
provide supplementary performance that the buyer can unilaterally reduce the price. In such a 
case, the interests of the seller has already been considered and protected through an additional 
period fixed for supplementary performance and, therefore, unilateral price reduction will not 
unfairly impact the balance of interests. 
However, price reduction has been constructed in a different way in Chinese contract law. 
According to CCL Article 111, if the liabilities for breach were not explicitly prescribed, and 
cannot be determined in accordance with CCL Article 61, the aggrieved party may, by 
reasonable selection in light of the nature of the subject matter and the degree of loss, require 
the other party to repair, replace, remake, accept the returned goods, or reduce the price or 
remuneration, etc. Obviously, there is no hierarchy among these remedies, no requirement to 
“exhaust prior remedies” before using the harsher ones. Under these circumstances, if price 
reduction were exercised as a formation right, the aggrieved party would be allowed to reduce 
the price as soon as it received a nonconforming tender. And the effect of price reduction 
would arise as soon as the declaration of intention arrives at the counter party. The breaching 
party has no balancing instruments available, and is therefore powerless before the change in 
the contractual relationship. Thus, on one hand, the breaching party has been deprived of an 
opportunity to cure, which amounts to a perhaps excessively harsh penalty, and, on the other 
hand, the buyer may be tempted to act opportunistically, for instance to compel the 
counterparty into making a further concession. 
Professor Han (2008) argues that giving priority to the breaching party’s right to cure 
should be the precondition to constructing price reduction as a right of formation. It has to be 
admitted that such a priority could to a large extent mitigate the negative consequences arising 
from the formation right approach. As a matter of fact, the approach of the priority of the right 
to cure is similar to the one of “exhaustion of prior remedies”. As I have pointed out in the 
comparative legal study, the priority of cure was suggested by German scholars when 
interpreting CISG Article 50. Such an interpretation would not have been detrimental to the 
Chapter 5  Reconsideration and Reconstruction of the Buyer’s Remedy Rights for Nonconformity 
151 
application of the CISG, as the Convention has established rules regarding the seller’s right to 
cure. In contrast, there is no seller’s right to cure in Chinese positive law, and there is no way to 
“create” it by interpretation. Under the CCL, in the case of the nonconformity of subject matter, 
it is the buyer that can “reasonably choose” remedies among different measures. The seller has 
no instrument to balance its interests with the buyer, and will inevitably bear a heavy burden if 
it intends to prove the unreasonableness of buyer’s selection of remedies. Although I agree that 
it is reasonable for the seller to be granted a right to cure, such system should be introduced by 
explicit legislation (see Chapter 4). It cannot be naturally interpreted out of the current 
dispositions of Chinese positive law. Given these considerations, and especially the lack of a 
right to cure, the formation right approach must be considered unsuitable for the Chinese legal 
system. 
Some scholars may argue that it could be inferred from the legal requirement for the buyer 
to make a “reasonable choice” among remedies for nonconformity that there is some kind of 
hierarchy among these remedy measures. It is agreeable that when the buyer makes a choice 
among different remedy measures, the sequence of these measures cannot be totally denied. In 
particular, repair, replacement, and remaking should have priority over return of the subject 
matter. However, the limitation of interpretation is: when the buyer chooses to return the 
subject matter in case of a nonconformity that is not serious in nature, the court may take into 
account the seller’s interests in cure when interpreting the “reasonableness” of the buyer’s 
choice, and then consider the buyer’s choice to be unreasonable, as it did in the decision of 
Shan MinEr ChuZi No.496 (2006). However, this reasoning cannot go as far as to establish a 
rigid hierarchy among every single remedy right. In other words, this interpretative theory can 
merely deal with grossly unfair situations when the seller chooses return of goods because of 
some insignificant nonconformity. It can hardly establish a strict “priority rank” for price 
reduction vis-à-vis most other remedies. We can indeed easily imagine that the court would 
find a return of the goods unreasonable if the nonconformity does not frustrate the purpose of 
contract. However, if in the same case the buyer pursued price reduction, it would not be so 
easy for the court to deny the reasonableness of the buyer’s choice, because price reduction 
does not seem as harsh to the seller as termination. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that price reduction should be built upon the concept of 
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modification of contract (e.g., Han, 2008, p. 21). In my opinion, this argument would conflict 
with the logic of the formation right approach because it will bring more incoherencies to the 
system. According to CCL Article 8(1), contracts are legally binding on the parties; the parties 
shall perform their respective duties in accordance with the agreement and may not unilaterally 
modify or terminate the contract. According to CCL Article 77(1), a contract may be modified 
if the parties reach a consensus through consultation. Under the CCL, only in two cases does 
modification not need consensus of contracting parties. One is modification under CCL Article 
54; the other is adjustment of liquidated damages under CCL Article 114. In either case, the 
modification of contract can be realized only with the intervention of a court or an arbitral 
tribunal. The modification cannot occur by unilateral declaration of one party’s intention. 
Evidently, if price reduction were interpreted as a kind of contract modification, it should not 
be exercised by unilateral declaration of one contracual party, as this would run counter to the 
idea and principle of contract modification, undermining the consistency of legislative policy 
and the coherency of the legal system. 
If price reduction were construed as a standalone device dependent upon the consensus of 
contract parties, it would be easier to maintain the balance of interests between the parties and 
the logic of the remedy system. Based on the above analysis of decisions in China, it can be 
observed that the courts tend to prevent unilateral price reductions, preferring to intervene 
between themselves to determine the amount of the reduction. This approach is consistent with 
the interpretation of price reduction as a form of contract modification. Next, I would like to 
compare different approaches for interpreting price reduction. 
5.2.5.2 New approaches for interpreting price reduction 
There are three possible approaches to construct the device of price reduction: 
The first one is to adopt German-style price reduction. This approach will treat price 
reduction as a partial termination. This means the conditions for exercising the right of price 
reduction would be based on the ones for termination of the contract. 
The second one is to merge the device of price reduction into that of damage 
compensation. This approach can be adopted if the liability for damages in sales law is not 
based on fault. Price reduction can then be constructed as a kind of formula for determining 
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damages. Under this approach, when the seller is not liable for nonconformity, the imbalance 
of interests between the parties should be addressed through other devices, such as that of 
unjust enrichment. 
The third one is to reconstruct price reduction as a kind of contract adjustment. This 
would mean that, on one hand, the remedy of price reduction is independent from that of 
damage compensation and, on the other hand, the justification for price reduction is not partial 
termination, but contract adjustment. Under this approach, price reduction should not be 
exercised through unilateral declaration of one party’s intention, but through consensus. The 
buyer would then be able to require the seller to make an offer on price reduction or to accept 
such offer raised by the buyer.  
From the standpoint of making proposals for legislative reform, each of the above 
approaches has their own pros and cons. If, as I argued in Chapter 4, the seller’s right to cure 
can be successfully introduced into a future “Chinese Civil Code”, the formation right 
approach may be an option, although not necessarily. For interpreting the positive Chinese law, 
I would like to advocate the third approach, that of interpreting the exercise of price reduction 
as a form of contract adjustment.  
First and foremost, the contract adjustment approach is the most consistent one with the 
present positive law. It maintains both the special function of price reduction in Chinese law 
and the coherency of the remedy system. As I discussed above, the first approach – the 
formation rights approach – cannot be interpreted into the current positive law, because 
Chinese law does not make the exercise of price dependent upon the “exhaustion of prior 
remedies” or the “priority of the right to cure”. Since these key justifications for the formation 
right approach cannot be interpreted into the positive law, this approach must be vulnerable. 
The second approach – merging price reduction with damage compensation – would be 
attractive were it not for the fact that present positive law provides for price reduction 
independently from damage compensation. If we totally abandoned price reduction as an 
independent remedy, we would lose a convenient device for interests balance in cases where 
the seller escapes damage compensation for nonconformity. The third approach – contract 
adjustment – is preferable because, on the one hand, it recognizes the price reduction as an 
independent remedy coexisting with damage compensation and, on the other hand, 
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constructing price reduction as a contract modification, as opposed to a partial termination, 
may prevent imbalance of interests and incoherencies in remedy system. 
Second, the contract adjustment approach may promote certainty in judicial practice and 
be suitable to the reality of commercial transactions. I have shown that price reduction has not 
caused serious dispute in present judicial practice and as they say, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. 
If the current flexibility of the price reduction device allows it to operate so smoothly, there 
seems to be little reason to impose stricter conditions and a more rigid process on it. Besides, in 
most cases, it is the seller who is in the best position to know the price of the nonconforming 
goods, as the seller is likely to be better informed on the value of the goods. Therefore, it is 
usually more commercially practicable for the buyer to require the seller to reduce the price for 
him rather than to reduce the price by himself. As to the specific process of exercising price 
reduction, the buyer should be entitled to require the seller to make an offer to reduce the price, 
if the seller provides an appropriate offer of reduction, then the dispute would be settled by an 
agreement of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the intervention of a court or an arbitral 
institution would be necessary.  
5.2.6 Conclusion of this section 
According to the prevailing view in China, price reduction can be exercised by unilateral 
declaration of the aggrieved party. This point of view, which has been borrowed from the 
dominant German law theory, has neglected great differences between the Chinese and German 
legal systems. Contrarily to what is the case in German law, damage compensation is not based 
on fault under the Chinese law on sales contract, meaning that the special function of price 
reduction is limited. Meanwhile, Chinese law also differs from German law in that the exercise 
of price reduction is not based on the strict conditions of the right to termination. Since there 
are no requirements in Chinese law to exhaust prior remedies or to give priority to a 
hypothetical seller’s right to cure, an interpretation of the right to price reduction as a formation 
right would lead to an imbalance in the interests of the parties, and should therefore be 
abandoned. To make price reduction more acceptable in legal practice, it is necessary to make 
it depend on the agreement of contracting parties or the leading role of judicial authorities. It is 
preferable to interpret the right to price reduction in Chinese law as a right to require price 
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reduction from the seller, i.e. a right to require a modification of the contract. This approach 
will better maintain the balance of interests between contracting parties, address the reality of 
commercial transactions, and preserve the coherency of the remedy system. 
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Chapter 6  Relationship among the Inspection Period, Notification 
Period, and Guarantee Period for Quality 
If the buyer intends to pursue remedies for nonconformity in quality or quantity, he must 
notify the seller of such nonconformity within a contractual agreed inspection period, or, in the 
absence of such agreed period, within a reasonable period after he discovered or should have 
discovered the nonconformity; otherwise the subject matter will be deemed as conforming to 
the contract. This is the so-called “notice rule”, provided in Articles 157 and 158 of the Chinese 
Contract Law (CCL). The current mainstream academic research on this rule is concentrated on 
the legal consequences of the fruitless lapse of those periods, and the debate focuses on 
whether those periods should be considered as a special prescription or extinction period 
(Ausschlussfristen).
①
 However, the duty to inspect the subject matter and to notify any 
nonconformity should be special device concerned with commercial transactions. They do not 
aim at generally promoting the stability of legal relationship, which is the main purpose of 
prescription. Accordingly, it may not be suitable to define the notification period in the CCL as 
a special prescription in the sense of BGB Article 438, or of an extinction period in the sense of 
JCC Article 566(3).
②
  
On the other hand, there are other related issues as to the application of the notice rule that 
have been examined only by a few judicial practitioners (e.g., Mao & Cai, 2004, p. 31; Sun, 
2011, p. 82), and even less legal scholars.
③
 One of the most important issues is the relationship 
among the inspection period, the notification period, and the guarantee period for quality. Some 
researchers basically consider that the characteristics of these three periods are essentially the 
same, namely, all of them are one period for complaint of nonconformity in the subject matter 
(Mao & Cai, 2004, pp. 31-35), some others concur, finding it unnecessary to distinguish 
between the inspection period and the notification period (e.g., Y. Li, 2011, p. 117).  
                                                             
① As to the view in favor of extinction period, see Liang (1991, p. 29); as to the standpoint in favor of special prescription, see 
Y. Wang (2001, p. 109). 
② The debate in China has been influenced by the debate over the nature of the right to demand damages and to terminate the 
contract provided in Article 566 of Japanese Civil Code (Shiomi, 2010, p. 91). 
③ In recent years there have been a few articles introducing related experiences in foreign legal systems (Chen & Li, 2011, p. 
96; J. G. Wang, 2011, p. 52). 
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The current researches are unsatisfactory. Generally speaking, first, the design of 
combining the inspection period and the notification period as one period under the CCL is 
rather rare from a comparative legal perspective. If the notification period is merged into the 
inspection period, an unjust consequence might be imposed on the buyer. Second, the 
guarantee period for quality under Article 158 of the CCL is different from the contractual 
guarantee period in the CISG, even though the latter has heavily influenced the drafting of the 
former. If the guarantee period for quality, which normally aims at protecting consumers and 
end users, is simply treated as the longest period for giving notice, it could also cause 
confusions and unjust consequences.  
In the Supreme People’s Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract of 2012 
(hereafter JILSC), there are as many as 6 articles that dealt with the problems in the areas of 
inspection period and notification period. However, neither of the preceding problems 
mentioned above has been settled. For improving the system of conformity of the subject 
matter, it is necessary to examine: (a) the consequences caused by the CCL’s combination 
design of the inspection period and the notification period, and (b) the legal effects of the 
agreed inspection period and of the guarantee period for quality. In this chapter, I will first 
conduct a comparative legal study to demonstrate the distinction between the inspection period 
and the notification period in foreign legal systems, and then point out the combination design 
of those two periods under the CCL. Next, I will analyze the legal effects of the agreed 
inspection period and of the guarantee period for quality and describe the problem of “double 
interference” with the time limit for giving notice. Finally I would like to provide new 
solutions to address the harsh consequences due to the combination design, and the conflicting 
application problems due to “double interference” issue. 
6.1 Distinction between inspection period and notification period in foreign 
legal systems 
In many foreign legal systems, the period for inspection and the one for notification 
cannot be, in principle, combined as one period, and the requirements for them can be 
different. 
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6.1.1 Inspection after delivery and notification after appearance of defects in 
German law 
The duty to inspect the subject matter and to notify of defects cannot be found in Articles 
434, 435 and 438 of the BGB, which merely stipulate the prescription for actions (Lettl, 2011, 
p. 266). These duties only exist in the case of commercial sales. According to Article 377(1) of 
the German Commercial Code (HGB), if the sale is bilateral mercantile, the buyer shall inspect 
the subject matter promptly (unverzüglich) after the seller tendered delivery, in light of the 
practicability in the ordinary course of business, and notify the seller promptly as soon as the 
defect appears. According to Article 377(2) and (3), if the buyer fails to notify the seller of the 
defect promptly, the subject matter will be deemed to be approved (genehmigt) (Boujong, 
Ebenroth, & Joost, 2001, p. 474). These rules, as Professor Canaris (2006) has emphasized, 
aim to protect the seller (p. 437). If the buyer delays in giving notice, the legal effect is a fiction 
of approval (Genehmigungsfiktion), and the buyer will lose all remedies based on defects, 
including requiring supplementary performance, termination of contract, price reduction, and 
refund of fees provided in BGB Article 478(2) (Canaris, 2006, p. 448).
 
The duty to inspect and to notify established in HGB Article 377 can, from the courts’ 
view, promote rapid settlement and the stability of legal relationship, protect the seller from 
repeatedly complaining about the defects, and promote the seller’s supplementary performance. 
Hence, this system is considered to be specifically beneficial in enhancing the efficiency in 
commercial transactions (Boujong et al., 2001, p. 478), and therefore differs from the rules on 
prescription under BGB Article 438. In my view, it is HGB Article 377, but not BGB Article 
438, that is the comparable rule with CCL Articles 157 and 158.  
Under German commercial law, although the time requirements for inspection and for 
notification are both “promptness”, they are not combined as one general phase. The inspection 
period is followed with the seller’s tender of delivery, while the notification period starts to run 
as soon as the defects appear. This distinction may be of little value when the defects can be 
easily discovered when inspecting, but if the defects are latent and cannot be discovered until a 
considerable period elapses, such a distinction becomes very important, because in such a case, 
the notification is required only after the latent defect appears (HGB Art. 377(2)). This kind of 
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design demonstrates that the period for inspection and the one for notification should be, in 
principle, distinctive and separated. In judicial practice, the judges usually consider the time for 
inspection and the one for notification separately (Boujong et al., 2001, §377 Rn. 73). 
6.1.2 Inspection before acceptance and notification after it in U.S. law 
The rule concerning the notice of breach applied in the majority of the United States is 
stipulated in Section 2-607(3)(a) UCC, according to which once a tender has been accepted, the 
buyer must notify the seller of the breach within a reasonable time after he discovered or 
should have discovered such a breach, otherwise he will be barred from all remedies (ALI & 
NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2204). Compared with HGB Article 377, there are two characteristics of 
the UCC’s notice rule. First, the scope of its application is not limited to defects, but has 
expanded to any breach, although in the case of delay in performance, the recent trend 
reflected in judicial practice is that the seller’s actual knowledge constitutes a sufficient ground 
to exclude the buyer’s duty to notify (White & Summers, pp. 654-655). Second, the time 
requirement for notification is within a reasonable time, but not promptness, and its connection 
with good faith is emphasized in the official comment on Section 2-607 of the UCC, according 
to which, the purpose of the notice rule is to defeat bad faith in commercial transactions, but 
not to exclude the remedies of a good faith consumer (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2205). 
It is important to note the content and function of acceptance of goods in the UCC. 
Generally speaking, acceptance of goods under the UCC may not only justify the seller’s right 
to demand price (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2204), but also indicate, after having a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the goods, a confirmation that the goods do conform with contractual 
requirements or, in the case of nonconformity, a confirmation that the buyer will retain the 
goods despite the nonconformity (UCC §2-606(1)) (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2203). Hence, 
the acceptance of goods does not mean taking the physical delivery of goods, but indicates 
certain approval of the conditions of such goods. Before the acceptance, there should be a 
reasonable opportunity for the buyer to inspect; after the acceptance, there should be a 
reasonable time for him to give notice. Evidently, inspection and notification are generally 
divided into two stages, instead of combined as one phase. 
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6.1.3 Distinction between examination and notification periods under the CISG 
During the drafting of the CISG, the notice rule became one of the most disputable issues 
and was fiercely debated between developing countries and industrialized countries 
(Schwenzer, 2007, pp. 107-109).
 
The requirement for giving notice was changed from original 
“promptness” to “within a reasonable time” (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 109). According to the first 
paragraph of CISG Article 39, the buyer shall notify the seller of any nonconformity after he 
has discovered or should have discovered such nonconformity and shall specify the nature of it, 
otherwise all remedies relied on such nonconformity cannot be admitted. Moreover, a new 
article -Article 44- was created: if the buyer has a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the 
required notice, he may reduce the price in accordance or claim damages, except for loss of 
profit. It has been argued that the notice rule under the CISG is closer to those legal systems in 
which there is a duty to give notice within a reasonable period (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 109). 
Differing from the requirement for giving notice under CISG Article 39, Article 38 of the 
CISG requires the examination to be undertaken within as short a period as is practicable in 
the circumstances (CISG Art. 38(1)); however, “if the contract involves carriage of the goods, 
examination may be deferred until after the goods have arrived at their destination” (CISG Art. 
38(2)). Articles 38 and 39 of the CISG have separated the time period for examination and for 
notification, making them with different starting points and time requirements. As the CISG 
Advisory Council (2004) stated in the second opinion: 
 “[U]nless the lack of conformity was evident without examination of the goods, the total 
amount of time available to give notice after delivery of the goods consists of two separate 
periods, the period for examination of the goods under Article 38 and the period for giving 
notice under Article 39. The Convention requires these two periods to be distinguished and 
kept separate, even when the facts of the case would permit them to be combined into a 
single period for giving notice.” 
The view that the period for examination and the one for notification should be 
distinguished and separated under the CISG has also been supported by judicial practice. In a 
prominent decision made by the German Supreme Court in 1999, which involved 
nonconformity in a grinding device used for paper-making, the court assumed three weeks was 
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sufficient for examination; after the three weeks, there were four additional weeks for the buyer 
to decide to and actually give notice.
①
 In other words, the buyer had three weeks to 
accomplish the examination and four weeks to give notice. In this case, the judge regarded four 
weeks to give notice as “regelmässig”, namely, “regular” or “normal” (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 
103; Boujong et al., 2001, p. 494).  
6.2 The combination design in the CCL and its consequences 
6.2.1 The merger between the notification period and the inspection one in the 
CCL 
The legislation in China differs from those introduced in the preceding section. According 
to CCL Article 157, the buyer shall inspect the subject matter within a contractual agreed 
inspection period; if there lacks such an agreed inspection period, he shall inspect promptly. 
This article establishes a duty for the buyer to inspect the subject matter and confirms 
promptness as the general requirement for inspection. On the other hand, the first sentence of 
Article 158(1) stipulates that if the contracting parties have agreed on an inspection period, the 
buyer shall also notify the seller of any nonconformity in quality or quantity within such 
inspection period. This provision then expands the duties that the buyer needs to fulfill within 
the agreed inspection period from “inspection” to “inspection and notification”. The first 
sentence of Article 158(2), however, provides that in the absence of an agreed inspection 
period, the buyer shall notify the seller of any nonconformity within a reasonable period after 
he discovered or should have discovered it. Therefore, according to Article 158(2), the general 
requirement for notification is not promptness, but rather a period with a reasonable length. 
Consequently, a contradictory situation arises: on the one hand, the CCL generally 
requires inspection to be undertaken promptly (CCL Art. 157) and notification should also be 
accomplished within an agreed inspection period (sentence 1 of CCL Art. 158(1)). Therefore, if 
the contracting parties have followed the instruction of Article 157 and agreed on a short period 
for inspection, the buyer may discover later that he must notify of the nonconformity 
immediately after he discovered it, otherwise he might fail to meet the requirement of notifying 
                                                             
① As to the detail of this case, see http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html#ctoc. 
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within that agreed inspection period. On the other hand, the second sentence of Article 158(1) 
provides that the notification should be given within a reasonable period of time after the buyer 
discovered or should have discovered the nonconformity in the absence of an agreed inspection 
period. Hence, the fact that the buyer has to notify immediately after he discovered the 
nonconformity if they agreed on an inspection period is obviously inconsistent with the general 
time requirement on notification. It is unconvincing to impose different requirements on the 
time for notification in light of whether or not there is an agreed inspection period, particularly 
considering that the agreed inspection period may only be intended to affect the buyer’s 
behavior of inspection, but not notification.  
In the next part, I would like to introduce a case that can reflect the unjust consequence 
arising from the combination design.  
6.2.2 Consequences of the combination design  
In the decision of LiuShiMin ErZhongZi No. 106 (2010),
①
 the facts of the case are of the 
following: the contracting parties have agreed on an inspection period of 7 days in a sale of 
steel pipe. Between August 16
th
 and 19
th
 2008, the seller delivered several types of steel pipes 
to the buyer. On October 8
th
 2008, the buyer notified the seller of inner cracks in one type of 
the steel pipes. On December 30
th
 2008, the contracting parties reached an agreement, in which 
the seller admitted the problem in the material quality and agreed to accept the return of unused 
steel pipes. On February 20
th
 2009, the buyer informed the seller of inner cracks in another 
type of steel pipes, and 3 days later, an employee of the seller confirmed the cracks by 
examining related pipes at the scene.  
The first instance court found that, according to the contractual agreement, any 
nonconformity in “appearance, types, categories, material quality, weight etc.” should be 
notified within 7 days after the delivery, thus, “7 days after delivery” should be the agreed 
inspection period in this case. According to Articles 157 and 158 of the CCL, given the 
complaint of quality was not raised until October 8
th
 2008, by when it had already exceeded the 
time limit, the steel pipes tendered by the seller should be deemed to be conforming with the 
contract, and therefore, the seller was not in breach of contract. As to the agreement achieved 
                                                             
① Cases and judicial decisions referred to in this chapter were found in the database of Beida Fabao, See 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp. 
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between contracting parties regarding the return of unused pipes, because there was no breach 
at all, the freight cost arising from the return of goods should be borne by the buyer.  
The buyer appealed to the second instance court and argued that the contracting parties 
only made consensus on inspection period for ostensible quality, but not for cracks within the 
pipes, therefore, the complaint raised did not exceed the “reasonable period” that is provided in 
Article 158(2) of the CCL. In other words, the buyer argued that the agreed 7 days period was 
related to quality conditions that could be observed from the exterior. The second instance 
court did not decide whether the complaint raised on October 8
th
 2008 was within a reasonable 
period, but found that since the cracks belonged to the material quality problems and the 
complaint about this problem raised in February 2009 was 6 months after the delivery, it should 
be considered that the complaint had exceeded the time limit. Finally, the second instance court 
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the findings of the first instance court. 
I would like to argue that this decision should be reconsidered. In as short as 7 days after 
taking delivery, it might be practicable to conduct a thorough examination on types, weights, 
and other nonconformities in appearance, but is hardly reasonable for discovering inner cracks 
in various types of steel pipes. In other words, a 7-day inspection period should not, from a 
commercial practicability’s perspective, be considered as fair and appropriate. Even if it might 
be considered as being sufficient for a reasonable opportunity to inspect, it was still 
unreasonable for giving notice, as the behavior of notification had been compressed to a highly 
short phase, i.e., immediately after the discovery of nonconformity, with no time to consider 
and seek consultation at all. Moreover, after the buyer notified the seller of the first 
nonconformity on October 8
th
 2008, the seller did not insist on the effect of the 7-day time limit, 
but reached an agreement with the buyer in December 2008, to accept the return of the unused 
pipes. In other words, the seller had confirmed the nonconformity and was cooperative with the 
settlement of the dispute. Considering this fact, in light of the principle of good faith, it is 
unreasonable to support the seller’s argument concerning the buyer’s delay in notification made 
on October 8
th
 2008. However, the courts of two instances ignored both the commercial 
practicability related to 7 days and the reasonable time required for notification, and failed to 
response to the contradicting behavior exhibited by the seller, which was arguably against the 
principle of good faith. On the contrary, relying merely on the disputable agreed inspection 
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period and the letter of the law, the courts denied all remedies of the buyer for nonconformity. 
In summary, what we can discover is a harsh unjust consequence borne by the buyer who had 
no significant fault other than insignificant delay (at least for the first notification) in 
notification, and an unjust enrichment gained by the seller who was even prepared to redress 
the nonconformities. 
After the inspection period merges with the notification period, even if the contracting 
parties have a fair agreement on the time limit for inspection in light of the commercial 
practicability, the buyer may discover later that, during the period which he merely intends to 
complete the behavior of inspection, he must also undertake notification, and a slight hesitation 
in giving notice would bar all remedies under the CCL. On the other hand, a seller who 
tendered an unsatisfactory subject matter may receive a “double protection” from the CCL and 
escape any liability arising from the nonconformity as long as he bargained for a short 
inspection period. In a word, the combination design in Articles 157 and 158 of the CCL may 
lead to the following consequences: set an unexpected “trap” for the buyer, and grant unjust 
enrichment to the seller. 
6.3 A single agreed time limit under the CISG 
The harsh consequence caused by merging the notification period into the inspection 
period can also be examined from another aspect, which is, the inspection period functions as 
the longest time limit, and therefore conflicts with the guarantee period for quality. In this 
section and the next one, I would like to introduce the guarantee period in the CISG and the 
CCL, and argue the conflict between guarantee period for quality and agreed inspection period 
in the CCL. 
CISG Article 39 provides that the buyer will lose his rights to rely on nonconformity of 
the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the nonconformity 
within a reasonable time after he has discovered or ought to have discovered it. To restrict the 
possible length of a reasonable period, it is provided that in any event the buyer loses the right 
to rely on nonconformity if he does not give notice “at the latest within a period of two years 
from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this time limit 
is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee” (CISG Art. 39). The two-year period is 
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the longest time limit, which is absolute and therefore will not be suspended or interrupted 
(Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 471). However, this time limit will not apply if it is 
inconsistent with “a contractual period of guarantee”. More precisely, the time limit may be 
shortened or extended by an agreed contractual period of guarantee (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 471). As to the content of an agreed contractual period of guarantee, it is 
not necessarily connected with a guarantee for the maintenance of the subject matter’s quality 
or a similar condition. From a functional perspective, insofar as the intention of the contracting 
parties include using this period to restrict the time limit, then such a period should be regarded 
as a “contractual period of guarantee”. For example, the contracting parties agreed that only 
when the buyer gave notice of nonconformity within 90 days after taking the delivery, then the 
seller would be liable for such alleged nonconformity. In this situation, the 90-day period 
should be regarded as a contractual period of guarantee, and function as the longest time limit 
(Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, pp. 471-472). It needs to be noted that this 90-day 
guarantee period merely refers to “guarantee of being responsible for” any nonconformity in 
the subject matter, but not necessarily to a guarantee concerning the maintenance of the subject 
matter’s quality. On the contrary, the maintenance of the quality may be either longer or shorter 
than 90 days. 
The inspection period, according to Article 38 of the CISG, should be a period “as short as 
possible” in light of specific circumstances. As to “agreed inspection period”, the CISG does 
not address this issue, because a breach of such agreed inspection period, if not leading to a 
delay in giving notice, will not bring about any consequence to either of contracting parties 
(CISG Advisory Council, 2004; Flechtner, 2008). In contrast, if the notice is given after a 
contractual period of guarantee, the notice will therefore exceed the time limit and 
consequently all of the buyer’s remedies will be precluded. Hence, it is the contractual period 
of guarantee under the CISG that may take the place of the two-year time limit and have a 
significant impact on the legal relationship of contracting parties.  
Under the CISG, since the agreed contractual period is clearly provided as a replacement 
of the two-year time limit, it will normally not be very short and consequently prevent the 
application of the reasonable period rule. According to Professors Schlechtriem and 
Schwenzer’s (2005) commentary on the CISG, even if there is an agreed contractual period of 
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guarantee, the buyer should still give notice of nonconformity within a reasonable period after 
he knew or ought to be aware of such nonconformity; in the absence of a contrary agreement, 
Article 39(1) should be presumed to apply (p. 472). For example, if the seller guaranteed in a 
contract that only if the buyer gives notice of nonconformity within one year after the delivery, 
will the seller be responsible. This does not mean that in case the buyer discovered a lack of 
conformity 7 days after delivery, he could wait until the end of the contractual period of 
guarantee to give notice of nonconformity. On the contrary, in the absence of a contrary 
agreement, the duty to give notice within a reasonable period should still bind the buyer in the 
case of commercial transactions.
①
  
6.4 The “double interference” with the time limit in the CCL and its 
consequences 
Under the CCL, given the agreed inspection period merges with the notification period 
and is usually very short, it can prevent the application of the reasonable period rule. 
Furthermore, as it can function as the time limit, there will be conflict between it and the 
guarantee period for quality, which can also affect the time limit for notification. I call the 
problem of the latter as “double interference” with the time limit. In this section I would like to 
show the confusing applications in judicial practice due to this problem. 
6.4.1 The first “interference”: agreed inspection period  
In Chinese judicial practice, the agreed inspection periods are normally rather short. In 
some cases, the agreed inspection periods are at the same time of tendering delivery or within 
24 hours after delivery;
②
 in some cases, the agreed inspection periods range from two to five 
days;
③
 One of the most common types of agreed inspection period is one-week period.
④
 
                                                             
① The situation is different for consumer sales, see §6.5 of this chapter. 
② For example, in Hu Yizhong Minsi (Shang) Zhongzi No.1709 (2010) decision, the first intermediate court of Shanghai city 
confirmed the agreement as to “inspect and accept at the time of taking delivery” to be enforceable, even to the latent quality 
problems; in Hu Erzhong Minsi (Shang) Zhongzi No. 301 (2007) decision, the second intermediate court of Shanghai city 
confirmed the agreement as to “inspect and accept on the spot” to be effective, even to the quality conditions inside of the 
subject matter. 
③ For example, the intermediate court of Guangzhou city confirmed 5 days printed on the delivery bill as the agreed inspection 
period for bobbin in Sui Zhongfa Miner Zhongzi No. 795 (2006) decision, and confirmed 3 days as the agreed inspection 
period for cloth in Sui Zhongfa Miner Zhongzi No.2194 (2009) decision.  
④ For example, in Nan Shi Miner Zhongzi No.190 (2011) decision, 7 days applied to chemical fertilizer; in Shen Zhongfa 
Miner Zhongzi No. 206 (2011) decision, 7 days admitted to silicone rubber; in Zhe Jiashang Zhongzi No. 427 (2009) decision, 
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Certainly, there are also a few cases involved inspection periods of longer than one month.
①
 
I discover that an agreed inspection period of no more than one week is rather normal in 
Chinese judicial practice, and many of those cases related to industrial materials. These short 
periods lack sufficient reasons for being enforceable for two reasons. First, various 
nonconformities cannot be discovered within one week. Second, the quality of many industrial 
materials is normally uneasy to change, and thus it is inappropriate to confirm such short 
inspection period even considering the need of preserving evidence. Furthermore, given the 
notification period is merged into the inspection period, such a short agreed inspection period 
will not allow enough time for notification. 
As a matter of fact, the problem is more extensive. As discussed in the preceding part, the 
two-year time limit under the CISG is used to restrict the length of a reasonable period, but an 
agreed contractual period of guarantee will have priority over the two-year period. In the CCL, 
the agreed inspection period generally means the buyer will also have to give notice within 
such a period, and thus it actually plays a role as the contractual period of guarantee in the 
CISG, to be the longest time limit. Accordingly, the agreed inspection period should be 
considered as an absolute period and will not be suspended or interrupted.  
6.4.2 The second “interference”: guarantee period for quality   
According to the second sentence of Article 158(2) of the CCL, if the buyer fails to notify 
the seller of any nonconformity within a reasonable period or fails to notify within two years 
after he received the subject matter, the quality and quantity of the subject matter is deemed to 
be conforming to the contract. However, if there is a guarantee period for quality, it will 
prioritize the time limit of the two-year. An evidential difference between CISG Article 39 and 
CCL Article 158 is that the latter uses “guarantee period for quality” rather than “contractual 
period of guarantee” (Kröll, et al., 2011, p. 594). Thus, the meaning has clearly changed: the 
“guarantee period for quality” does not refer to the longest guarantee period any more, but refer 
to the guarantee periods that are normally provided by various government departments in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 days for kirsite; in Fo Zhongfa Miner Zhongzi No. 220 (2005) decision, 7 days for laminating glue and methylbenzene; in 
Zhe Yong Shang Zhongzi No.331 (2009) decision, 7 days for numerical control machine; and in Yong Yin Shang Chuzi No.127 
(2011) decision, notification after 25 days was considered to be too long, as the agreed period for stainless steel materials was 
7 days. 
① For example, 30 days was admitted for wool yarn in Hu Yizhong Minsi (Shang) Zhongzi No. 782 (2005) decision; and 
two-month period for water pump was admitted in Yi Zhong Min Zhongzi No. 5023 (2009) decision. 
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China, aiming at protecting consumers or end users
①
 from inferior products. Furthermore, the 
guarantee period is not identical to “the longest period”, but can only interfere with the time 
limit. 
The typical guarantee periods for quality are the consumption of food,
②
 medicine,
③
 and 
durable consumer products.
④
 These periods are associated to the safe or effective periods for 
consumption, but do not establish a duty for the buyer to “notify within such a period”. Under 
these circumstances, it is necessary to ask when the buyer should give notice, before the last 
day of the consumption period or may within a reasonable period even after the last day of the 
consumption. 
When commenting on related rules in the CISG, the prevailing opinion is that if a 
guarantee is merely related to “specific features of the goods or their fitness for an ordinary or 
a particular purpose for a certain period of time, and the giving of notice is not regulated in 
more detail,” the buyer should be entitled to give notice even after the end of the guarantee 
period (e.g., Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 472; Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 374). In 
other words, the guarantee period, which is related to the maintenance of certain features of the 
goods, does not usually include such consensus of contracting parties: the notice must be given 
before the lapse of the guarantee period. Hence, an agreement that contains a one-year 
utilization for a piece of goods does not mean that the buyer may not give notice within a 
reasonable period after the end of the utilization period, but merely means that the quality of 
the goods is still under guarantee even on the last day of the utilization period (Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer, 2005, p. 472). It can be easily understood: the time limit should be longer than the 
period for utilization; otherwise the quality problems occurred on the last day of utilization 
cannot be remedied. 
Although the guarantee period for quality cannot be treated as the time limit, it may 
interfere with the latter. More precisely, it may extend or shorten the time limit. For example, if 
the consumption of one subject matter is one year, the buyer may give notice within a 
                                                             
① Among them, there are farmers using farming machinery products. See Provisions on Liability for Repair, Replacement and 
Return of Farming Machinery Products issued in March 1998 and amended in March 2010. 
② See Article 99 of Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
③ See Article 49 of Drug Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
④ The related rules can be traced back to regulations on “san bao” (repair, replacement and return) related to certain domestic 
household electric products in the 1980s and the latest one is Provisions on Liability for Repair, Replacement and Return of 
Private Car issued in December 2012. 
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reasonable period after this one year if the nonconformity does not appear until the end of the 
consumption; nevertheless, a notice given too late after the end of this year can hardly be 
considered as reasonable; if the consumption of one subject matter is three years, the time limit 
for giving notice will undoubtedly be extended to more than three years, in which case the 
inference of such guarantee period is more evident and significant (Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 
2005, p. 472). 
However, as analyzed in the preceding part, the contractual period of guarantee in the 
CISG, which is mainly agreed by contracting parties, has been replaced by an agreed inspection 
period in the CCL, which merges with the notification period. Consequently, there are two time 
periods that can determine or interfere with the time limit for giving notice; if there is no clear 
coordinating arrangement related to the relationship between them, the conflict will be 
inevitable. As I will show in the next part, the “double interference” problem has caused 
serious problems in judicial practice. 
6.4.3 Chaos arising from the “double interference” with the time limit 
The following cases are typical ones collected from the database of Beida FaBao, which 
can indicate the chaos due to the “double interference” with time limit. 
 
Case A: In the decision of Tianshang ChuZi No.426 (2011), the People’s court of 
Tianning district, Changzhou city found that in the contract for a sale of central air conditioners, 
the supplier had guaranteed to keep maintenance of the whole machine for one year, the 
compressor for three years; meanwhile the contracting parties had agreed that the buyer should 
inspect and accept the air conditioners within 7 days after the installment. The court found that:  
“The contract has provided an agreed time requirement for inspection and acceptance. The 
buyer did not prove his complaint about quality problems was raised to the seller within 
this agreed period, and the air conditions have been used until the present day since the 
installment…therefore, the claim based on nonconformities of air conditioners should not 
be admitted.”  
In this case, although the contract has provided a rather long maintenance period, the court, 
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after clarifying the agreed inspection period, refused to give consideration on the maintenance 
period, but directly enforced the agreement related to inspection period and denied the buyer’s 
claim. 
 
Case B: In Chao Min ChuZi No.18074 (2007) decision, the People’s court of Chaoyang 
district, Beijing city found that: 
“The contracting parties have agreed that the buyer should inspect and accept after taking 
delivery, the maintenance period is one year, and the buyer may require replacement 
within three months when there are serious quality problems. However, the contracting 
parties did not explicitly specify whether those periods are agreed inspection periods or 
guarantee periods for quality … In such a case, in light of the law, the buyer should notify 
the seller within a reasonable period since he discovered or should have discovered any 
nonconformity.” 
In this case, although there was maintenance periods provided in the contract, the court 
refused to regard them as agreed inspection period, but, on the contrary, decided to apply 
Article 158 of the CCL to determine a reasonable period. 
 
Case C: In the decision of ErZhong Min ZhongZi No.18994 (2011), different from case A 
and case B, the first instance court (the People’s court of Dongcheng district, Beijing city) 
found that although the buyer had inspected and accepted the categories, quantities, and types 
of the subject matter, the contract of sale had already provided that guarantee period for quality 
of meter-reading system and radio receiver was three years……therefore, the guarantee period 
for quality was three years. The second instance court (the second intermediate court of Beijing 
city) agreed with the finding of the first instance court and found that it was acceptable if the 
buyer complained about the quality within the three-year guarantee period. In other words, the 
courts held that the three-year guarantee period was equivalent to the period for inspection and 
notification. 
 
Case D: In Kun Min Si ZhongZi No.588 (2010) decision, the intermediate court of 
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Kunming city found that, referring to the second paragraph of CCL Article 158, there was no 
explicit agreement on the inspection period in the two documents of the contract, but the 
guarantee period for quality had been clearly provided to be one year. The court decreed that 
given the petitioner’s complaint about the problems in quality had exceeded the guarantee 
period for quality, and “he failed to prove that any other complaint was made to the appellee 
within such one year period……Hence, the claim of the petitioner cannot be supported”. In this 
case, the court considered the guarantee period for quality to play a similar role as the agreed 
inspection period, and consequently, the complaint about the quality problems should be made 
within such a period. 
It can be observed that, from these cases introduced above, the courts’ decisions 
concerning the relationship between inspection period and guarantee period for quality are not 
coherent at all. In case A, the court ruled that the inspection period differed from either the 
maintenance period or the guarantee period for quality, and the latter two would not impact the 
application of the former one. In case B, the court did not directly pursue the guarantee period 
for quality, but instead pursued the rule of determining a reasonable period. In case C, even if 
there was an explicit agreement concerning the inspection period, the court still applied the 
guarantee period for quality, and gave the latter priority over the agreed inspection period. In 
case D, in the absence of an explicit agreed inspection period, the court used the guarantee 
period to determine the period for inspection and notification. The divergence reflected in the 
preceding cases is whether the guarantee period for quality takes priority over the agreed 
inspection period or should be used as a supplementary reference in the absence of an explicit 
agreed inspection period. Evidently, there is a significant inconsistency regarding this issue in 
judicial practice. 
6.5 Solutions for the combination design and the “double interference” 
problem 
The combination design and “double interference” problem are not only inconsistent with 
the experiences in foreign laws, but also cause unjust consequences in Chinese judicial practice. 
To deal with these problems, it is necessary to suggest and compare different solutions. 
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6.5.1 Solutions for the combination design 
Plan A is through the so-called “teleological reduction”,① to distinguish the inspection 
period under CCL Article 157 from the one under CCL Article 158(1). Specifically speaking, 
an agreed inspection period in judicial practice that only takes into account the practicability of 
inspection should be admitted as an inspection period under CCL Article 157 and can only 
affect the buyer’s behavior of inspection; the one that considers not only the practicability of 
inspection, but also the time needed for the buyer to make decision and to give notice should 
be admitted as an inspection period provided in CCL Article 158 and can bind the buyer’s 
behaviors of both inspection and notification. If the buyer can successfully prove that the 
agreed inspection period in the contract did not consider the time for giving notice, but merely 
considered the normal time for accomplishing inspection, then this period cannot be given the 
effect based on Article 158(1), and thus it can merely be considered as the period for restricting 
the behavior of inspection. In such case, delaying in inspection, if not leading to delay in giving 
notice, will not preclude the buyer from all remedies; the judges should, according to the 
reasonable period rule, determine a reasonable period for the buyer to give notice.   
Plan B was raised by the JILSC. The first paragraph of Article 18 of the JILSC 
distinguishes latent defects from apparent defects, and provides that if an agreed inspection 
period is too short for the buyer to accomplish a thorough inspection, in light of the nature of 
the subject matter and the usage of transaction, it should be decided as a period merely 
concerning the complaint about apparent defects. The court should further determine a period 
for giving notice of latent defects in light of the reasonable period rule (Xi, 2012, p. 325). 
This author argues for Plan A rather than Plan B. First, Plan B does not distinguish the 
period for inspection from the one for giving notice, probably because the inconsistency on the 
requirement for giving notice between CCL Article 158(1) and Article 158(2) is overlooked. 
Under the approach of Plan B, the courts will continue to ignore that the requirement reflected 
in Article 157 -promptness- should not be applied to a period that contains both inspection and 
notification, otherwise the time for giving notice cannot reach a reasonable length, and thus, 
hardly comply with the principle established in Article 158(2). Second, Plan B is based on an 
                                                             
① The justification of teleological reduction should be found in the order of justice; one of the basic principles is to different 
things there should be different solutions, and the source of the necessity to do so is: the nature of things should have an effect 
with priority (Larenz, 2003, p. 268). 
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unconvincing ground, i.e., the time for giving notice of apparent defects is different from the 
one of latent defects. According to Plan B, an excessively short agreed inspection period 
should be decided as a period for giving notice of apparent defects. It means, within a very 
short period of time, the buyer must not only accomplish the inspection of apparent conditions 
of the subject matter, but also decide to and actually give notice of the apparent defects. The 
problem is that even if the short time period is sufficient for examining apparent conditions of 
the subject matter, it is neither reasonable nor necessary to require the buyer to give notice 
within such a period. It can be easily imagined that, for instance, in a transaction of industrial 
materials, it may be practicable for the buyer to examine the style, color, and exterior designs 
within a short period, but the buyer may wish to further inspect the interior conditions of the 
subject matter and give notice of nonconformity after a thorough inspection and investigation, 
and it is acceptable insofar as the buyer notifies within a reasonable period. So, why must he 
first give notice of the apparent defects? There is no ground to consider the time for giving 
notice of latent defects to be a reasonable length, while the time for giving notice of apparent 
defects an excessively short one. In other words, it is plausible to treat the time for inspecting 
latent defects and the one for inspecting apparent defects differently, but there is no basis to 
establish such a difference when deciding the time for giving notice. On the contrary, the 
approach of Plan A correctly recognizes the importance of keeping the notice period generally 
separated from the inspection period and differentiated the consequences for delay in 
inspection and delay in notification; therefore, it should be the preferable approach. 
6.5.2 Solutions for the “double interference” problem 
In the first place, we should clarify some circumstances without real “double interference” 
problem.  
In China, the “san bao” periods are widely applied for consumer products, which allow 
the consumers to, in light of related regulations, require the seller to repair, replace, or return 
goods in certain time. These periods are not the outcomes of private agreements, but provided 
by various government departments based on the policy of consumer protection. There should 
be no “double interference” problem in such case as the duty to timely inspect and to give 
notice should be inapplicable.  
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Specifically speaking, although Articles 157 and 158 of the CCL have not excluded 
consumer sales from their governing issues, from the perspectives of legislative purpose and 
comparative law, the duty to timely inspect and to give notice should not be used against tardy 
consumers with no bad faith. First, CCL Article 157 was mainly established based on Chinese 
commercial trade usages
①
 and international commercial law, such as the CISG and the UCC. 
Under the CISG, Article 2 explicitly provides that it cannot be applied to the sales of goods 
“bought for personal, family or household use”; under the UCC, even if the requirement for 
giving notice can be applied to consumer sales, the official comment of UCC §2-607 clearly 
states that the purpose of the notice rule is not to preclude the remedies of a good faith 
consumer (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2205), and the U.S. scholars and courts generally hold a 
friendly standpoint towards aggrieved consumers (White & Summers, 1988, p. 482). Given 
CCL Articles 157 and 158 were largely influenced by related legislations in those legal systems 
and made no special arrangement for consumer sales, it is rather questionable to directly apply 
these rules to consumers.  
Second, if the buyer is a middleman and the guarantee period for quality printed on the 
package of goods is destined for end users, then there is no consensus of intentions between 
this buyer and the original seller as following: the buyer should notify any nonconformity 
within this guarantee period for quality. In other words, this kind of guarantee periods for 
quality normally does not interfere with the notice period of the middleman buyer. 
In the case that contracting parties are both commercial dealers, if a guarantee period for 
quality and an agreed inspection period both exist, then the “double interference” problem will 
occur and there will be a need for solutions to determine which time period should have a 
priority. 
Plan C is corresponds to Plan A. If the agreed inspection period did not consider the time 
needed for giving notice, it should not be regarded as the inspection period under Article 158(1) 
of the CCL, and consequently, cannot bind the buyer’s notification. If the agreed inspection 
period has indeed considered the time for giving notice (e.g., a few months), then it should be 
regarded as the inspection period under Article 158(1), and therefore can bind the buyer’s 
                                                             
① In the process of drafting this article, the main references include related rules in the international commercial laws and the 
Regulation on Contracts for Sales of Industrial Products and Minerals in 1984 (expired) (Hu, 1999, pp. 238-241). 
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notification. In such case, if there is a guarantee period for quality (e.g., one year), then the 
“double interference” problem will occur. According to the agreed inspection period, the buyer 
should in any events notify the seller within such agreed inspection period (e.g., a few months), 
otherwise his remedies will be precluded, while according to the guarantee period for quality, 
as long as the nonconformity appears within the guarantee period for quality, the buyer will be 
remedied insofar as he gives notice within a reasonable period after the sign of nonconformity 
occurs. Under this situation, the only way to address the problem of “double interference” is to 
refer to the interpretation of the contract and to explore the real intentions of the contracting 
parties in individual case. For example, in the case of commercial sales, if the guarantee period 
for quality is added under the influence of the “san bao” regulations provided by government 
departments, and the contracting parties have particularly agreed on a specific period for 
inspection and notification, which has indeed considered the time needed for the buyer to give 
notice, then it seems the effect of the agreed period should be prioritized over the former, since 
it has exactly reflected the negotiating outcome of the contracting parties and the arrangement 
of their interests. 
Plan D corresponds to Plan B. According to the interpretation of the JILSC, in the case 
that an agreed inspection period is shorter than the guarantee period for quality, as long as the 
inspection period has expired, it should be deemed that the seller has tendered conforming 
subject matter, and the buyer then does not have any remedies based on nonconformity, but if 
it is still within the guarantee period for quality, the buyer still has a right to require the seller 
to deal with quality problems as promised. In the view of the JILSC, it seems there is no 
conflict between the agreed inspection period and the guarantee period for quality, and 
therefore they can coexist without any problem (Xi, 2012, p. 332). 
I do not agree with Plan D, for its logic is questionable. The duty of the seller to deal with 
quality problems in the guarantee period for quality does not come from a service contract 
which has an independent consideration, but, on the contrary, arises from the seller’s duty to 
tender conforming goods. The reason that the seller should deal with the quality problems is 
that the quality of the subject matter fails to comply with the quality requirement of contract, 
and therefore the seller should be liable for failing to fulfill his duty to tender conforming 
goods. Hence, it is contradictory as, on one hand, it deprives the buyer of all remedies based on 
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nonconformity, while on the other hand, it entitles the buyer to require the seller to deal with 
quality problems within guarantee period for quality. I have argued that if the agreement did 
not include the consensus that the buyer should notify within the agreed inspection period, it 
would be unreasonable to require the buyer to do so, and this kind of inspection period should 
not bind the behavior of buyer’s notification, and therefore no “double interference” exists. If 
the inspection period has indeed considered the time for giving notice, then the “double 
interference” problem cannot be denied; in such a situation, pursuing various interpretative 
methods should be the only possible way to eliminate one of the “double interference”. 
6.6 Conclusion of this chapter 
Under German Law, U.S. Law and the CISG, the period for inspection of goods and the 
period for notification of nonconformity are clearly distinguished. The time requirement for 
inspection are “promptness” or “with a reasonable opportunity”, while the one for notification 
are “promptness” or “within a reasonable time”. Contractual period of guarantee under the 
CISG is applied to replace the time limit of two-years for notification. Under the CCL, 
however, the inspection period merges with the notification period, and as a contractual period, 
has the same function as the time limit for giving notice. Therefore, the inspection period 
provided in the CCL is very harsh on the buyer. Teleological reduction should be applied to the 
inspection period provided in CCL Article 158(1), so that it can be differentiated from the one 
in Article 157.  
As to the guarantee period for quality, this kind of period in China has different types and 
normally can only interfere with, but not equal the time limit for giving notice. When dealing 
with the “double interference” with the time limit problem, we must interpret the contract in 
light of various interpretative methods, to exclude one of the “double interference”. The JILSC 
entitles the court to intervene in the agreement of inspection period, but the solutions it 
provided still have some disadvantages due to the lack of recognition of the necessity to divide 
the inspection period and the notification period. 
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Chapter 7  The Road to a “Reasonable Period” for Notification 
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable period for notification of 
nonconformity has always been a difficult problem, in the absence of an agreed inspection 
period.
①
 Some courts believe that the reasonable notification period should end at the time 
when the buyer begins to use the subject matter,
②
 or takes the delivery of them;
③
 some courts 
directly adopt the time limit of two years provided by the law;
④
 some others again have 
determined the reasonable period on a case-to-case basis, often concluding on a few months’ 
time.
⑤
 It can be said that the judicial decisions are greatly divided in this respect. There have 
been some studies that have reviewed the experiences of foreign legal systems in the 
application of similar rules.
⑥
 However, there is still a lack of thorough studies on the proper 
method for determining a reasonable period for notification.
⑦
 In 2012, the Supreme People’s 
Court has issued an Judicial Interpretation on the Law of Sales Contract (hereafter JILSC) and 
listed many factors for the courts to refer to when determining a reasonable period for 
notification. Unfortunately, the justifications for the notice rule are still unexplored, and the 
content of these listed factors should also be clarified.  
Finding suitable criteria for determining a reasonable period has also been a difficult 
problem in international law. Jurists and judges from European countries and the United States 
                                                             
① CCL Article 158(2) provides that: “Where no inspection period is agreed, the buyer shall notify the seller within a 
reasonable period since the buyer discovered or should have discovered the quantity or quality nonconformity. If the buyer 
fails to notify within a reasonable period or fails to notify within 2 years since he received the subject matter, the quantity or 
quality of the subject matter is deemed to conform to the contract, except that if there is a guarantee period for quality in 
respect of the subject matter, the guarantee period applies and prevails over such two year period.” 
② For example, the intermediate court of Kunming city found that, in KunMinSan Zhongzi No. 371(2007) decision, the 
original quality problem in house should be complained of before the buyer moved into it. All cases and judicial decisions in 
this dissertation are found in the database of Beida Fabao, see http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/index.asp.. 
③ As to apparent quality problems, some courts tend to consider that these problems should be raised at the time of taking 
delivery. For example, in Sui Zhongfa Miner Zhongzi No. 876 (2005) decision, the court denied the plaintiff’s demand on the 
ground that he failed to complain about the lack of maple leaf pattern on the surface of printed box at the time of taking 
delivery. 
④ For example, in WuZhong Minyi Zhongzi No. 974 (2010) decision, the intermediate court of Urumqi city considered two 
years as reasonable for the buyer to give notice, on the ground that such a period was “sufficient” for the buyer to inspect. 
⑤ For example, in Erzhong Min Zhongzi No.12821 (2009) decision, the second intermediate court of Beijing city found that 
three months should be the reasonable period for giving notice of nonconformity in rolling machines. 
⑥ See, e.g., L. H. Chen & Q. Li, On the Application and Interpretation of Article 39 (1) of the CISG in Germany, Journal of 
Suzhou University, 2011 (5); J. G. Wang, Study on the Notice of Nonconformity Goods under the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference and Its References to China, 2011(5). In the first literature, many German decisions have been examined, however, 
since those decisions were basically made before 1998, the development of the “noble month” approach in the past decade has 
been largely overlooked. 
⑦ As to the need for solutions for such a problem, see Y. Q. Sun (2011). 
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have struggled for many years to find an appropriate approach for determining such a 
reasonable time for notification. As a result, there have been diverging national applications of 
the article of the U.N.’s CISG that provides a reasonable notification period (CISG Art. 39). In 
German-speaking countries, a so-called “noble month” (Grosszügiger Monat) has been used as 
a rough average period in the past few years for determining a reasonable period, while the U.S. 
lawyers have been pursuing the policy rationales to protect the seller from being prejudiced by 
the failure of notification of breach when applying UCC §2-607(3)(a) and CISG Article 39. 
The former approach has an advantage of a certain uniformity and predictability in the 
application of law, but it has been criticized for being too “rigid”, while the latter may be more 
appropriate to fit requirements of individual case, at the expense of uniformity. Since the 
drafting of the rule on determining a reasonable period in the CCL was inspired from similar 
rules in foreign legal systems, especially from CISG Article 39,
①
 it is helpful to introduce 
those experiences for improving the related interpretative theory in China.
②
 
7.1 The rise of the “noble month” approach 
The “noble month” approach consists in using one month as a rough average period for 
giving notice when applying CISG Article 39, which can be extended or shortened in light of 
specific circumstances in individual case. This approach developed from Germany’s judicial 
practice, and therefore has close relationship with the notice rule and its application in 
Germany. In the following subsections, I would like to briefly introduce the notice rule in 
German law and its influences on international conventions, and then describe the rise of 
“noble month” approach when applying CISG Article 39. 
                                                             
① CISG Article 39 provides: “(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give 
notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought 
to have discovered it. (2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give 
the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over 
to the buyer, unless this time limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.” All texts of the CISG referred to in 
this dissertation are taken from the official website of UNCITRAL, see 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf. 
② This is not only inspirable for the application of CCL Article 158, but also useful for the application of CISG Article 39 in 
China. I found rare decisions applied CISG Article 39 had carefully examined related precedent decisions or made thorough 
analysis on determining a reasonable period. 
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7.1.1 The strict requirement under German law and its impact on international 
laws 
7.1.1.1 The strict requirement for giving notice under German law  
Article 377 of German Commercial Code (HGB) provides for the buyer’s duty to inspect 
the subject matter and to notify of defects. According to HGB Article 377(1), if the sale is 
bilateral mercantile, the buyer shall inspect the subject matter promptly (unverzüglich) in light 
of the practicability in the ordinary course of business and notify the seller promptly as soon as 
the defect appears (Boujong et al., 2001, p. 474). It can be observed that German commercial 
law establishes strict requirement for giving notice - Promptness, which, according to BGB 
Article 121, means without culpable delay (ohne schuldhaftes Zögern). To determine whether 
there is a culpable delay, both subjective and objective factors should be considered: the 
subjective one mainly refers to whether the behavior of the buyer complies with the 
requirement of a respectable businessman; the objective one refers to whether it is practicable 
in light of the ordinary business course (Boujong et al., 2001, p. 494). For a substantial period 
of time, the German courts have imposed strict standard on the time for giving notice of defects: 
in many occasions as short as three to five days. Some scholars advocate that the period for 
both inspection and notification should not be longer than 14 days altogether, and this opinion 
is known as “Magnus-doctrine”.① 
Article 377 of the HGB originated in Article 347 of the Common German Commercial 
Code of 1861 (ADHGB), the rule of which only applied in the case of transportation 
transactions, regardless of whether the buyer was businessman or not. The legislative purposes 
of ADHGB Article 347 included: (a) enabling the seller to adopt proper measures to collect 
evidence related to defects (ADHGB Art. 348 Abs. 2); (b) enabling the seller to confirm 
whether the alleged defects existed from the beginning or occurred in the process of 
transportation, as in the case of the latter it was the buyer who should bear the risk of loss 
(ADHGB Art. 345 Abs. 1); (c) in the case of agent or intermediate trade, protecting the seller 
by allowing him to demand damages against his own supplier; (d) enabling the seller to 
preserve and use the salvage of defective goods; and (e) protecting the seller from doubtful or 
                                                             
① Because it has been highly advocated by Professor Magunus (Andersen, 2012, p. 192). 
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repeated complaint about defects (Mangelrügen) when the price fluctuated and the buyer might 
try to escape from this bargain (Boujong et al., 2001, p. 477). Likewise, in light of the judicial 
decisions of the German Supreme Court (BGH), Article 377 in the present German 
Commercial Code (HGB) also aims at protecting the seller’s interests in confirming what time 
the defects occurred and being free from repeated complaint about defects, and promoting 
settlement and the stability of legal relationship (Boujong et al., 2001, pp. 477-478). According 
to recent literatures, the functions of this rule also include promoting the seller to tender 
subsequent conforming goods and to mitigate the loss (Boujong et al., 2001, pp. 477-478). 
As to the distinction between the notice rule established by Article 377 of the HGB and 
the special prescription provided in Article 438 of the BGB, it should be understood from the 
following aspects. Frist, the former only applies in the case of commercial transaction, while 
the latter applies to both civil and commercial cases. Second, the former has various functions 
(as mentioned in the preceding paragraph), while the latter is basically designed to promote the 
stability of legal relationship. Third, from the legal effect’s perspective, the notice rule has a 
harsh consequence called “fiction of approval” (Genehmigungsfiktion), which means the 
subject matter would be deemed to be approved by the buyer, and the buyer would lose all 
remedies for defects; in contrast, the special prescription only has a weak effect, which merely 
gives rise to a defense that the seller may or may not choose to raise.
①
 Hence, it can be 
concluded that the scopes of the application of these two systems do not coincide, and the 
functions and legal effects are significantly different. Although the special prescription has 
been reformed (even if not thoroughly) during the modernization of German obligation law,
②
 
the strict requirement on giving notice of defects continues to apply in German judicial 
practice.  
7.1.1.2 The impact of the German-style rule on the ULIS 
The notice rule in German law impacted the preparation of the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods (ULIS)
③
 in the 1950s and 1960s. As Professor Schwenzer (2007) 
                                                             
①
 Even if the buyer has fulfilled his duty to inspect and to notify of the defects, the special prescription still applies. 
② Medicus (2007) argues that it is the general prescription that should be applied in the case of defects in thing, however, the 
modernization was not thorough and consequently it is still a rather short prescription that applies to the remedies for defects (p. 
51). See also Zimmermann (2005, pp. 133-135). 
③ The ULIS and ULF (Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) were both finalized in 
in 1964 and came into force in 1972, and both were the main references of the CISG (Honnold, 1999, pp. 4-10). 
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has pointed out, ULIS Articles 38 and 39 were heavily influenced by those legal systems 
whose domestic sales laws “stipulated rather rigid notice requirements, especially German law” 
(p. 107). Consequently, Article 39 of the ULIS also required the buyer to “promptly” notify the 
seller of lack of conformity of the goods after he discovered or should have discovered it 
(Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, 2005, p. 460). As to the meaning of the term “promptness”, it was 
defined as “within as short a period as possible in the circumstances” under ULIS Article 11. 
This requirement is rather close to “without culpable delay” in German law (see the first 
paragraph of §7.1.1.1). 
However, the ULIS was not widely accepted, but was implemented by only a few states, 
among which there were “very strict notice requirements under their domestic sales laws, such 
as Germany and Italy” (Schwenzer, 2007, pp. 107-108). Moreover, Cases applying rules of the 
ULIS were also primarily concerned with sales contracts of parties having their places of 
business in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 108). Accordingly, the 
notice rule under the ULIS was often interpreted “in very much the same way as their domestic 
counterparts” and “promptness” often meant a period not longer than three to five working 
days (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 108). 
7.1.1.3 The adjustment of the time requirement for notification under the CISG 
The ULIS was mainly drafted by European scholars and reflected the legal culture of the 
Western Europe.
①
 In 1966 the United Nations decided to establish an organization with 
worldwide participation and sponsorship to promote “the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade”, and that the result was the UNCITRAL (Honnold 
& Flechtner, 2009, p. 6). Based on the ULIS and ULF, this organization finished the draft of 
the CISG, which was finalized in 1980 by representatives of 62 states and 8 international 
organizations (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, pp. 5-10). The CISG came into force in 1988, and 
has been approved or succeeded by 80 states until April 2014.
②
 
During the drafting of the CISG, the German-style notice rule had become not so popular. 
On the one hand, some legal systems do not adopt similar notice rule, for example, English law 
                                                             
① Among 28 countries that participated in the Hague conference, 19 belong to the Western European (Honnold & Flechtner, 
2009, p. 9). 
② See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/zh/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. 
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only requires the buyer to give notice if he wishes to avoid the contract, on the other hand, even 
in those legal systems with established rules concerning period for inspection and notification, 
the time of such periods are quite different, for example, in the UCC and Dutch law it is 
required that notice should be given within a reasonable period (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 105). 
Only a few states provide that the notice must be given within a specific period, such as 8 days 
in Italian law.
①
 Moreover, the drafted notice rule was opposed by many developing countries. 
Representatives from these countries argued that a strict notice requirement and the harsh 
consequence -losing of all remedies- were unacceptable, because their countries had to import 
“most manufactured and complex goods” and the nonconformities might become apparent 
“only long after delivery to unsophisticated buyers.” (Brussel, 1993, pp. 63-65) These 
representatives were also concerned that “their developing infrastructures would dramatically 
delay their ability to respond” and therefore be seriously punished (Ryan, 1995, pp. 110-111). 
After a long debate, the strict requirement on the inspection and notification were decided 
to be abandoned (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 108), the time requirement for giving notice changed 
from “promptness” to “within a reasonable time” and an exception of this rule was added in 
Article 40 -the requirement for giving notice would not apply in the case that the seller was 
aware of or should have been aware of the defect, but did not disclose it. Moreover, Article 44, 
a new article that was unknown to any other legal system was introduced. According to this 
article, the buyer who failed to give timely notice may still reduce the price or claim damages, 
except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to conform to the 
requirements of CISG Article 39 (Ryan, 1995, pp. 111-112).
②
 Professor Schwenzer (2007) 
argues that Articles 38 and 39, observed together with CISG Article 44, “may be fairly 
characterized as being closer to those legal systems that provide for a duty to give notice within 
a reasonable time in their domestic laws” rather than “to those that do not stipulate any notice 
requirement at all, or to those with very strict notice periods.” (p. 109) 
                                                             
① According to Article 1495 (1) of Italian Civil Code, the buyer shall notify the seller of defects within 8 days after he 
discovered defects, otherwise all warranty rights are excluded (G. Z. Chen, 2010, p. 270; A. L. Fei et al., 2004, pp. 361-362). 
② However, someone examined decisions made before 2006, which had been translated into English, and pointed out that in a 
few decisions which applied CISG Article 44, rare undeveloped countries had been successfully protected by pursuing this rule 
(Birch Ⅲ, 2006, pp. 4-15). 
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7.1.2 The development of the “noble month” approach in the application of the 
CISG 
Accompanying the adjustment of time requirement for notification in the CISG, German 
courts have gradually become more generous when deciding a reasonable period for the buyer 
to give notice. Compared with the previous standards, such as two weeks or even several days, 
a new “starting point” has generated and begins to earn international influence. 
The German Supreme Court (BGH) referred to the one-month period in the well-known 
mussels-case in 1995. In this case, the buyer gave notice six weeks after the nonconformity of 
the goods should have been discovered. This was considered to be too late, while the BGH 
reasoned that the generous average of one month was acceptable.
①
 In 1999, the BGH 
explicitly ruled in favor of a four-week period starting at the time the buyer knew or ought to 
have known the nonconformity of the goods. The facts of the case were as follows: On April 
7
th
, 1993, the buyer purchased a grinding device and attached it to a paper-making machine; the 
devise was then able to operate on April 17
th
. On April 25
th
, the grinding device broke down 
and on the next day it suffered a total failure. At first, the buyer did not take action in regard to 
the device itself. However, on May 17
th
, the buyer received complaint about rust in the paper 
which was produced during the time the device had been in use. Ten days later (May 27
th
), the 
buyer commissioned an expert to determine the cause of the rust and on June 11
th
, he received 
a report from the expert that concluded the rust was due to the grinding device. Three days later 
(June 14
th
), the buyer notified the seller of the nonconformity.
②
 Compared with the rigid notice 
requirements at the beginning of the 1990s, the standpoint of the court became more generous. 
The BGH held that the notice was given in due time, although more than two months had 
passed after the delivery. The BGH found that at the time of the failure of the device the buyer 
ought to have been aware of the latent defect. At that time, the period for examination under 
CISG Article 38 started to run. The court calculated the amount of time available for 
examination by assuming that the buyer should have had one week to decide whether to select 
and commission an expert; two weeks for the expert to prepare his report were deemed 
adequate. Thus, the BGH arrived at a three-week period for examination. At this point, the 
                                                             
① See http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html#ctoc; see also Schwenzer (2007, p. 112). 
② See http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991103g1.html. 
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period for giving notice under CISG Article 39 started to run. As the court assumed a 
four-week period for giving notice, which was added to the three weeks for examination, the 
buyer’s notice was still before the expiration of the total seven-week examination and 
notification period. By actually giving notice three days after getting the report concerning the 
cause of nonconformity, the buyer was still able to compensate for the delay in examination.
①
 
In this case, the court described the four-week period for giving notice as “regelmässig,” which 
means “regular” or “normal.” (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 113; Boujong et al., 2001, p. 494) Professor 
Peter Schlechtriem (1999) has commented this case, saying that this decision was a welcome 
development “at least in the case of complex and complicated goods, compared with the 
original German decisions”. 
This kind of ruling quickly drew attention. the Swiss Supreme Court then followed by 
expressly upholding a finding of the Court in Luzern State which allowed the buyer one week 
for examination followed by one month to give notice in the case of a defective second-hand 
textile cleaning machine (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 114). At the Conference of “25 Years United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)”, which was held 
in March 2005, the reporter on CISG Article 39 concluded that the analysis of case law 
regarding the notice period showed “a cautious convergence in the direction of the ‘noble 
month’.”(Girsberger, 2005, p. 247) Meanwhile, the concept of “noble month” was introduced 
to English academic circle in 1997 (Andersen, 2012, p. 185). It needs to be noted that one 
noble month is rather generous in German-speaking countries, given earlier decisions made in 
this area normally granted no more than two weeks for the buyer to give notice; this rule of 
thumb reflects the endeavor these legal authorities made to adapt the unified application of the 
CISG notice rule. However, whether around one month is reasonable should still be answered 
in light of the specific circumstances in individual case.  
In academic circle, the standard of one “noble month” is advocated by Professor 
Schwenzer, who is also a member of the CISG Advisory Council
②
 and an influential CISG 
specialist in German-speaking countries. She said that the “noble month” approach was still 
                                                             
① See http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991103g1.html; see also Schwenzer (2007, pp. 112-113). 
② The CISG Advisory Council is an unofficial organization founded by scholars in 2001. The founding fathers include some 
famous specialists in the area of contract law and comparative law, such as Professor E. Allan Farnsworth and Professor Peter 
Schlechtriem. The members of it come from different countries, including the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, China, and the 
U.S.. The opinions released by it have been referred to in some U.S. decisions. Someone even suggested that the CISG 
Advisory Council had “come of age”. (Karton & Germiny, 2009. p. 448). 
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opposed by both those who advocated stricter standard and those who demanded more flexible 
requirement, but it “might become acceptable in the long run” (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 123). 
Andersen (2012) studied in 2012 the cases from Germany concerning the application of CISG 
Article 39 and discovered that although the BGH had not always explicitly used one “noble 
month” as a standard, the decisions of the BGH was not inconsistent with it, and the lower 
courts seemed more willing to use one “noble month” as a “benchmark”; more importantly, 
since 2005 there had been no reported instances of very short original “Germanic-style 
timeframes” in operation under CISG Article 39 (p. 196). Girsberger (2005) even argues that 
the “noble month” theory may have had a good start in Germany and Switzerland and have 
influenced many courts outside these jurisdictions; although there are strong oppositions, this 
standard may “serve as a starting or vantage point, upon which certain groups of situations 
should be distinguished, would increase legal security” (p. 247). All in all, the “noble month” 
approach has become an influential standard in German-speaking countries and even 
influenced jurisdictions outside this area. It is worthy to pay attention to this approach when 
constructing an interpretative theory on the determination of a reasonable period in China. 
7.2 The development of the policy rationales concerning “prejudice” 
The approach of policy rationales concerning “prejudice” means the justifications of the 
notice rule should be policies aiming to protect the seller from suffering prejudice arising from 
the buyer’s failure to give proper notice; meanwhile, determining a reasonable period for 
giving notice should also be guided by these policy rationales. This approach originally 
developed from the U.S. judicial practice and was then argued to be applicable when 
addressing the determination of a reasonable period under CISG Article 39. In this section I 
would like to first introduce the development of the notice rule in U.S. law and then explore the 
proposed policy rationales behind it. 
7.2.1 The present U.S. notice rule and its policy rationales 
7.2.1.1 The present notice rule and its predecessor in U.S. law 
The notice rule applied in the majority of the U.S. is stipulated in UCC §2-607(3)(a), 
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which states that if a tender has been accepted, “the buyer must notify the seller of breach 
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach, or be barred 
from any remedy” (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2204). This rule was inherited from Section 49 
of the Uniform Sales Act (hereafter USA), which was drafted by Professor Samuel Williston in 
1906. The latter was introduced to address the issue of the effect of acceptance of goods. USA 
§49 states that:  
“In the absence of expressed or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods 
by the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy 
for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract. However, if after acceptance of the 
goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of any breach within a reasonable time 
after he knows or ought to know, the seller will not be liable anymore.” (Williston, 1909, 
§484)  
Jerry Phillips (1972) argues that neither the notice rule in the UCC nor the one in the USA 
belong to the general requirement of the Common Law, and that there was no comparable rule 
in the U.K.’s Sale of Goods Act of 1893 (pp. 461-462). Professor Williston (1909) mentioned 
that the latter part of USA §49 had imposed on the buyer’s rights a “qualification”, “which is 
justified by business practice and by some decisions, as well as by the law on the Continent of 
Europe” (pp. 846-847). John Reitz (1988) has further pointed out that, when drafting USA §49, 
Professor Williston “in part [drew] his inspiration” from Article 377 of the German 
Commercial Code (HGB) (pp. 534-536). 
Compared with HGB Article 377, the notice rule in the USA (as well as the UCC 
afterward) had significant differences, the most important one of which was the time 
requirement for giving notice became “within a reasonable time”, instead of “promptness”. The 
official comment of UCC §2-607 in particular emphasizes the connection of the notice rule 
with good faith in commercial practice and states that the purpose of this rule is not to preclude 
remedies of a retail consumer who is in good faith, but to defeat bad faith in commercial 
transactions (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2205). 
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7.2.1.2 The early rationale for the notice rule: addressing the effect of acceptance 
When Professor Williston introduced the rule of notification of breach, he connected it 
with another system -acceptance of goods. He analyzed that, under U.S. law, there were great 
disputes related to the buyer’s right to demand damages after he accepted a nonconforming 
tender. The problem was: “if one party who has a right to rescind the contract and nevertheless 
allows the party in default to continue with the contract and accepts the defective performance”, 
did that mean the performance had been “received as full satisfaction of all obligations?” 
(Williston, 1909, p. 847) Professor Williston (1909) tended to give a negative answer, arguing: 
“when insufficient performance is received by the buyer he should not be debarred from 
recovering damages because of the insufficiency, unless he has agreed to accept what has been 
offered him as full satisfaction of all his rights”, and the mere fact that he had taken the goods 
should not indicate such assent (p. 847). However, at that time, views towards this issue were 
greatly divided. Although many decisions were close to the standpoint of Professor Williston’s, 
some jurisdictions turned to the opposite side: For example, in New York, it had been held that 
“taking title to the goods indicated an assent to accept the goods in full satisfaction of the 
seller’s obligations as to the quality of the goods” and this doctrine had been followed by some 
other jurisdictions (Williston, 1909, pp. 851-853). Under these circumstances, what did it mean 
if the buyer held the goods without any objection for a considerable period of time? Professor 
Williston (1909) argued that this kind of behavior might guarantee such presumption: “the 
goods are exactly what the contract requires or the buyer is satisfied with them despite the 
nonconformity to the contract.” (p. 852) Indeed, in many decisions the importance of giving 
timely notice had been emphasized at that time. As the Supreme Court of Maine stated, the fact 
of acceptance, as a matter of evidence, might “have great weight on the question of satisfactory 
or sufficient performance”, first, it might “raise considerable presumption that the article 
delivered actually corresponded with the agreement”, and then it might be some evidence of 
wavier of any defect despite the tender did not “so correspond” (Williston, 1909, p. 852). 
Furthermore, this court argued, if the goods had been accepted without objection within a 
reasonable time after the delivery, the evidence of waiver might be considered “conclusive” in 
the absence of proper explanation (Williston, 1909, p. 852). 
It can be observed that, in early 20
th
 century, there was great divergence in U.S. law with 
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regards to the legal effects of acceptance of goods: Some believed acceptance of goods itself 
might indicate that the buyer had approved the quality condition of the tender and that 
consequently, the buyer might not demand damages based on quality problems; the opposite 
standpoint was that receiving the goods might not indicate such kind of approval, and that the 
buyer’s remedies for defect would not be precluded unless there were agreement to the contrary. 
During the lasting debate between these two views, the focus had been moved to how to 
determine whether the buyer had agreed to accept the tender as sufficient performance. Under 
these circumstances, whether the buyer had complained about quality problems became a 
considerably important factor. Professor Williston, on the one hand, tended to agree that the 
mere fact of receiving the goods did not mean the buyer had accepted the goods as full 
performance, while on the other hand, argued that if the buyer did not notify the seller of the 
defect within a reasonable time, then it would constitute a strong evidence of wavier of any 
defects. This standpoint of compromise tells us that Professor Williston, as well as the early 
U.S. sales law, did not draw a clear distinction between “taking physical delivery” and 
“acceptance” of goods; consequently, the approach of presuming “acceptance of goods” to be 
accepting goods as full performance was not totally abandoned, but merely adjusted, by 
postponing the harsh consequence of it to after the lapse of a reasonable period of time.  
In the second edition of Williston’s Treaties on Sales Law, Professor Williston clearly 
stated his intent to introduce the notice rule to strike a balance between contracting parties. He 
believed that it was necessary to establish a system that might enhance the certainty of 
application and avoid possible hardships in front of contracting parties: “the hardship on the 
buyer of holding that acceptance of the title necessarily deprives him of the seller’s 
obligations”, and “the hardship on the seller of allowing a buyer at any time within the period 
of the Statute of Limitations to assert that the goods are or were defective though no objection 
was made when they were received” (Williston, 1924, p. 1259). Given these considerations, a 
rule related to notification of breach has been added into the law, to use as important evidence 
to decide whether the goods are in full satisfaction. However, this device has been made “an 
absolute condition” and only if the buyer followed the requirement of it, might his rights be 
preserved (Williston, 1924, p. 1259). Professor Williston has demonstrated reasonableness on 
his design, but he might not expect a lasting debate over this device in the next few decades 
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(Reitz, 1988, p. 534). 
The second Article of the UCC was adopted in the majority of the U.S. in the 1950s and 
1960s and has achieved accomplishment that has not been made by the Uniform Sales Act 
(White & Summers, 1988, pp. 3-5). Nevertheless, under the UCC the notice rule is basically 
preserved with little change and the effects of acceptance are still “strong”: it may justify the 
seller’s right to require payment and indicate the goods are in conformity with the contract or 
the buyer will retain the goods despite the nonconformity (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2203). 
Therefore, the reasons that Professor Williston raised to support the notice rule does not 
disappear. Some scholars still believe that the necessity of the notice rule under the UCC still 
lies in the strong effects of the acceptance of goods (Squillante & Fonseca, 1974, pp. 300-301). 
7.2.2 The rise of policy rationales concerning “prejudice” and the amendment of 
UCC Article 2  
An interesting thing was, when making supplement to Williston on Sales in 1995, 
Professor John Fonseca (1995) added one thesis entitled “UCC §2-607(3)(a): Reasonable 
Notice of Breach as a Question of Law” and clearly changed the traditional standpoint of 
Professor Williston, who considered a reasonable period as a matter of fact (pp. 514-531).
①
 In 
this supplemented thesis, it has been argued that in successful litigation strategy the importance 
of policies behind the notice rule should not be neglected, and that those policies should 
include: (a) enabling the seller to investigate the alleged breach; (b) enabling the seller to 
finalize the sale of goods; (c) enabling the seller to cure the alleged breach; and (d) promoting 
dispute settlement through negotiations (Fonseca, 1995, pp. 514-515). Most of the policies 
were related to the purposes of protecting the seller’s various interests, and had significant 
weight in decision making (Fonseca, 1995, pp. 515-531). 
Actually, since the 1970s, more and more U.S. scholars have learned to address the notice 
rule from policy guidance’s perspective (Hammond, 1985, p. 525; Henning & Lawrence, 2009, 
p. 573).
②
 The policies summarized by Professors White and Summers are widely referred to in 
the academic circle, as well as in judicial practices (e.g., Faegre & Benson, 1995, p. 514; Reitz, 
                                                             
① As to Williston’s view, see Williston (1948, pp. 39-40). 
② The U.S. courts had already insisted on such an approach. For example, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth federal circuit courts of 
appeal held that a determination of whether notice was reasonably made under UCC §2-607(3) should be guided by the 
policies behind this provision (Rapp, 2004, pp. 401-402). 
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1988, pp. 582-583). At first, they concluded three policies: the first and the most important one 
is to enable the seller to adjust, replace, and take other measures to remedy the breach and 
therefore to mitigate the loss and his liability, the second one is to provide an opportunity to 
enable the seller to arm himself to negotiate and to prepare for the litigation, the last and not so 
important reason is to give the seller some “mind balm” that can be obtained from the Statute 
of Limitations (White & Summers, 1988, pp. 480-481). However, the last rationale has caused 
serious criticism, as most scholars believe that the notice rule need not play a role similar with 
limitations on action; in addition, Professors White and Summers seemed to have overlooked 
the value of good faith (Reitz, 1988, pp. 540-542). In a later literature of these two scholars, a 
new policy has been added to meet the requirement in transactions - cutting off the “doubtful 
tardy claim” from the buyer (White & Summers, 2009, p. 656). 
The U.S. scholars began to note that the foundation of Williston’s reason for introducing 
the device of notice was connected to a questionable “presumption”, namely, once the buyer 
retained the goods for a certain period without complaint, it could be presumed that the goods 
were conforming to the contract or the buyer intended to accept the goods actually tendered 
instead of conforming one. This presumption is not convincing in many cases, especially in 
those the buyer had not paid the entire price; as to the buyer who has not yet discovered the 
breach, this presumption is particularly “implausible” (Reitz, 1988, p. 540). Even though the 
acceptance of goods has been given a strong effect, the protection on the seller’s interests 
through the notice rule should have reasonable grounds: the seller should at least show that it is 
possible for him to suffer prejudice due to the buyer’s delay in giving notice. Reitz (1988) 
carefully examined each type of “prejudice” and concluded that each type, such as enabling the 
seller to cure or to investigate and collect useful evidence, could not justify all sorts of cases in 
various circumstances; on the contrary, the notice rule should normally be justified by several 
policies together, and the scope of its application should not be as wide as the one of the 
limitation rules (pp. 547-548).  
In my view, when Professor Williston, in part inspiring from related rules in German 
Commercial Code and its legal practices, introduced the notice rule into the Uniform Sales Act, 
he was prepared to address a special issue under U.S. law: to reconcile different views towards 
the legal effects of acceptance of goods. This problem arises because U.S. law did not establish 
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explicit distinction between acceptance and taking delivery of goods. Professor Michael Bridge 
has demonstrated the difference between taking delivery and acceptance of goods in U.K. law. 
He argues that the SGA 1979 has basically drawn a distinction between them, and that although 
this distinction might not be “precisely delineated”, it undoubtedly exists in fact:  
“For example, the buyer may fail to take delivery of the goods for some time, but 
nevertheless subsequently accept the goods. Or he may accept the goods (in the sense of 
signifying his approval of them after examination), but subsequently fail to take delivery 
of them.” (Bridge et al., 2010, §9-003) 
Since in early U.S. law there was no such distinction between taking physical delivery and 
acceptance of goods, Professor Williston tried to introduce a device to deal with the divergence 
regarding the legal effects of acceptance. He, as mentioned above, on the one hand, did not 
deny the strong effect of acceptance of goods, while on the other hand postponed the 
occurrence of this effect to a time after a reasonable period elapses after delivery. Therefore, 
notification becomes a key factor for the buyer to demand remedies. The approach Professor 
Williston adopted is to make the notification within a reasonable time a necessary condition for 
the buyer’s remedy. Accordingly, the failure of notice will bar the buyer from all remedies 
based on nonconformity. However, as the Supreme Court of Maine has stated, either the fact of 
acceptance or the one of the buyer’s silence within a reasonable period might merely act as an 
“evidence” that has “great weight on the question of satisfactory or sufficient performance” 
(Williston, 1909, p. 852). In other words, these facts can only function in the process of the 
evaluation of evidences, to prevent the buyer from successfully proving the existence of breach, 
and the legal effects of the buyer’s failure to give notice should be no more than the one of 
disadvantageous evidence, but not “absolutely” bar the buyer from all remedies. Since 
Professor Williston adopted the latter approach, a problem arose: given the notice rule has a 
rather harsh consequence and may seriously punish the buyer, the justifications of it could no 
longer be based on what the acceptance of goods or the buyer’s silence within a considerable 
period can prove, but should on policy rationales that can support the absolute deprivation of 
all buyer’s remedy rights. After a long dispute over this strict notice rule, the U.S. courts had 
gradually clarified a few policies, and the standpoint to restrict the harsh consequences of the 
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notice rule has earned the support of the majority, leading to an amendment to UCC 
§2-607(3)(a). 
In 2003, the second Article of the UCC was amended and the new Section 2-607(3)(a) 
provides that, if a tender has been accepted, the buyer must give notice to the seller within a 
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach, however, the failure 
to give notice under the preceding requirement will only bar the remedies of the buyer to the 
extent that the seller has suffered prejudiced arising from the buyer’s failure (ALI & NCCUSL, 
2010, p. 151). This amendment has reflected the endeavor of the U.S. lawyers and scholars to 
strike a new balance between the buyer and the seller, by easing the consequences of the 
buyer’s failure to give notice (Miller, F., 2009, p. 143). Although how this new article can be 
adopted in the U.S. is still unclear,
①
 given the considerable influence and success of the UCC, 
it is safe to say that the policy rationales concerning prejudice will be more important in U.S. 
judicial practice. 
According to the amendment of the UCC, policy rationales concerning prejudice do not 
have a direct influence on the determination of the length of a reasonable period, but mainly 
influence the consequences of the buyer’s failure to give notice. However, since these 
rationales are indeed the justifications of the notice rule, it is also proper to refer to them when 
determining a reasonable time for giving notice. Under U.S. law, a period longer than four 
months is usually considered as unreasonable; in some cases even three weeks, fifty days, or 
two months cannot be considered as reasonable, either (Fonseca, 1995, pp. 501-531). As to the 
food, the period for giving notice is sometimes decided to be as short as possible: in the case 
A.C. Carpenter, Inc. v. Boyer Potato Chips, the buyer sent a letter to the seller complaining of 
the nonconformity eight days after he received the delivery, and the seller received the letter 
four days later, the hearing office held that the notice was not timely as “twelve days was too 
long for parties dealing in perishables” (White & Summers, 2009, p. 656).② However, as to 
cases involving consumers, more than four months can sometimes be considered as acceptable 
(White & Summers, 2009, p. 657). It is fair to say, the determination of a reasonable period 
                                                             
① For example, a report from Texas considers this amendment to UCC §2-607(3)(a) as “both substantial and questionable”, 
however, no thorough analysis was provided in this report (Henderson, 2009, pp. 256-257). As a matter of fact, the resistance 
met by the proposed Article 2 of the UCC is mainly because this proposal aims at enhancing the protection of consumers and 
reducing the one for the seller’s interests, and therefore cannot be easily stomached by many influential manufactures (Rusch, 
1999, pp. 1684-1685). 
② It needs to be mentioned that the buyer was also questionable on whether he was in good faith in this case.  
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should still in light of many factors, especially the nature of the subject matter and trade 
usages. 
7.2.3 The U.S. scholars’ standpoint as to the application of CISG Article 39  
CISG Article 39 requires the buyer to give notice “within a reasonable time”. This means, 
compared with the HGB, the time requirement for giving notice under the CISG is closer to the 
one under the UCC. The U.S. scholars argue against the presumed standard for determining a 
reasonable period, such as one “noble month”. Professor Harry Flechtner argues that this kind 
of suggestion (a presumed standard) aims at arriving at “an internationally-oriented 
compromise between those (mainly Germanic) authorities” that have short notice period 
requirement in domestic laws and those have more “forgiving domestic law traditions” 
(Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 372).
①
 However, to provide a “presumptive” period for CISG 
Article 39 “departs from the intention of drafters”, as they “could easily have included a 
presumptive period in Article 39(1)” and the process of negotiating the draft Convention would 
have been the “proper milieu for arriving at an internationally-acceptable compromise”; on the 
contrary, the drafters did not provide such a presumption, but chose a “radically flexible 
standard”, which varies with the facts in individual case (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 372). 
Professor Flechtner even said that to impose such a presumptive period on the application of 
CISG Article 39 would “invade the function of the Convention’s drafters and the sovereign 
prerogatives of the Contracting States.” (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 372) Professor 
Flechtner (2008) did some examination and pointed out that even the German Supreme Court 
did not persist in the “noble month” standard in the late decisions (pp. 16-17). He pointed out 
that in one case involved a stolen vehicle the German Supreme Court seemed to refuse the 
presumption of one month as a normal reasonable period by stating: “the circumstances of each 
individual case are decisive in measuring the time period, so that a schematic fixing of the time 
for the notice of defect is impossible.” (Flechtner, 2008, p. 17)   
Nevertheless, Professor Flechtner also proposes a test for determining whether the buyer’s 
notice is within the scope of “a reasonable time”. This test asks whether the seller suffered 
substantial prejudice from the buyer’s delay in giving notice. Such a test “sacrifices the 
                                                             
① This kind of endeavor has been widely appreciated (DiMatteo et al., 2004, pp. 430-431). 
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predictability of a presumptive period, but it appears more in keeping with the approach 
adopted by the Convention’s drafters” (Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 373). This approach is 
argued to: 
“[be able to] preserve the important function of Article 39 notice in the Convention’s 
architecture, while ensuring that the notice requirement does not exceed its proper role as a 
secondary or derivative obligation intended to advance rather than interfere with the 
Convention’s primary goals, which are to require the seller to deliver goods of the quality 
and in the manner required by the contract and to obligate the buyer to pay as agreed.” 
(Honnold & Flechtner, 2009, p. 373)  
It can be easily discovered that the test proposed by the U.S. scholars is based on the 
policy rationales concerning “prejudice” developed from the U.S. judicial practice. However, 
the policy rationales concerning “prejudice” in the new Article 2 of the UCC are to deal with to 
what extent remedies would be precluded by the buyer’s failure to give notice, in other words, 
to ease the harsh consequences of the notice rule, whereas the approach advocated by the U.S. 
scholars regarding to the application of CISG Article 39 is to use these policy rationales to 
determine a reasonable time for notification, namely, to ease the “rigidness” when deciding a 
reasonable period for giving notice. In the former case, if the seller did not actually suffer 
prejudice from the buyer’s failure to give notice, then the buyer will not be barred from all 
remedies, whereas in the latter case, if the seller did not suffer prejudice, the buyer may be 
granted a rather generous period for giving notice, but the buyer will still lose all remedies if he 
fails to give notice within a certain period. Hence, although the policy rationales approach has 
been introduced to guide the application of CISG Article 39, subject to the letter of provisions 
in this Convention, the plan adopted in the new Article 2 of the UCC cannot be completely 
transplanted to address the application of CISG Article 39, and the effect of this approach to 
strike a new balance between contracting parties has therefore been weakened. 
Since the approach of policy rationales concerning prejudice on the seller has a “soft” 
control on the result of determining a reasonable period for giving notice, it can be imagined 
that it will not bring much uniformity to the application of CISG Article 39. When the U.S. 
scholars tried to summarize the results of decisions made in the U.S. after 15 years application 
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of the CISG, they came to the conclusion that the opinions of the courts were not unified at all 
(DiMatteo et al., 2004, pp. 364-366). It needs to be mentioned that the judicial decisions 
addressing CISG Article 39 made by the U.S. courts did not occupy a significant amount: only 
around 50 cases from 1988 to 2006 were made, and most of them were not reported (AcQuillen, 
2007, p. 511).
①
 Among these cases some U.S. courts referred to the decisions made by foreign 
courts when applying Articles 38 and 39 of the CISG, and did not find for a generous result for 
the buyer (Schwenzer, 2007, p. 118). It is fair to say that although policy rationales regarding 
“prejudice” seems to be an attractive approach for applying the notice rule under the CISG, 
whether it can play a constructive role in judicial practice is still unclear. 
7.3 Guidance and starting scope when determining a reasonable period 
under the CCL 
The approach of “noble month” may contribute to the uniformity and predictability in the 
application of law, whereas the guidance of policy rationales aiming to protect the seller from 
being prejudiced may be more suitable to fit specific requirement in individual case. Regarding 
the application of the CISG, the approaches for helping decision making provided by German 
and U.S. law scholars have shown, as in many other cases, different legal wisdoms. 
When establishing a frame for determining a reasonable period, it is necessary to take into 
account both the predictability and flexibility of its legal application. I suggest that the 
guidance of policy rationales can be considered as the primary reference for determining a 
reasonable period, while a fixed scope or starting point can be used as a secondary reference.  
The reasons for establishing such a frame are as follows. First, the requirement for 
notification under U.S. law is closer to the one provided in the CCL – both require the notice to 
be given within a reasonable period instead of “promptly”, so it is more suitable to emphasize 
the experiences developed from the U.S. legal system, which has no tradition to impose a 
rather strict time limit on notification. Second, the approach of “noble month” merely reflects 
normal results in a few types of case, and this kind of results should vary in light of the nature 
                                                             
① This could certainly not match with the decisions made by the German courts. In around 2005, Professor Zimmermann 
(2005) pointed out that there had been approximately 1000 decision at that time around the world and over one quarter were 
made by the German courts (pp. 96-97). 
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of the subject matter, the nature of nonconformity, usage of transaction, and other specific 
circumstances. Third, many CISG specialists are rather skeptical of the “noble month” 
approach. The CISG Advisory Council (2004), in its second opinion, states that “no fixed 
period, whether 14 days, one month or otherwise, should be considered as reasonable in the 
abstract without taking into account the circumstances of the case.” This standpoint deserves 
attention. In practice, Chinese judges usually lack the initiative to interpret statutory rules in 
depth. If a fixed scope of notice were established, it is possible that the judges tend to strictly 
follow it and ignore the importance of policy rationales behind it, in which case unjust 
decisions would be unavoidable. Last but not least, as I discussed in subsection 7.1.1 of this 
chapter, the legislative purposes of the notice rule under German law were also connected with 
protecting the seller’s reasonable interests; therefore, policies concerning prejudice can reflect 
the common purposes and functions of the notice rule in different legal systems. All in all, the 
policy rationales regarding prejudice on the seller are suitable to be fundamental guidance and 
a relatively “fixed” scope could only be a secondary reference. 
7.3.1 Policy rationales regarding prejudice as fundamental guidance 
As I have introduced in the preceding subsections, there is more than one policy rationale 
to support the notice rule. These policies include: preserving opportunities for the seller to cure 
the breach and to mitigate damages, providing him opportunities to collect useful evidence, as 
well as generally enhancing the effectiveness of commercial transactions. Most of them aim at 
protecting the seller from being substantially prejudiced by the buyer’s failure to give notice.  
Specifically speaking, promoting the stability of legal relationship should not be the main 
purpose of the notice rule, because the general prescription has already had such a function. 
Since a rather short prescription –merely two years- has been provided in present Chinese 
law,
①
 it is in particular unnecessary to establish a system that may promote the stability more 
rapidly. Given the notice rule is normally connected with commercial practices, what could be 
considered is the policy of promoting the effectiveness of commercial transactions. The policy 
of preserving the seller’s opportunity to investigate and to collect useful evidence related to 
                                                             
① Professor Liang (2007) argues that the two-year prescription In China is too short, which is clearly an outcome under the 
influence of Soviet law. He argues that in the future, when codifying Chinese civil laws, the general prescription should be 
extended to no shorter than 5 years (p. 254). 
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alleged nonconformity is important. Although the rules on the burden of proof may to a large 
extent protect the seller’s interests in this respect, the seller may still be prejudiced because of 
losing of opportunities to collect helpful evidences that may serve his interests in preparing 
litigation. As to mitigating the loss arising from the nonconformity, it should be a less 
important policy, because even if the aggrieved party failed to control the expansion of loss, he 
should only be liable for the expanded loss, but not be barred from all remedies. 
It needs to be noted that the seller’s interests in cure deserves protection. As I have 
introduced in Chapter 4, after the modification of German obligation law, the seller’s 
supplementary performance has a priority (Vorrang) over other remedies (Looschelders, 2007, 
Rn. 82), which has been known as the seller’s right to provide a second tender (Recht des 
Verkäufer zur zweiten Andienung) (Brox & Walker, 2006, §4 Rn. 40). When defects occur, the 
foremost concern of contracting parties is “repair and replacement, but not termination nor 
price reduction”, and the seller’s supplementary performance can usually satisfy these interests, 
the reasonableness of it has thus been widely recognized (Brox & Walker, 2006, §4 Rn. 40). In 
U.S. law, the seller’s rights to cure are explicitly provided in UCC §2-508, to protect the 
seller’s interests in the bargain (ALI & NCCUSL, 2010, p. 2189). By contrast, there is neither a 
seller’s right to cure nor a seller’s priority to provide a second tender in Chinese Contract Law, 
nevertheless, from the perspective of striking a balance of interests between contracting parties 
and maintaining the coherency of the remedy system, it is necessary to protect the seller’s 
interests in cure. After all, only if the seller received a timely notice, is he able to provide 
effective supplementary performance, such as repair or replacement. Hence, one of the policy 
rationales behind the notice rule should be preserving the seller’s interests in cure the breach. 
To sum up, when determining a reasonable period, the most important polices should be 
protecting the seller to cure the breach, and enabling him to collect helpful evidence that may 
serve his interests in litigation. As to mitigating the loss, it could be connected with the policy 
of promoting cure. Furthermore, the effectiveness of commercial transactions could be another 
factor for consideration. Generally speaking, the higher the possibility of a prejudice for the 
seller, the stricter the determination of a reasonable period should be. 
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Diagram 7.1  
Negative Relationship between the strictness of determining a reasonable period and the 
possibility of a prejudice for the seller 
7.3.2 A generous starting scope as a secondary reference 
In German legal practice, given the requirement for giving notice under the CISG 
evidently differs from the one in German commercial law, judges have been more generous 
when deciding a reasonable period under the CISG, by extending the notice period from 
original two weeks or a few days to around one month. In U.S. law, as demonstrated above, a 
period shorter than four months is usually safe for the buyer to give notice, except in special 
circumstances. Because the legal effect of the failure to give notice is to deem the subject 
matter to be conforming with the contract under the CCL,
①
 it is agreeable to generally adopt a 
“generous” starting point, to protect the buyer from being seriously punished.  
In this dissertation, I suggest a generous starting scope for a reasonable notification period, 
the range of which is between one month and a few months. The court may shorten or extend 
the length of this period in light of specific circumstances in individual case. However, when 
the judges decide to shorten or extend such a period, the accompanying requirement is 
providing sufficient reasons based on various policy rationales. If the court decides to shorten 
the period to less than one month, especially to less than two weeks, it should explain that, in 
                                                             
① Although some scholars argue that the nature of a reasonable period is extinction period, the explicit expression of CCL 
Article 158 shows that this interpretation can hardly be accepted. As to the argument for extinction period, see Liang (1991), as 
well as Han (2011a); as to the argument for special prescription, see G. G. Li (1999, p. 734) as well as Y. Wang (2001, pp. 
109-117). 
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light of the nature of nonconformity or other related circumstances, why the period should be 
decided so strictly; likewise, if the court tries to extend the period for giving notice to more 
than a few months, such as to one year, it is also necessary to explain in detail why a notice 
given after such a long time is still acceptable. Given the existence of a fixed “starting scope”, 
when determining whether a period could be considered as reasonable, the judge will be more 
or less restricted, and any decision with an extremely short or long period will be questioned. 
7.3.3 Clarification of factors listed in the JILSC 
The JILSC has listed many factors for the judge to refer to. The first paragraph of JILSC 
Article 17 provides that when determining a “reasonable period” as prescribed in CCL Article 
158(2), the People’s court should take into account the following factors: 
“(a) the nature of transaction, the purpose of contract, the ways of dealing, and customary 
practice between the parties; (b) the category, quantity, and nature of the subject matter; (c) 
the circumstances regarding installation and use; (d) the nature of defects; (e) the duty of 
reasonable care to be assumed by the buyer; (f) the inspection methods and the degree of 
difficulty in inspection, and the specific circumstances at the location of the buyer or 
inspector and their own skills, and (g) the principle of good faith.”  
It should be admitted that these factors are helpful for guiding judges to decide whether a 
period for giving notice is reasonable. Nevertheless, since the JILSC simply listed as many 
factors as possible, some of them lack clarification and therefore cannot be properly understood 
and applied. 
First, factors related to the practicability of inspection are important, but these factors, 
such as inspection methods, the difficulty in inspecting the subject matter, and the skills of 
inspector should not be referred to when deciding the “length” of a reasonable period for 
giving notice, but should be connected with the “starting point” of a reasonable period. In other 
words, these factors should be considered when, and only when deciding when the buyer 
should have discovered the nonconformity in quality or quantity. As I argued in the preceding 
chapter, the inspection period and the notification period should in principle be divided and 
kept separate, and neither of them should be merged into the other. During the inspection 
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period, the buyer should do whatever he can to discover any nonconformity with the contract; 
when he discovered or should have discovered nonconformities due to preliminary inspection, 
a reasonable period for giving notice starts counting regardless of whether further inspection is 
necessary or actually goes on, otherwise, the notice period will be postponed to a rather late 
time.  
Second, the nature of transaction should not be applied in light of the distinction between 
commercial contract and civil contract. Since the purpose of the contract, usage of transaction, 
the nature of subject matter, and the nature of nonconformity have been listed as independent 
factors for consideration, the nature of transaction becomes redundant. According to the 
explanation of the Supreme People’s court, the nature of transaction mainly refers to whether 
the contract involves commercial contract or consumer contract, “in the case that consumers 
complain after using the product, it can still be basically considered as within a reasonable 
period, while if a businessman raises objection on the subject matter after using it, it should be 
regarded as exceeding a reasonable period in most cases.” (Xi, 2012, pp. 320-321) This kind of 
view is not agreeable. In the first place, as discussed in Section 6.5 of Chapter 6, the notice rule 
can seldom be applied to consumer sales, disregarding the consumer used the subject matter or 
not, the policy rationales of the notice rule could be promoting the effectiveness of commercial 
transactions, but not generally promoting the stability of legal relationship. Besides, in modern 
society, given it is often difficult for a consumer who discovers nonconformity to pursue 
remedies in respect of either the ability of proving it or the cost to litigate, the product suppliers 
have generally been required to guarantee the quality in a certain period, which may range 
from a few months to a few years. This kind of policy has to a large extent overridden the 
policies to protect the commercial seller from being prejudiced by a failure of giving notice 
normally due to a bad faith behavior. Hence, it is unnecessary to impose the duty to timely 
inspect the goods on the consumers, and the duty to notify the seller within a reasonable period 
is basically nullified by the widespread guarantee period for quality. Second, even in the case 
of commercial transactions, it is not reasonable to require the notification to be given before the 
subject matter is used. This is a serious misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, the law has 
never required the notice to be given before the use of the subject matter; on the contrary, in 
some cases it is practicable to discover the nonconformity only in the process of using. Thus, 
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this view has introduced an obligation with no ground under the CCL. 
7.4 Conclusion of this chapter 
To determine a reasonable period for notification of nonconformity of goods, 
German-speaking countries have in the past few years been using “noble month” as a rough 
average period, whereas U.S. law has been pursuing the guidance of policy rationales to protect 
the seller from being prejudiced by the buyer’s failure to notify a breach. The former has an 
advantage in the uniformity and predictability in the application of law, but it has been 
criticized for being too rigid; the latter may be more appropriate to fit requirement in individual 
case, but of course at the expense of uniformity. 
When establishing instructions for determining a reasonable period in Chinese law, it is 
necessary to take into account both the predictability and the flexibility of its legal application. 
The policy rationales regarding the seller’s prejudice are suitable as fundamental guidance, 
while a relatively “fixed” scope could be a secondary reference. As to the content of policy 
rationales, there should be more than one to support the “notice rule”. These policies include 
preserving opportunities for the seller to cure the breach, providing time to collect useful 
evidence, and mitigating damages caused by the breach, as well as generally enhancing the 
effectiveness of commercial transactions. Most of them aim at protecting the seller from being 
substantially prejudiced by the failure of giving notice. The JILSC has listed many factors for 
the courts to refer to when determining a reasonable period. However, their contents still need 
to be clarified. 
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Chapter 8  Conclusion 
In Chinese contract law, just like in many other contract laws in the world, there are two 
“reasonableness” issues that deserve further research. One concerns the reasonable exercise of 
the buyer’s remedy rights in case of quality or quantity problems in the subject matter; the 
other concerns the reasonable time limitation on these buyer’s remedies. I considered those 
issues from the perspectives of the balance of interests between the contracting parties and the 
inner coherency and consistency of the system.  
Before addressing these two issues, I had to overcome a theoretic obstacle in Chinese 
contract law, namely, the instability of certain fundamental instruments in the analysis of the 
relationship between a buyer and a seller. This instability, as we saw, stems from the 
divergence between the so-called “unitary” and “relative independence” theories, which 
disagree on whether the remedy regime for quality or quantity problems in tendered subject 
matter is a “single-track” or “double-track” regime. In the first part of this dissertation (Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3), I discussed these two theories and argued for a shift in fundamental 
instruments for the analysis of the remedy system. The conclusion of this part can be 
summarized as follows.  
First, in Chinese judicial practice, the concept of warranty liability for defects has been 
interpreted as an a priori obligation of warranty and an a posteriori liability for breach of that 
obligation. The divergence is due to the confusing juxtaposition of two different notions, 
“warranty” and “liability”. The joint concept of “warranty liability” is therefore nearly 
unusable and should be avoided altogether in the future.  
Second, the practice of maintaining a special remedy regime for latent defects besides the 
main remedy regime for breach of contract has been largely abandoned or is losing its charm in 
many civil law countries, where it first originated in. In China, it has become largely 
indefensible to argue that a “double-track” remedy system has survived in the CCL, as 
proponents of the relative independence theory persist to say. On the contrary, it is the unitary 
theory’s vision of a “single-track” remedy system that should serve as the basis for an optimal 
interpretation of the Chinese Contract Law (CCL). 
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Third, the concept of nonconformity with the contract is clearer and more suitable than 
that of defects for interpreting the CCL, as the latter concept has various meanings in China. 
Accordingly, the notion of a seller’s obligation to tender conforming subject matters is also 
more suitable than that of warranty for defects for determining contractual obligations under 
the CCL. The “warranty liability for defects” mentioned in China’s Supreme People’s Court’s 
Judicial Interpretation should be interpreted as a type of the seller’s obligation to tender 
conforming subject matters. 
The second part of this dissertation, which included Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, discussed 
the reasonable exercise of the buyer’s remedy rights. The conclusion of this part can be 
summarized as follows.  
First, future efforts in Chinese contract law should go towards the construction of a 
seller’s right to cure, to strike a balance between contracting parties and to maintain the 
coherency with the policies behind rules on termination of contract and those behind rules on 
notification of nonconformity. The right to cure should be understood in Chinese law as a right 
to suspend the buyer’s inconsistent claims provided certain conditions are fulfilled, such as 
seasonableness and absence of unreasonable expenses for the buyer.  
Second, under the CCL, given the buyer’s right to require supplementary performance has 
been established as the foremost remedy in the case of nonconformity in the subject matter, it is 
not suitable to introduce the buyer’s right to reject goods from Anglo-American law. Chinese 
law could, however, benefit from a deeper development of the buyer’s right to refuse to take 
delivery. The condition for the buyer to refuse subject matters with a nonconformity in quality 
should be similar to the one in the case of those with a nonconformity in quantity, i.e., the right 
to refuse should arise as soon as the buyer discovers nonconformity which will harm his or her 
interests and is suitable to be removed immediately.  
Third, an analysis of relevant case law disproves the prevailing view in Chinese 
scholarship according to which price reduction could be exercised – as a formation right – by a 
unilateral declaration of the buyer. Interpreting the right to price reduction as a formation right 
would lead to an imbalance in the interests of the parties, since there are no requirements in 
Chinese law to exhaust prior remedies or to give priority to a hypothetical seller’s right to cure. 
In contrast, it is preferable to interpret the right to price reduction in Chinese law as a right to 
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require price reduction from the seller, i.e. a right to require a modification of the contract. 
The third part of this dissertation (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) covered the standard of 
reasonableness for time limitations on the buyer’s notification of nonconformity. The 
conclusion can be summarized as follows.  
First, although the periods for the buyer to inspect the subject matter and notify 
nonconformities should be distinguished and kept separate, the CCL has merged the two, 
which is detrimental to the buyer. We also saw that the guarantee period for quality could not 
equal the time limit for giving notice, but should instead be interpreted as a factor that may 
interfere with the length of the time limit. As a result, there is a problem of “double 
interference” with time limit, which I proposed to solve by pursuing various methods of 
contract interpretation. 
Second, when determining a reasonable time for giving notice, we saw that it could be 
beneficial to borrow from the experiences of both the German-style “noble month” approach 
and the U.S.-style policy rationales concerning the prejudice on the seller, in order to take into 
account both the flexibility and predictability of the application of law. In China, the policy 
rationales behind the notice rule should be fundamental guidance, while a relatively “fixed” 
starting scope similar to the “noble month” could become a secondary reference. 
This dissertation endeavored to contribute to the academic debate in the following aspects. 
First, it aimed to demonstrate the ambiguity and confusion that arises in Chinese judicial 
practice from the structure of the “warranty liability for defects”. The dissertation also 
discussed the reasonableness of replacing the concept of warranty liability by that of a seller’s 
obligation to tender conforming subject matters, as a new analyzing instrument for constructing 
interpretive theory. 
Second, on the level of interpretative theory, this dissertation has clarified the 
characteristics of the right to reject nonconforming subject matters and the one to refuse to take 
physical delivery of them. It has also suggested a new interpretation of the buyer’s right to 
price reduction as a right to require contract modification. Further, the dissertation has also 
clarified the relationship among the inspection period, notification period, and guarantee period 
for quality, and proposed a framework for determining a reasonable period for giving notice, 
primarily guided by policy rationales and supplemented where necessary by a relatively 
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“fixed” time period. 
Third, on the level of lawmaking theory, this dissertation argued in favor of the 
introduction of a seller’s right to cure, constructed as a right to suspend the buyer’s inconsistent 
claims. It proposed that the elements of this right to cure should include: promptness, absence 
of unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer, absence of unreasonable uncertainty for 
reimbursement, and contradiction of the buyer’s inconsistent claims. 
The following issues have not been thoroughly discussed and deserve further analysis in 
the future: first, the theory on deciding the content of contractual obligation, which has close 
relationship with the theory of information disclosure, should be made further research. Second, 
in the case of nonconformity in subject matter for sales, the categories and calculation of 
damages is rather important and should be studied thoroughly. 
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